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SUMMARY 
 
This study explores the transformation in Thai collective memory 
projected by the state based on the images of Ayutthaya presented in educational 
material during the last five decades. As the story of the Ayutthayan kingdom 
occupies an important place in the grand narrative of Thai history and contributes 
greatly to the notion of Thai identity, most Thai citizens have often perceived its 
territory, material splendor, culture, and interaction with foreign countries as 
characterizing a predecessor of the current state. Due to its significant position, the 
image of Ayutthaya has long been a contested terrain where definitions produced 
by successive political regimes that prioritized different interests have collided. As 
the dynamism of a changing Thai national interest forces previously existing 
images of Ayutthaya to “lag” behind changing present-day realities, new image of 
Ayutthaya will be created to become part of the collective memory supporting a 
new Thai identity that is suitable to the current state’s interests.  
Throughout its existence, the Thai state, particularly through the 
educational infrastructure of school curricula, textbooks and museums, has 
promoted different images of Ayutthaya that suit its concerns at a given time. At 
least two dissimilar images of Ayutthaya-in terms of its polity, its major economic 
activities, and its orientation in the global arena–were promoted during the latter 
half of the twentieth century. By studying and comparing its representation in the 
curricula, lower-secondary school textbooks, and museum exhibits from the 1960s 
and the 1990s, we see the nationalistic and militarized image of Ayutthaya, an 
agrarian state with land-based economic activities, and a state comparable with the 
West. That image has been challenged and transformed into a new picture of a 
rather peaceful and cosmopolitan merchant empire with strong maritime relations 
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with the East. The numerous breakthroughs made by Thai and overseas scholars 
in their academic studies are not sufficient to explain such a phenomenal 
transformation; we should also consider the Thai state’s changing perceptions of 
its national interest as an equally important factor in dictating which images of 
Ayutthaya past will be made available in the state-directed educational system. By 
presenting the transformation in the Ayutthayan image that forms the core of Thai 
collective identity rooted in the perception of the past, the thesis demonstrates the 
importance of the ever-changing national interest that affects the construction, 
representation, and dissemination of knowledge about the past, a mechanism 
available for shaping a desirable identity among the nation’s citizens.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VI
 
Note on Abbreviations Use 
 
 
To keep the footnotes concise and complete, I employ several abbreviations for 
journals and organizations.  
 
AHSC  Ayutthaya Historical Studies Centers 
CR Crossroads: An interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies  
FAD  Krom Sinlapakon [Fine Arts Department] 
FSHP The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and 
Humanities Textbook Project 
DICD Krom Wichakan [Department of Instruction and Curriculum 
Development]      
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
JAS  Journal of Asian Studies 
JSAS  Journal of Southeast Asian Studies   
JSS  Journal of Siam Society 
JTU  Journal of Thammasat University 
KRSA  Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia 
MOE  Ministry of Education  
RTSS  Rattasatsan [Journal of Political Sciences] 
SAC  Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre 
SW  Sinlapa Wattanatham [Art & Culture] 
TAT  Tourism Authority of Thailand   
WAMS Warasan Aksornsat Mahawittayalai Silpakorn 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
Thai Collective Identity and the Image of Ayutthaya 
 
 
At the close of the Twentieth Century, interest in Thai history seemed to 
gain a new dynamism. This phenomenal resurgence materialized in films, books, 
seminars, and others. Instead of hoping for the promise of the new millennium, 
Thai society decided to take a closer look at their past. Promoted to boost the local 
cosmetics brand, an image of Phra Supankanlaya, King Naresuan’s sister, created 
a widespread craze. People rushed to purchase her portrait, inspired by the dream 
of the company owner. Later, even the academic stepped in to verify her 
existence.1 The popularity of historical films, i.e. Bangrachan and the royally 
sponsored Suriyothai, was enormous, along with television series and films. 
Numerous books on popular historical subjects and guidebooks for historical sites 
throughout Thailand also flooded the market.  
How could a society which has invested so much energy in pushing for 
progress and modernity suddenly turn its attention toward the fate of ancient 
monarchs and kingdoms? How could this explosion of interest in Thai history be 
understood?       
 
I. On Past and Its Narration 
To make sense of this phenomenon, I would like to bring up a brief but 
significant debate in early 2003 from Sinlapa Wattanatham magazine, currently 
the most active print-space of Thai history. On the one side, Suchit Wongthes a 
prolific writer, founder, and editor of the magazine proposed Prawatsat 
                                                 
1 Sunait Chutinataranond, Phrasupankanlaya chak tamnan sunah prawatsat (Bangkok: Mathichon, 
2001). 
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yadphinong [kinship history] between people across nationalities against the grain 
of the dominant nationalist school that he labeled as Lhalang-klangchat [backward 
and jingoistic]. Suchit urged historians to turn away from the history of war and 
conflict, and emphasize instead socio-cultural interaction across borders.2  
His idea received harsh criticism from prestigious historian Thongchai 
Winichakul, as “pretentious” plot. The new generation, Thongchai argued, should 
learn about conflict and exploitation but not “wrong” history which misrepresents 
the past and disseminates hatred towards Thailand’s neighbors. For Thongchai, 
war and conflict are parts of history that might not be pleasant but are necessary 
for people to learn from.3  
The Suchit-Thongchai debate clearly illustrated how predetermined 
objectives govern the production of history. Suchit’s argument reflect Thailand’s 
current international relations context: to achieve its national interest, one must 
emphasize positive relationships in the past to support current attempts to live in 
peace with its neighbors. In short, history must be written to suit contemporary 
political needs. On the other hand, Thongchai sees history as a lesson to be 
learned.  Ignoring the history of conflicts is a pretentious way of representing the 
past that creates a distorted image of the Thai as a “peaceful race”.4  
With differed objectives, the two authors are forced to employ different 
plots in their historical writing. It is clear that the historian must decide, 
consciously or unconsciously, on a suitable plot in weaving a series of 
unconnected information into a coherent narrative. As Hayden White has 
convincingly argued, historical writing is definitely not possible without this 
                                                 
2 Suchit Wongthes,“Prawatsat yadphinong tookthong lae deengamkwa prawatsat songkram”, SW 
24,5 (Mar 2003), pp. 10-11; Suchit Wongthes,“Yoklerk ruang lewlai aochaisai santiphap dauy 
prawatsat kruayad”, SW 24,6 (Apr 2003), pp. 10-12. 
3 Thongchai Winichakul,“Prawatsat Datcharit”, SW 24,7 (May 2003), pp. 10-11. 
4 Thongchai, “Prawatsat Dacharit”, pp. 10-11. 
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fictional mode of emplotment.5 As a recent creation which has to appear archaic, 
the nation demands history to guarantee its long and continuous existence as a 
unified entity; hence national history and the nation-state formation emerge 
simultaneously.6 A desirable national history needs to be constructed with a 
suitable plot and supporting information. To further national homogeneity, some 
memories have to be forgotten and some remembered.7 Since national history 
appears as a story widely believed to be factual, it has always been used as “hard 
evidence” to defend various claims of the nation.  
General claims on the plot of the past knowledge in constructing Thai 
identity have been made rather often.8 However, these studies do not look at the 
way Thai history was depicted in the sources whereby most Thai citizens learned 
it under the compulsory education. A contemporary influential debate that touched 
upon this issue originated from Thongchai’s provocative reflection on “royal-
nationalist history”. He declared that the master narrative of Thai history, 
emploted by Prince Damrong Rachanuphap during the early twentieth century and 
reinvented powerfully after the 1973 incident to suit the bourgeoisie’s needs, is 
that “the Thai nation was threatened by foreign enemies, capable kings rescued 
and preserved its independence, and the nation was finally safe and prosperous.” 
Thongchai believes that no Thai historians and educational institutions could 
                                                 
5 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination of Nineteenth Century Europe 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 7-11; David Lowenthal, The Past is a 
Foreign Country, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). p. xxvi. 
6 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago University Press: Chicago, 1995); Bernard Lewis. History: Remembered, Recovered, and 
Invented (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975); Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of 
Memory (London: University Press of New England, 1993), pp. 156-57.    
7 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 11. 
8 Craig Reynolds,“The Plots of Thai History”, in Pattern and Illusions: Thai History and Thought, 
ed. Gehan Wijeyewardene and E.C. Chapman. (Canberra: the Richard Davis Fund and Department 
of Anthropology, Australian National University; Singapore: ISEAS, 1992); Thongchai 
Winichakul, “Phramaha Thammaracha: Phurainai Prawatsatthai”, in Kanmuang nai prawatsat yuk 
Sukhothai-Ayutthaya Phranahathammaracha Kasatrathirat, Phiset Chiachanphong (Bangkok: 
Mathichon, 2003), pp. 146-83.  
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escape from this commanding plot. In his words, “over the last 20 years, no 
historical school has challenged this royal-nationalist history or the memory of the 
Bangkok royalty”.9 However, Saichon Sattayanurak has recently attacked 
Thongchai as anachronistic and sarcastic toward Thai academia. Saichin argues, 
Thongchai should not be target most Thai historical writings as such, since many 
historians have tried to move beyond traditional views, but he may have based his 
judgment on the historical textbooks.10  
My research will show that both claims are questionable. Thongchai 
underestimated the change and challenge posted by recent innovative studies, but 
Saichon’s focusing of Thongchai’s point on the textbooks also goes without proof. 
I will argue that the governing plot of historical textbooks and museum exhibits of 
the last 50 years has been transformed to accommodate changing state interests.  
 
II. History and the Chameleon Identity 
Apart from the fictional nature of history, the context surrounding the 
Suchit-Thongchai debate itself is also important here. The anti-Thai riot that took 
place in Phnom Penh in early 2003 was the immediate cause for Suchit’s 
emphasis on “kinship history”. Starting from a rumor that a Thai superstar had 
bluntly claimed Thai’s rights over Angkor Wat, the icon of Cambodian pride, this 
riot showed how the site of memory, the embodiment of a collective past so vital 
                                                 
9 Thongchai Winichakul,“Prawatsat baeb rachachatniyom: chakyuk ananikhom amphrang su 
rachachatniyommai rue latthi sadetpho khong kradumphithai patchuban”, SW 23,1 (November 
2001), pp. 57, 64.  
10 Saichon Sattayanurak,“Wipak sastrachan Dr.Thongchai Winichakul”, SW 25,9 (August 2004), p. 
146. 
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to the identity of a nation, can mobilize the people to sacrifice their lives in 
defending the nation.11       
More importantly, this debate took place in the aftermath of the 1997 
financial crisis, which ended decades of high economic growth and create huge 
debts for both public and private sectors. Making its impact felt beyond business 
circles. As the boom turned to bust, criticism of lokkapiwat [Globalization] 
became widespread and Thai society began to question the current economic 
development model. Parallel with this doubt is a trend of going back to learn 
about “authentic” cultures: Thai people have called for a better story to explain 
their past and sustain their identity. History is now needed to explain the sudden 
collapse, ensure their place in the global context, and help guide their path into the 
unpredictable future.12 Evidently, the financial crisis provoked an identity crisis 
that shook the notion of Thai identity to its core. The Thai sought refuge by 
revisiting their past, leading to a sudden demand for movies on historical events, 
cultural tourism, and the heritage industry depicted at the beginning of this 
chapter.  
Since the past is a major source in inventing, reinventing, and confirming 
one’s identity,13 it is predictable that a debate on the direction of history will erupt 
in the shadow of a crucial identity crisis, a rupture in the stream of historical 
continuity. I will describe this condition, whereby the existing version of the past 
ceases to function according to society’s needs, as “historical lag”. As this thesis 
                                                 
11 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire”, in History and Memory in 
African-American Culture, ed. Genevieve Faabre & Robert O’Meally (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994); Craig Reynolds, “Sanyalak haeng tuaton anusonsathan kan pratuang 
koranee prieptiep phama lae thai”, SW 23,10 (Aug 2002); Charnvit Kasetsiri,“Thailand-Cambodia: 
A Love-Hate Relationship”, KRSA 3 (March 2003). 
12 Craig Reynolds “Thai Identity in the Age of Globalization”, in National Identity and Its 
Defenders: Thailand Today, ed. Craig Reynolds (Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 2002), pp. 308-33; 
Pattana Kitiarsa (ed.). Manussayawittiya kap kansuksa prakotkan hoyhahadeet nai sangkhomthai 
ruamsamai (Bangkok: SAC, 2003), p. 33. 
13 Lowenthal, Past is a Foreign Country. 
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will show, “historical lag” can also result from rapid social change, concurrent 
with changes in the political, economical and international arena.   
The fall of Ayutthaya in 1767 was undisputedly the first major event that 
forced the Thai to redefine their knowledge of the past. As Ayutthaya had 
developed almost continuously for four centuries, the collapse of the royal capital 
was a catastrophe; their pride and confidence built during the years of stability and 
material splendor were seriously shattered. Therefore, after the establishment of a 
new capital at Thonburi/Bangkok, the elite started to invest in the production of a 
new foundational worldview and new identity to counter the traumatic memory.14 
Famous Ayutthayan literary works were recomposed, surviving historical records 
were edited, and foreign tales and knowledge were translated and adopted.15  
 The 1893 Paknam gunboat crisis released the second shockwave that 
forced the Thai to appraise their identity. The French battleship ready to bombard 
Bangkok’s Grand Palace has smashed away the elite’s confidence in their 
strength. After a century of stability and territorial expansion, the Bangkok 
Empire proved to be fragile and powerless in the face of Western military power. 
Here, a new plot of royal-nationalist history was created to cover the “territorial 
loss” in regaining a new confidence.16     
 The final shockwave before the 1997 crisis was attributed to the American 
era. At the climax of the Cold War that turned hot in Southeast Asia, the influx of 
American culture worried the Thai.17 The Sarit-Thanom-Praphas authoritarian 
                                                 
14 Nithi Aeusriwongsa, Prawatsat rattanakosin nai phraratcha phongsawadan Ayutthaya 
(Bangkok: Matichon, 2000 (3rd print)). 
15 Kannikar Satraproong, Rachathirat, Samkok lae Saihan kap lokkathat khong chon channam thai 
(Bangkok: FHSP, 1998), pp. 5-28. 
16 Thongchai, “Prawatsat baeb rachachatniyom”, pp. 58-61. 
17 Nithi Aeusriwongse, “200 pee khong kan suksa prawatsatthai lae thangkang-na”, in his 
Krungtaek prachaotak lae prawatsat niphonthai: Wadua prawatsat lae prawatsat niphon 
(Bangkok: Matichon, 1995), pp. 26-39. 
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regime worsened the situation by suppressing other mode of historical perception 
and imposing their monopolized narrative. Under such conditions, a search for a 
new direction of the past progressed underground. An illegal circuit to exchange 
documents helped disseminate ideas, often quite radical, which paved the way for 
the 14 October 1973 uprising.18 Interest in Thai history blossomed after the 
collapse of the military regime, leading to a new era in Thai historiography. The 
overthrow of the authoritarian government thus helped in opening up space and 
questioning the national past that functioned as a source of legitimacy for the 
ruling elite.19 Several approaches developed underground, particularly the Marxist 
school, were now raised to challenged the official narrative.20  
Though radicals were again banned or forced to disband after the 1976 
massacre, other strains of history with new overseas graduates added a degree of 
diversity to Thai historical studies.21 Several new spaces opened to accommodate 
such expansion.22 The semi-academic journal Sinlapa Wattanatham launched its 
inaugural issue in 1979 with the article “Sukhothai was not the first capital city” 
as starting point to challenge the state-imposed knowledge of the past.23  
Historiography also became a legitimate area of research attracting new 
scholarly attention.24 In 1979, the first thesis on Thai historical writing was 
                                                 
18 Prachak Kongkeerati. “Konchathung 14 Tula: khwamkluanwai tang kanmuang wattanatham 
khong naksuksa lae panyachon paitai robob padetkanthahan, phoso” 2506-2526 (MA. Thesis, 
Thammasat University, 2002).  
19 Thongchai Winichakul, “The Changing Landscape of the Past: New Histories in Thailand Since 
1973”, JSAS 26,1 (March 1995), pp. 99-120.    
20 Craig Reynolds & Hong Lysa, “The Marxist School”, JAS 18,1 (November 1983), pp. 77-104.  
21 Thongchai, “Changing landscape”; Patrick Jory. “Problems in Thai Historiography”, KRSA 3 
(March 2003). 
22 Hong Lysa. “Warasan Settasat Kanmuang”, in Thai Construction of Knowledge, ed. Andrew 
Turton & Manas Chittakasem  (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 1991). 
23 Hong Lysa,  “Twenty Years of Sinlapa Wattanatham: Cultural Politics in Thailand in the 1980s 
and 1990s”, JSAS 31,1 (Mar 2000), p. 27. 
24 Charnvit Kasetsiri & Suchart Sawatsri (ed). Pratyaprawatsat (Bangkok: FSHP, 1975) & 
Nakprawatsat kap prawatsatthai (Bangkok: Prapansan, 1976); Charnvit Kasetsiri, “Thai 
Historiography From Ancient Times to the Modern Period”, in Perceptions of the Past in 
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submitted at Chulalongkorn University, revealing values and factors that had 
affected the Thai mode of recording the past.25 As more historiographical works 
appeared, their focus diversified to cover regional traditions of past records, 
specific historical issues, and the socializing process of history through the 
educational system.        
 
III. Inscribing the Past 
 Education is one major activity that plays a crucial role in transmitting 
various practical skills and cultivating desirable citizens by teaching them norms 
and values. For a long time, this transmission of cultural grammar was far from 
effective. The invention of print-capitalism resulted in the mass production of the 
written record in a vernacular language so that the education system of each 
emerging nation was gradually standardized.26 Modern schools were then set up to 
promote the common language, thus making further knowledge accessible to the 
masses. Under this process, people would learn to see things in the same way as 
their fellow citizens, who shared a similar pool of knowledge gained from a 
common educational experience.   
 Yet the state does not disseminate knowledge for its own sake. Viewed as 
a governmental practice, knowledge is a subtle form of disciplining technologies 
that function to regulate and govern the citizens.27 This directive practice is 
                                                                                                                                      
Southeast Asia, ed. Anthony Reid & David Marr (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of 
Australia, 1979). 
25 Natwipah Chalitanond, “Wiwattanakan khong kankian prawatsatthai tangtae samaiboran 
chonthung samai rattanakosinthonton” (MA Thesis: Chulalongkorn University, 1979); Saichon 
Wannarat, “Kan suksa prawatsatniphon nai prathetthai”, in JTU 9,1 (1989); Yupha Choomchan. 
“Prawatsat niphonthai phoso 2465-2516” (MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1987). 
26 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991, revised ed.). 
27 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” in Michel Foucault, Power: Essential works of Foucault 
1954-1984, Vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubian (London: Penquin, 1994), pp.201-22; Thomas Popkewitz, 
“The Production of Reason and Power: Curriculum History and Intellectual Traditions”, in 
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achieved through curricula, textbooks, museum exhibits, and other media that 
project selected information suitable to the state’s ideology. This in turn 
influences the way individuals organize their “self” and identity. Schooling is thus 
the primary institution of the state’s implicit social control.28 Hence, a school 
curriculum is a state invention that involves forms of knowledge functioned to 
regulate and discipline the individual. Society is broken down by mass-schooling 
into docile and productive individuals, “good” citizen, who possess a desirable 
ideology to serve the national interest.29  
 History education in particular allows the state to inscribe a desirable 
identity for its citizens. As the production of historical knowledge has often been a 
state monopoly through its control of archival documents and authority in its 
interpretation, national history is a field of knowledge intensively politicized by 
state ideology.30 With limited access to archival materials, the people possess little 
power to question and challenge the state narrative of the past and they have little 
choice to subscribe to the state’s version as a memory of their own.    
Although the state’s monopoly of historical materials in Thailand was 
broken years ago and many scholars have presented their critical views of official 
national history, the government’s control over curriculum production and 
approval of textbooks nation-wide has prevented the liberalization of the Thai 
historical narrative known to most citizens. Most Thai still learn about their past 
through textbooks strictly regulated by the rigid curriculum structure imposed by 
                                                                                                                                      
Cultural History and Education: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Schooling, ed. Thomas 
Popkewitz et. al. (New York: RoutledgeGefalmer, 2001), p. 162. 
28 Thomas Popkewitz et. al, “History, the Problem of Knowledge and the New Cultural History of 
Schooling”, in Popkewitz, Cultural History, p. 11. 
29 Popkewitz, “The Production of Reason”, pp. 152-63 
30 Patrick Jory, “Books and the Nation”, in JSAS 31,2 (Sept 2000), pp. 368-73.    
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Ministry of Education (MOE),31 specifically the Department of Instruction and 
Curriculum Development (DICD). A text which is composed by a renowned 
professor but does not follow the DICD guidelines will be amended or rejected. 
Any negotiation on content deviant from state expectations is almost impossible.32  
Thai state control over the production of the past knowledge also covers 
other modes of dissemination, such as history museums. As places that house 
historical artifacts and employ authenticity to reinforce the narrative presented in 
school textbooks, museum exhibits must present information which conforms to 
the plot and supports state ideology.   
Whether it be a curriculum, textbook or museum exhibits, educational 
mechanisms function to guarantee that the new generation of Thai citizens will 
grow up with a version of national history that goes together with national goals. 
Their identity will be cultivated with collective memories of history invented and 
standardized by state devices in the name of national interest.33 In this study, the 
transformation of the curriculum, the version of national history presented in 
Lower-Secondary school textbooks and museum exhibits during the moment of 
“historical lag” will be case studies.   
 
IV. Ayutthaya in Thai Identity 
  To understand the change in the Thai collective memory where knowledge 
of the past is used to shape and socialize Thai citizens, we need to focus on the 
                                                 
31 Nithi, “Chatthai muangthai, pp. 47-88; Warunee Osatharom, “Beabrianthai kap asia tawanok 
chiangtai “puanbankhongrao” phapsathonchettanakati udomkanchatthai”, in RS 22,3, pp. 2-5; 
Charles Keyes, “State Schools in Rural Communities: Reflections on Rural Education and Cultural 
Changes in Southeast Asia”, in Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change 
in Rural Southeast Asia, ed. Charles Keyes (Monograph 36/ Yale Southeast Asia Studies, Yale 
Center for International and Area Studies, 1991), p. 12.    
32 Personal communication with Charnvit Kasetsiri, July 2003.  
33 Eric Hobsbawm & Terrence Ranger (ed), The Invention of Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
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way the image of one particular subject of historical study has been transformed. 
This subject must be significant enough to be mentioned, questioned, and 
reproduced continuously by the state apparatus over the long term. With those 
requirements, the Ayutthayan past will be an ideal subject. 
 In a similar manner that Rome functions for Italian minds and the 
Persepolis for Iranians of the pre-Khomaini era, Ayutthaya has long been an 
indispensable part of collective memory among the Thai. Believed to exist as a 
Thai political, economical and cultural center from 1351 to 1767, Ayutthaya’s 
image is vital to the notion of Thai-self and identity. It was during those 417 
years, generally known as Samai Ayutthaya [Ayutthayan period], that the 
architectural styles, urban planning, costumes, art, and political ideas labelled as 
“Thai style” today are believed to have originated. Thus, the image of Ayutthaya 
embodies those key aspects of Thai identity rooted in the past. 
During its heyday, Ayutthaya’s glory allowed the Thai kings to exert their 
“self-centric” policies and see Ayutthaya as the center of the universe.34 Poems 
written in the Ayutthayan time depict such notions vividly as, “Ayutthaya 
possesses great dignity…like the only flower on land. Other numerous cities are 
nothing in comparison with Ayutthaya. The three gems [of Buddhism] illuminated 
sky and heaven.”35  
After it fail, Ayutthaya’s glory still dominated the memory of the Thai 
elite in the Bangkok court, reflected in the city plan, architecture, court rituals and 
place names with which the Bangkok monarchs tried to recreate the lost 
                                                 
34 Sunait Chutinataranond, “Kansadet prapat Europe phoso 2440: khwammai cheongsanyalak”, in 
Leumkhotngoa ko Phoapandin, ed. Kanchanee La-ongsri &Thanet Apornsuwan (Bangkok: 
Mathichon, 2002), pp. 197-213. 
35 “Klongkamsuan Sriprat” [Kamsuan sriprat verse] in Wannakansamai Ayutthaya lem 2 
[Ayutthayan Literature Vol. 2] (Bangkok: Amarin, 1988), p. 515, cited in Sunait, “Kansadet 
prapat”, p. 204. 
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Ayutthaya.36 In Khlong Thang Phasa [poem of various ethnic groups], one of the 
oldest ethnographical records written around the Third Reign (r.1824-1851) to 
depict the characteristics of 32 different races, Ayutthaya was selected as a 
representation of the Thai identity instead of skin color, language or custom. The 
verse on the Thai people reads, “Thais live in the grand and awe-inspiring city of 
Ayutthaya, dressed in an elegant costume as if it was enchanted by angels”.37 
Thus, Ayutthaya as a source of Thai identity was already well in place even before 
the nation-building period.  
To inscribe the collective memories that will help unify and turn the 
Bangkok Empire into a Siamese nation, the image of Ayutthaya definitely fits the 
requirement of a glorious national past surpassing all others. It was an old 
kingdom from which the Bangkok dynasty drew its ancestry and legitimacy. Its 
sphere of power was sometime compatible with Bangkok’s and occasionally 
exerted its power over their neighbors. Therefore, Ayutthaya became a national 
past, a predecessor of the current Bangkok dynasty, and the source of modern 
Thailand’s glory. Through many forms of education, Thai citizens are now 
expected to identify themselves primarily not with Chiangmai, Vientiane, Khorat, 
Nakhonsithammarat, or Pattani, but with the glorious image of Ayutthaya.38
  
V. Overview 
 Though Thai education has been subjected to numerous studies, some 
focusing particularly on the education of historical knowledge as a form of 
                                                 
36 Hiram W. Woodward. Jr., “Monastery, Palace, and City Plans: Ayutthaya and Bangkok”, CR 2,2 
(1985); Rudiger Korff, “Bangkok as a Symbol?: Ideological and Everyday Life Constructions of 
Bangkok”, in Urban Symbolism, ed. Peter Nas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993).   
37 Prachumcharuk Watphra Chetuphon Chababsombun [Collection of Chetuphon Temple 
Inscriptions: Complete edition] (Phranakhon: Phanfaphittaya, 1967). pp. 771-73, cited in Davisakd 
Puaksom, Khonpleaknah nanachat khong krungsayam (Bangkok: Mathichon, 2003), p. 31.   
38 Nithi Aeusriwongse, “Kansuksa prawatsatthai nai adeet lae anakot”, RP 1 (Jul 1980), p. 18. 
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socialization, few have attempted to articulate the transformation in the historical 
perception of one particular issue.39 Most studies only survey broad changes in 
school curricula,40 while other works usually focus on the impact of the education 
in one particular period. Authors often start out by surveying curriculums or 
textbooks and draw on some correlations with the socio-political context, while 
some moved on to discuss education’s socializing role by creating docile 
citizens.41  Although the significance of Ayutthayan past in the notion of Thai 
identity is obvious, most studies have tended to concentrate on other issues.42  
The only exception is Somkiat Wanthana’s Doctoral thesis, which looks at 
the way Ayutthayan history of various periods was narrated to suit the ever-
changing political demands. However, as he covers historical works of various 
origins and not just those which are state-approved, the images of Ayutthaya in 
each period are diverse and can be only broadly categorized. The lack of thematic 
comparison does not allow for the presentation of how specific description of 
issues concerning Ayutthayan history changed. His innovative and extensive study 
does not include the images of Ayutthaya presented in school textbooks and 
museum exhibits, where state intention could be most clearly detected. Moreover, 
                                                 
39 Arayaying Saranprut, “Prawatsatniphon ruang ‘muang Nakhon Pathom’” (MA Thesis, 
Thammasat University, 1990). 
40 Ladda Suwannakul. “Pattanakan khong laksoot prathomsuksa lae mattayomsuksa nai 
prathetthai” (MA. Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1974).   
41 Nithi Aeustiwongse,“Chatthai muangthai nai beabrain pratomsuksa”, in his Chatthai muangthai 
beabrian lae anusaowaree (Bangkok: Mathichon, 1995), pp. 47-88; Paveena Wangmee, “Ratthai 
kap kanklomklao tangkanmuang pan beabrain naichuang phoso 2475-2487” (M.A. thesis, 
Chulalongkorn University, 2000); Sumin Juthangkul. “Kanklomklao tangkammuang doichai 
baebrianluang pensue naisamai rachakanthi 5” (MA. Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 
1986); Watcharin Maschareon. “Beabrian sangkhomsuksa kapkan klomklao tangkanmuang 
naisamai chompon Sarit Thanarat: Suksakorane khwammankong khongsathaban chat satsana 
phramahakasat” (MA. Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1990). 
42 Bryce Beemer, “Constructing the Ideal State: The Idea of Sukhothai in Thai History, 1833-
1957” (MA Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1999).  
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his studies end with the works produced in early 1980s; hence, the recent 
transformation of Ayutthay’s image is left un-explored.43  
This study will take a rather different approach to study the relationship 
between the education of historical issues and the collective identity. By focusing 
on a particular historical issue as vital to the Thai identity as Ayutthayan history 
depicted in textbooks and museum exhibits, I hope to understand the process 
whereby history has been used to construct suitable collective memories and 
shape citizens’ identity when Thai society has experienced radical and rapid social 
change. By analyzing the transformation in the image of Ayutthayan history 
represented in the state-controlled means of education like curricula, school 
textbooks, and museums in the second half of the twentieth century, I will argue 
that in explaining the role of history in cultivating desirable citizens, one must 
take into account the dynamism in content of such historical issue. Whereas 
Ayutthayan history has been employed to transmit norms and values to the Thai 
citizens, there are great differences in the content used for this purpose. The 
Ayutthayan history written according to a commanding plot in a particular social-
political, economical, international context will be promoted only as long as it 
serves state ideology and help in achieving national goals. Once a new context 
convinces the Thai nation to redefine its national goals, it will create a “historical 
lag” where the old version of Ayutthayan past would be undermined by a more 
suitable narrative. By not taking into account the dynamism in versions of 
Ayutthayan history implemented by Thai state, which has so often been neglected, 
                                                 
43 Somkiat Wanthana, “The Politics of Modern Thai Historiography” (2 Vol.) (PhD Thesis, 
Monash University, 1986); See also Somkiat Wanthana. Prawatsat niphonthai samaimai 
(Bangkok: Thai Studies Center, Thammasat University, 1984); “2 Sattawatkhongrat lae prawatsat 
niphonthai” TUJ 13, 3 (September 1984); “Muangthai-yookmai: Sampanthaphap rawang rat kap 
prawatsat samnuk ”, in Yumuangthai, ed. Sombat Chantravong & Chaiwat Satha-anand (Bangkok: 
Thammasat University Press, 1987). 
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one fails to acknowledge the complexity of relations between the past, collective 
memories, identity, and nationalism.  
Beginning with the development of school curricula and the subject of 
history, this thesis I will focus on the 1960 and 1990 curricula as the two most 
significant influences that defined the way history was taught in Thailand in the 
second half of the twentieth century (chapter 2). Different issues relating to the 
image of Ayutthaya as depicted in high school history textbooks of the 1960s and 
1990s will be compared and analyzed, starting with the image of Ayutthaya as a 
dominant center of the Thai past (chapter 3), followed by the idea of prosperity as 
a reflection of Thailand’s current economy (chapter 4) and the image of 
Ayuthayan‘s international relations as a way of projecting a very long connection 
with particular state (chapter 5). How the Ayutthayan past in the museum exhibits 
was transformed will eventually complete our understanding of the dynamic 
evolution of Ayutthayan’s image (chapter 6).  
 
Chapter 2  
Thai Education, School Curriculum, and the  
Dissemination of Historical Knowledge 
 
This chapter will look at the way knowledge of the Thai and particularly 
the Ayutthayan past was disseminated in the expanding education system, and 
show how history successfully secured its key position within the state’s 
socializing project. Beginning with the broad theme of educational development 
in Thailand, successive curricula will be examined to show how history as a 
subject was included and promoted. As a state designed mechanism that dictated 
what forms of knowledge should be taught or ignored, each curriculum reflects a 
“desirable” knowledge of the past important enough to be disseminated through 
national education in shaping the Thai collective memory. The important place of 
history, especially Ayutthaya, in Thai education will be demonstrated, with a 
detailed discussion of the 1960 and 1990 curricula to form a background for 
thematic analysis in the following chapters.  
           
I. Expansion of National Education in Thailand 
 Before the late nineteenth century, education in Siam was limited to 
temples and most subjects taught were religion-related. However, the temple also 
provided secular knowledge including astrology, mathematics, medicine, 
literature, law, martial art, and some form of history.1 Since most Thai boys would 
spend some part of their lives in the temple, education there would be definitely 
                                                 
1 David Wyatt, The Politics of Reform In Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 17. 
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influential on the Thai worldview. Outside the temple walls literacy education was 
very limited.  
Modern schooling in Thailand was first implemented in the missionary 
schools, but its impact was very limited.2 With a rising demand for a literate 
workforce capable of working in a Western-style bureaucracy, the Thai state 
began to invest in modern education. Whereas their main concern was to produce 
students with reading and basic mathematical skill, textbooks were primarily on 
Thai grammar.3 Extensive proposals for educational reform had been made since 
King Mongkut Reign (r.1851-1868), including the composition of modern 
textbooks.4 Apart from Thai grammar, their contents included the units of 
measurement, standard forms for official reports, etc.5  
The major educational change however was associated with the Great 
Reform of King Chulalongkorn (r.1868-1910). Though the first royal decree on 
countrywide education was declared in 1875,6 it was not successfully enforced 
due to the young King’s limited support and court politics.7 After his main 
opponents had passed away, Chulalongkorn re-instigated his reform scheme with 
more success. In 1884, Prince Damrong was instructed to implement national 
education in accordance with the aborted 1875 plan; school would be arranged in 
temples using monks as instructors with the government providing textbooks and 
                                                 
2 Phipada Yongcharoen & Suwadee Thanaprasit, Kansuksa lae phonkrathoptorsangkhomthai 
samairattanakosin, 2325-2394 (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1986), pp. 136-44. 
3 MOE, 200 pee khongkansuksathai (Bangkok: MOE, 1982), pp. 10-11, 45-50. 
4 Wyatt, Politics of Reforms, p. 68. 
5 Krissana Sinchai & Rattana Phacharit, Khwampenma kohng beabrian thai (Bangkok: Curriculum 
and Instruction Development Department, MOE, 1977), pp. 10-11. 
6 MOE, 200 pee, pp. 8-9. 
7 Wyatt, Politics of Reforms, pp. 73-75 
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salaries.8 Eventually, the Education Department was founded in 1889, headed by 
Damrong, and upgraded to the Ministry of Education in 1892.  
Modern education thus became a major force in supplying workforce for 
the King’s reform. The large corps of educated officials, mainly from the lower 
classes and armed with new ideas of civility, progress, and meritocracy rather than 
blood-ties, were upset with their limited class-mobility and the country’s lack of 
progress. While the modernizing process that introduced the print-media public 
sphere had stimulated the dreams of a new political regime, modern education led 
eventually to the 1932 revolution that brought down the absolutist regime.9 One of 
the People Party’s objectives in their proclamation on 24 June 1932 was a mission 
of education, that every citizen should have enjoy equal access to government-
provided education. The number of students receiving compulsory education rose 
significantly until schools were established in every district throughout Thailand 
in 1935.10 Moreover, the regime encouraged schools throughout the kingdom to 
adopt the same educational scheme designed by the central government; thereby 
Chinese and other private schools could no longer follow their self-designed 
curricula.  
 The strongman of the People’s Party, Field Marshall Phibunsongkram 
(Premier between 1938-44, 1948-57), took up nationwide education to polish and 
indoctrinate Thai nationalism to an unprecedented degree. Students had to pay 
daily respect to the National symbols, i.e. flag, anthem, and Buddha. The sense of 
                                                 
8 Kullada Keshboonchu-Mead, “The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism” (PhD Thesis, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002), pp. 136-37; Craig Reynolds, “The 
Buddhist Monkhood in Nineteenth Century Thailand” (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 
1973). 
9 Attachak Sattayanurak, Kanpleanplaeng lokkathat khong chonchannamthai tangtae rachakan thi 
5 tung phuttasakkasat 2475 (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1995); Thanapol 
Limpichart, “The Public Sphere and the Birth of “Literature” in Siam” (MA Thesis, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, 2003). 
10 MOE, 200 pee, p. 113.  
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belonging to a Thai nation was emphasized regularly in the national holidays, 
notably National Day, in commemorating of the 1932 revolution.11  
As the Cold War developed, relations with the United States also grew 
close after Phibun’s return to power in 1948.12 During 1950-1963, the US 
government began to support, through UNESCO, the establishment of several 
educational institutions. The Thai government implemented the 12-year US 
educational system; the education budget increased from 10% of the national 
budget to 18 and the 21% between 1951-1959.13  
When containment policy was at its height, Thailand became a major US 
ally in Southeast Asia and massive foreign aid was pumped in, with the hope that 
rapid economic development would save Thailand from being another domino. 
During the military regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Thanom 
Kittikhachon, and Praphas Charusathien (1957-73), which I will refer to as the 
military Regime, national education expanded substantially due to US support. 
Polytechnics and teaching colleges were mushrooming, and the National Council 
for Education of Thailand (NCET), National Research Council of Thailand, and 
Association of Social Sciences of Thailand were also established.14
During the first meeting of NCET on 8 September 1959, Sarit ambitiously 
proclaimed his vision in developing the nationwide education as a strong 
foundation for his “revolution era” [samai patiwat], in order to “build the people 
                                                 
11 Chanida Prompayak Puaksom, Kanmuang nai prawatsat thongchatthai (Bangkok: Matichon, 
2003), pp. 152-63. 
12 Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign policy and Thai military Rule 1947-1977 
(Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1988).    
13 MOE, 200 pee, p. 125. 
14 Warunee Osatharom, “Kansuksa cheongprawatsat nai sangkhomthai: bodsamruat sathana 
khwamru”, in A document companion the seminar on “Thai History on the road of change: the 
review of knowledge for developing Thai History research” at SAC, 28-29 Nov 1998, pp. 2-3.  
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of our nation to achieve excellence”.15 Education must serve to cultivate 
productive and rational citizens, in accordance with the regime’s well-known 
motto: “work is money, money is work, those will bless [people] with happiness.” 
Ironically, the expanding of national education under the military regime 
did indeed produce a huge workforce beyond what the economy could 
accommodate; this eventually became a prime cause of the regime’s overthrow in 
1973. Finally, when the withdrawal of US troops at the end of the Vietnam War 
led to the sudden contraction of the economy, the Sarit’s educational revolution 
reached its tragic climax with the traumatic student massacre in 1976.16
The military’s return after 1976 coup was short-lived, however, due to the 
gradual disappearance of the threat to national stability and integrity with the 
collapse of the Communist Party of Thailand in the early 1980s. The specter of 
industrialization introduced by America and world capitalism was beyond military 
containment; Thai politics was reluctantly opened for more diverse participants 
and the military regime gradually faded from the political scene. Military 
commanders, especially during General Prem Tinsulanonda rule (1980-8), decided 
to use the political system in their quest for power, instead of mounting coups. 
The lure of huge benefits from taking part in economic development by far 
outweighing pure political power, though, and General Chatchai Choonhawan 
(premiership 1988-91) thus moved to promote the “turning of the battlefield into 
the market place”. Economically, Thailand was now on track to become a Newly 
Industrialized Country. Aside from cultivating  “good” citizens, national 
education was expected to foster the growing economic sectors, especially 
                                                 
15 Pin Malakul & Kamhaeng Palakul, “Ngarnnaidan pattana kansuksa”, in Prawat lae phonngarn 
khong chompon Sarit Thanarat (His Cremation Volume, 1964), pp. 98-100. 
16 Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” in his Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, 
Southeast Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 139-73.    
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producing technicians, specialized professions, and low-skill labor. The ghost of 
national security had subsided to the promise of economic profit made possible by 
enormous capital inflows, the burgeoning export economy, and the tourism boom.  
Thanks to the huge inflow of foreign capital into a politically stabilized 
and democratized Thailand, the attempt to revive the military rule in 1991 was 
seriously challenged by the urban middle-class stimulated by the economic boom 
and ready to defend their interests in the street protests of May 1992. Together 
with the cleansing of the military as a dominant political faction, the so-called 
“people’s constitution” was designed to secure the move toward democratization. 
The educational process was reappraised, with a focus on creative learning that 
was believed to increase the nation’s competitiveness in the world economy. 
 
II. Past Knowledge in the State Designed Curricula  
Disseminated Memory for Nationhood  
Though no curriculum was used before Chulalonhkorn’s education reform, 
interestingly traditional rituals often included praying and chanting of verses about 
the mythical princes or kings who had committed good deeds to achieve spiritual 
goals. The chanting of Jataka stories was a political act confirming the Thai 
monarchy’s status as the worldly-Buddha.17 It was these religious tales recited to 
the illiterate masses that helped form their idea of the past, mythical as it might be. 
With a selection of stories performed regularly, the mythical past thereby 
functioned as a mean to regulate the social norm, whereas the first textbooks 
                                                 
17 Patrick Jory, “Vessantara Jataka, Barami, and the Bodhisatta-Kings: The Origin and Spread of a 
Thai Concept of Power”, in CR 16,2 (2002).  
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taught only skills and did not pass down ideas of the past until the mid-nineteenth 
century.18   
When the first plan for educational reform was launched in 1875, 
Chulalongkorn conceived only of teaching the subjects practical to the expanding 
bureaucracy, namely language and basic algebra. Civic Duties, History and 
Geography, later grouped under Sangkhomsuksa [Social Studies], as a social 
mechanism, were not introduced before 1885.19 The inclusion of these subjects 
reflected the new state objective; instead of producing only a capable workforce, 
the Thai elite now tried to cultivate desirable citizens for the kingdom rushing to 
become a nation-state.20   
The founding of the Education Department in 1889 reflected the rising 
concern over educational matters, and History [Wicha Phongsawadan] was 
included as an independent subject for the first time in the 1892 curriculum. The 
Bangkok government was also keen on enforcing its curriculum by dispatching 
officials to inspect its implementation twice a month.21 Educational policies of the 
late nineteenth century Siam were clearly designed along the idea that “education 
is not only for the benefit of the people, but also for the prosperity of the nation”.22 
With a realistic vision, the state’s composition and translation of more textbooks 
after 1898 was promoted to standardized the national education and deepen the 
curriculum’s impact.23
                                                 
18 Warunee Osatharom, “Kan suksa nai sangkhomthai phoso 2411-2475” (M.A. Thesis, 
Chulalongkorn University Press, 1980), p. 27. 
19 Ladda, “Pattanakan”, p. 9.  
20 Ibid., pp. 190-91. 
21 Ibid., pp. 45-48. 
22 Wutthichai Munsilp, Kanpathiroopkansuksa naisamai rachakanthi 5 (Bangkok: Social Sciences 
Association of Thailand, 1973), p. 216; Shiori Sato, “History Education at Secondary School Level 
in Thai Socio-Political Context” (M.A. Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1996), pp. 37-38.   
23 Wachirayan Warorot, Phra-aksorn Ruangchatkan laoreankhong chao sayam thisongthop 
phrabatsomdet phrachulachomklao chaoyuhua (Cremation Volume of Puak Kunakorn, 1956), pp. 
2-5. 
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A series of chronicles were also read from 1895 onward, namely the 
Concise History of Ayutthaya, History of the Present Dynasty, and the detailed 
version of Thai history that deal mostly with Ayutthaya’s past. The trope of 
territorial control, the leading role of kings, and the integrity of the Siamese past 
were clearly represented in History textbooks of this period. While the record of 
wars with neighboring countries helped form the nation’s self, the contribution of 
the great monarchs helped draw loyalty to the present king, who wished to appear 
as the national defender rather than a divine being.24
The 1902 curriculum released after the Paknam crisis also introduced 
Geography, together with History, to create a clear spatial and historical image of 
the new nation.25 For the first time, high school students were required to draw the 
map of Siam and memorize some background knowledge of each region.26 
Moreover, the text repeatedly emphasized Siam’s unique shape, its fertility and its 
non-colony status, in contrast with its neighbors.27 This emerging emphasis on 
geographical features vividly reflected the serious concern over its territoriality 
after the shock of “territorial loss”.  
A large section of information regarding Thai history was further added in 
the 1909 curriculum. The primary school student was now required to read a new 
textbook on a general knowledge of Siam [khwamru ruangmuangthai] together 
with a detailed History textbook. These two subjects were purposely assigned to 
primary schools because primary education was compulsory for so all young Thai 
                                                 
24 Rong Sayammanonda, Prawat krasraung suksathikan (Bangkok: Kurusapa, 1964), pp. 107-13; 
Weerasak Keeratiworanan, “Kansuksa kanpannana kanplienplaeng tangprawatsat chak 
“sayamyukkao” pen “sayam yukmai”, phoso 2367-2411” (MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 
1998).  
25 Saksri Panabut et. al., Kanwikroh nangsue baebrian (Bangkok: Ramkhamhuang University 
Press, 1978), pp. 15-17.   
26 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, pp. 26, 41-43. 
27 Department of Education, Phumisat Sayam [Siam Geography] (Bangkok, 1907), cited in Sumin 
Juthangkul, “Kanklomklao tangkammuang”, pp. 117-23.  
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citizens. World History and the complete History of Siam were also introduced in 
the higher level.28
Unlike the pre-reform era, historical and geographical knowledge had 
become of great concern for the Thai elite as disciplines that helped establish the 
identity and self of the nation. The Thai state, hoping to appear ancient, 
disseminated its perception of the past and territoriality in its version of History 
textbooks used in the modern education system. The Ayutthayan past was selected 
to represent the national past that would allow the monarchy to claim its great 
contribution.  
 
From the Height of Absolutism to Phibun Rule  
After the campaign in “geo-body building” of the Fifth Reign, the 
monarchy had become a target of successive criticisms.29 Thai history during the 
King Wachirawut period (r.1910-25) was thereby altered to heighten the 
monarchy’s contribution to the Thai nation. However, he could not subdue the 
intellectual voices which employed a newly emergent printing space to express 
their dissatisfaction with the ruling regime.30 At the same time, the booming 
numbers of Chinese immigrants who maintained support for the nationalist 
movement in China were also seen as seeds of instability needing to be socialized 
by the education system.31 This policy eventually materialized into new 
                                                 
28 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, pp. 26-28. 
29 On concept of geo-body, see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body 
of a Nation (Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 1994). 
30 Matthew Copeland, “Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy 
in Siam” (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1993). 
31 MOE., 200 pee, p. 60. 
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mandatory lessons in the Thai language, Thai Geography, Civil Duties, and Thai 
History taught in every school.32  
Wachirawut was definitely conscious of the potential benefit from mass 
education for his government’s problems, as reflected in a speech delivered in 
1914, “The benefit I expect for our nation to remain stable must include the 
planting of the notion that they must listen to what their superiors order. This is 
one thing that should be taught and practiced from the time they are young. 
Therefore, molding the children’s behavior while they are in schools is one major 
responsibility…”33  
The curriculum drafted and adopted under Wachirawut first appeared in 
1913, requiring that teachers submit their syllabus to MOE. The 1921 curriculum 
imposed compulsory education for every child between 7-14 years of age.34 
Modern education using new textbooks but employing literate monks in village 
temples as teachers rapidly allowed the Thai state to disseminate modern 
knowledge throughout the country by using the existing infrastructure.35  
In the 1928 curriculum, the term Prawatsat replaced Phongsawadan as the 
term for “history”.36 The fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932 opened a new era 
of Thai history teaching, and Social Studies was the most altered subject. The new 
1937 curriculum also included a study trip to major historical sites; Ayutthaya was 
of course at the top of the list.37 Lower-secondary textbooks now included the 
biographies of some national heroes, including those of commoner background, 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 79; Beemer, “Constructing Ideal State” pp. 73-74. 
33 Chamuen Amorn Darunarak, Phraracha koraneeyakit samkan nai phrabatsomdet 
phramongkutklao chaoyuhua lem 7 [Major Works of King Wachirawut Vol. 7] (Bangkok: 
Kurusapa, 1970), p. 100, cited in MOE, 200 pee, p. 61. 
34 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, pp. 28-29.  
35 Francis Wong Hoy Wee, Comparative Studies in Southeast Asian Education (Kuala Lumpur: 
Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, 1973), p. 21. 
36 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, p. 30. 
37 Ladda, “Pattanakan”, p. 141-43. 
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namely Panthai norasing, Thao thepkasattree-Thao srisuntorn, and Thao 
suranaree,38 in accordance with the background of the new People’s Party regime. 
Intended to stir the racial consciousness of Thai citizen, the subject was 
changed from “History of Thailand” to “History of the Thai Race” [Prawatsat 
chonchat thai]. In the 1948 curriculum, History had grown to become a large 
subject, covered the history of Thai nation through the ages, with separate 
chapters on national heroes and international relations.39  
The post-1932 government attempted to construct the Constitution as a 
new national symbol,40 and new textbooks introduced Constitution and 
Democracy alongside “nation, religion and monarchy”, as things that “must be 
respected”. However, a series of coups and changes of constitution (6 versions 
over 25 years) and the promotion of Phibun’s leadership cult eroded the 
constitution’s position as a powerful national symbol.41 Luang Wichit Wathakan, 
the main architect of a nationalist history during this period, promoted the racialist 
history of Siam to buttress a vision of the “Great Pan-Thai Empire” [Maha 
Anachakthai].42 The national hero was emphasized as a model for the Thai to 
follow their contribution.43 Wichit himself saw the lack of uniformity in the 
teaching materials used by different schools and campaigned a policy for MOE to 
standardize textbooks nationwide.44
  
History Education During the Cold War 
                                                 
38 Paveena, “Ratthai kab kanklomklao”, p. 125. 
39 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, pp. 31-32. 
40 Paveena, “Ratthai kapkan klomklao”, pp. 89-113. 
41 Watcharin, “Beabrian sangkhomsuksa”, p. 61 
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At the dawn of the Cold War, the 1950 curriculum reflected Thailand’s 
growing concern over the influence of major powers: one objective in studying 
History was, “to learn about neighboring countries and the major powers that have 
interacted with Thailand”.45 The coming of the Americans during the Cold War, 
as mentioned above, had a significant impact on Thai national education.  
In 1960, the first and only curriculum issued under the Sarit regime 
emphasized “education suitable to the times and social condition” that would 
allow students to pursue their talents, and gain enough knowledge for their 
careers, and would create a good citizens equipped with a desirable worldview”.46 
Changes in this curriculum included the expansion of education from 10 to 12 
years following American consultation.47 Social Studies was divided into four 
subjects: Civic Duties, Moral, Geography, and History.48 Social Studies became 
the core of the curriculum; every school was required to conduct four hours of 
class per week in order to “know and understand the social and cultural 
development in the past and the current political situation that people of every 
race have created according to the history of each country/nation”.49
In this era of “revolution”, Sarit often referred to history as an example 
that proved his ideas. In the oath of allegiance of the military forces, a ceremony 
invented during his rule, he always insisted that Thailand would never become 
slaves if they did not lose their unity. He said, thus the “history of the Thai nation 
is the best proof for this truth…only unity will keep Thailand solid”.50  
                                                 
45 MOE, Laksoot mattayomsuksa thonton phoso 2493 (Bangkok: Kurusapa, 1950), pp. 17-18.  
46 MOE, Laksoot prayok mattayomsuksa thonton phoso 2503 (Bangkok: Kurusapa, 1965 (3rd 
prints)), p. 1. 
47 Ladda, “Pattanakan”, pp. 148, 172. 
48 Watcharin, “Beabrian sangkhomsuksa”, pp. 102-04. 
49 MOE, Laksoot 2503, pp. 2-14.  
50 Ardsuk Duangsawang, “Prawat cheewit”, in Prawat lae phonngarn khong chompon Sarit 
Thanarat (Cremation Volume of Sarit Thanarat, 1964), pp. 99-100.  
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The major change in curriculum was a chance for the government to 
introduce new textbooks; MOE allowed individuals from the private sector to 
submit their copies of texts for its approval before being used nationwide.51 
Eventually, the control of the historical knowledge that the student should learn 
was still very much in state hand. Textbooks for History used in lower-secondary 
class according to 1960 curriculum contained lessons on Thai history and history 
of foreign countries that would be taught alternately in the first and second 
semesters, the first textbook on Thai history mentioned the Nanchao kingdom; the 
Southward migration of the Tai race; the Sukhothai era; and the formation, 
administration and culture of the Ayutthayan period. The textbook used for the 
second-year Thai history lessons was about the progress of the Thai state during 
the Ayutthayan period and major events during King Naresuan’s and King Narai’s 
reigns, followed by major events in the late Ayutthayan period. The third year text 
began with major events during the Thonburi and Bangkok period up to the 1932 
revolution, including a survey of progress in many areas and Thai international 
relations. 52   
The 1960 curriculum required the lower-secondary student to learn 
extensively about the Ayutthayan past through one-and-a-half semesters of their 
History class. Judging from the time devoted to teaching it, the Ayutthayan past 
was the most importance issue in the History curriculum at this time. The image 
of Ayutthaya was undisputedly the most influential collective memory for 
formation of Thai identity rooted in perception of the past; therefore, its 
importance requires a detailed analysis in the next three chapters.           
 
                                                 
51  Watcharin, “Beabrian Sangkhomsuksa”, p. 113.  
52 MOE, Laksoot 2503, pp. 18-19.  
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History Education in the Recent Curricula 
After the fall of military regime in 1973, the rapid social changes which 
had taken place eroded the practicality and feasibility of the 1960 curriculum and 
its textbooks. In 1975, the upper-secondary curriculum was changed. The 1978 
curriculum included the revision of the lower-secondary level with several new 
subjects, including the history of Thailand’s relations with its neighbors.53 
Meanwhile the issue of national security appeared as one objective in “Our 
country”, and “Our Neighboring Countries” also contained a chapter particularly 
devoted to the Thailand’s security in comparison with other Southeast Asian 
countries.54 Major change was most evident in the 1981 curriculum, revised only 
at the upper-secondary level, it focused on Economics in response to the national 
obsession with becoming a Newly Industrialized Country. Economics was taught 
for the whole semester as a compulsory subject.55  
All of these structural changes of curriculum were taking place under the 
recent wave of radical change in the world economy and international system over 
the last few decades. During this period, Thailand was transformed from a 
producer of agricultural products into an important exporter of industrial goods. 
The Thai economy is now reliant on global demand and the burgeoning tourism 
industry. The army has lost much of its influence in the political arena due to 
reduced threats from its neighbors and separatist groups. Civil society has been on 
the rise and has started to challenge the state authority severely. Beyond this, we 
see the rise of the Asia-Pacific region on comparable terms with the West. In this 
era, “Thainess was no longer something to be defended in the interests of national 
                                                 
53 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, pp. 60-64.  
54 MOE, Laksoot mattayomsuksa thonton phoso 2521 (Bangkok: Kurusapa, (3rd print), 1982), pp. 
72-77; Paitoon Phongsabud et. al., Puanbankhongrao lem 2 (Bangkok: Thai Wattana panich, 1984, 
Curriculum 1978), pp. 92-99.     
55 Shiori Sato, “History Education”, pp. 65-75. 
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security but to be consumed in the interests of boosting the economy”.56 These 
internal and external changes severely eroded the explanatory capacity of the 
commanding plot of Thai history. The 1990 curriculum is an appropriate 
document in representing these decades of change.  
The 1990 curriculum focuses on economic change and the technological 
advancement of the late Twentieth Century, and encourages students to employ 
appropriate technology to improve their quality of life.57 It is notable that, 
Thailand’s national security is not mentioned in the curriculum’s objectives. 
Among the four objectives of Social Studies stated, the importance of the 
environmental issues resulting from rising pollution and environmental 
degradation in the years of rapid economic development is clear. The issues of 
economical and cultural problems together with the role of the monarchy also 
receive special emphasis.58   
Social Studies are large subjects that require six hours of lessons per week 
and the student is required to pass them.59 The lessons of these compulsory 
courses included, Our Country 1-4, Our Continent, and Our World. Our Country 
1 focuses on general knowledge of Thailand, while Our Country 2 deals with the 
outline of Thai history from Sukhothai up to the present. The extensive 
Ayutthayan history is the focus of Our country 3, taught in the second semester of 
the second year. Instead of narrating the story chronologically as before, this 
textbook discusses the political, economical, cultural, and international relations 
aspects of Ayutthaya theme by theme. Various aspects of this past also appear in 
other subjects. In Our History 4, the student will learn about the development of 
                                                 
56 Reynolds, “Thai Identity”, p. 311.  
57 MOE, Laksoot mattayomsuksathonton phoso 2521 (Chabab prapproong 2533) (Bangkok: 
Kurusapa (2nd prints), 1998), Preface of the first edition.  
58 Ibid., p. 49.  
59 Ibid., pp. 2-7.   
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the Thai nation during the Thonburi and Bangkok periods. For Our Continent and 
Our World, the lessons concentrate on the introductory knowledge of Asia and 
other regions respectively.60 Though composed three decades after the 1960 
curriculum, the 1990 version still requires the lower-secondary student to spend 
more than one semester in learning about Ayutthaya.  
Curriculum 2001, designated to be used in some selected schools since 
2002 before being adopted nationwide by 2005, focuses on the vision of 
cosmopolitanism to catch up with the fast-changing world. However, the 
curriculum does not overlook national unity, pride in being Thai, and the 
understanding of Thai national history.61 The fact that the 1990 curriculum has 
been used unaltered for over 12 years make it most suitable as a case study to see 
the transformation of Thai collective memories as projected by the state. 
Moreover, the three decades that separated this curriculum from its 1960 
predecessor are long enough for changes in the perception of the past in society as 
a whole to be detected. Judging by their influence, contents and contexts, both 
curricula represent major change for their time. Both were used to guide Thai 
national education for more than a decade, thus playing an influential role in the 
way most young Thai citizens came to learn about the national past and Thai 
identity. A detailed comparative analysis of the presentation of Ayutthaya in lower 
secondary level textbooks written according to these two curricula will be the 
subject of subsequent chapters.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
60 Ibid., pp. 52-53, 67. 
61 MOE, Laksoot kansuksa kanpuhnthaan phoso 2544 (Bangkok: Rosopoh, 2002), preface-p. 8. 
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As long as memories of the past are vital to national identity, the 
production and dissemination of the historical knowledge in the educational 
system will still be under the state’s monopoly, which uses the control of the past 
to control the present and shape the future of its citizens and the nation. The place 
of Ayutthaya in successive school curricula shows this fact vividly. As knowledge 
vital to the collective identity to the citizen of the modern Thai state, Ayutthayan 
history has been promoted and included in textbooks since the time of 
Chulalongkorn. It is the past knowledge that has received the greatest promotion 
since modern Thai education took its first step. Many curricula were used, revised, 
and discarded in the last century. Against the tide of time, the Ayutthayan past has 
always appeared as a significant part of Thai education. Now we shall look at the 
dynamic process that led to the transformation of the image of Ayutthaya as a 
representation of Thai identity.                
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Ayutthaya as Militarized State and its Deteriorating Domination 
 
For the purpose of national unity, each nation requires its history as an 
evidence of its existence since time immemorial. Thai government since the 
formation of a modern state has invested in the promotion of the Ayutthayan past 
that is expected to become collective memory through education mean. It is 
important to note that these collective memories are by no means permanent or 
static, but have evolved gradually in response to the changing national interest 
envisioned by the state elite. To achieve the new national goal, the state needs to 
reallocate its resources, redesign its policies, and readjust the collective memories 
to foster a new identity suitable for its new objectives. As a vital part of the 
national history of Thailand, Ayutthaya has long been a frontier of such re-
imagining process, and its image has experienced a significant transformation 
during the last 50 years.  
School textbooks have been a key mechanism for disseminating different 
images of Ayutthaya according to the ideology of each regime. Composed or 
authorized by the state’s educational institutions, primarily the DICD, textbooks 
used in the nationwide pre-tertiary education system are the major infrastructure 
in the socializing process of the Thai state.1 Without school textbooks, the 
transmission of common and standardized ideas would be far less feasible, if not 
impossible. In this and the next two chapters, the narrative of Ayutthayan history 
appear in textbooks written according to the 1960 and 1990 curricula will be 
                                                 
1 Phinyo Sathorn, Lak borihan kan suksa (Bangkok: Thai Wattana Panich, 1973, 2nd print), p. 278; 
Ladda, “Pattanakan”, p. 2; Keyes, “State School”, p.12.  
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analyzed theme by theme. In this chapter, I will begin with the Ayutthayan history 
as a common bond.  
 
I. Nationalized Memories
As stability and territorial integrity are major goals that any nation-state 
hopes to pursue and maintain, since the nineteenth century the Thai kings have 
tried to carve a modern nation out of the existing Bangkok Empire. By employing 
modern technology- mapping, printing, administrative mechanisms, railways, etc.- 
they have envisioned a modern nation-state where power from the center could be 
felt equally throughout the territory. Though successful in expanding their 
influence to the far-flung corners of the empire, subduing several revolts and 
receiving international recognition, the Bangkok rulers of the 19th and early 20th 
century were still in need for a long-term policy that could guarantee the integrity 
of Siam.  
In this respect, educational policies as a subtle form of governmentality 
seem more reliable in the long run and more cost-effective than military 
subjugation. The promotion of the Central Thai language, instead of regional 
languages, was utilized to intensify the degree of communication within newly 
defied national borders. A common language brought people closer to the center 
as they subscribed to ideas circulated in a public sphere dominated by Bangkok; 
national history also emerged out of this need. Modern education, which dated 
from the Fifth Reign, thus began to receive greater attention from the Thai elite, in 
the expectation that it would play a great role in maintaining Siam’s territorial 
integrity.  
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Beginning in the nineteenth century, the grand image of Ayutthaya was 
used to justify the right of Bangkok kings to rule over the former kingdom. The 
early Bangkok monarchs hence tried to construct the record of their past beyond 
their current dynastic lineage. During the Fourth Reign, many phongsawadan 
were compiled and edited to create a smooth and consistent narrative, attempting 
to accentuate the long existence of the Siamese nation.2 The most notable case 
was the extensive version that still contains the editing and comments of 
Mongkut.3 For the center, phongsawadan would support the claim of Siamese 
elite to suzerainty over the periphery by showing the record of its long subjugation 
to the Ayutthayan and Bangkok court. The elite hoped that those records of the 
Siamese influence and presence in the disputed areas during the emergence of 
Western colonial aggression would back up their territorial claims. 
Away from the negotiation table, phongsawadan also played another 
equally vital function, and versions of new chronicles with purified information on 
Ayutthayan history were read as compulsory texts in school from 1888 onward.4 
As mass education expanded to reach a larger proportion of young Thai citizens, 
the officially selected version of Bangkok’s historical account gradually replaced 
other various local versions of the past. With a standardized story of the 
Ayutthayan kingdom, the Thai state hoped to eradicate divergent versions of 
collective memories with a common story composed and imposed by the state 
authority.  
To absorb every member of “the under-construction” Thai state to identify 
with the Ayutthayan past, the story disseminated through textbooks must appear a 
grand and glorious one. The Phongsawadanyoh chabab ratchakanthi 4 
                                                 
2 Nithi, Prawatsat Rattanakosin.  
3 Prarachaphongsawadan chabab phrarachahatthalekha, (Bangkok: FAD, 1999).   
4 Saksri, Kanwikroh nangsue, pp. 15-17.  
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[Mongkut’s Brief Notices of the History of Siam] traces the history of Siam back 
to the foundation of Ayutthaya. Among the names celebrated in the book are U-
Thong, Naresuan and Narai, respectively the founder, restorer, and great diplomat 
monarchs of Ayutthayan times.5 The Chronicle of Bangkok from the First to the 
Fourth Reign compiled by Thipakorawong was the definitive account that gave 
the capital a central role in the national historical development. This towering 
project reflected the Bangkok court’s vision to unify the nation through history 
and demonstrate the eminent role of the new power center as replacing the lost 
Ayutthaya.6 Military victories were celebrated and the wealth of the kingdom 
projected, to overshadow other power centers such as Chiangmai, Khorat, Nakorn 
Si Thammarat, etc. With this grand image, the Thai state hoped that all citizens 
would identify themselves as descendents of Ayutthaya, no matter which corner of 
Thai territory they called home, and willingly become part of the Siamese nation.  
The founding of the Siam Society in 1904, the Archaeological Society in 
1907, and the Antiquarian Society in 1909, all to promote the study of the past, 
reflected royal support for the production of historical knowledge that would 
prove the long existence of Siamese nation.7 Chulalongkorn justified his 
Antiquarian Society project on the grounds that  
Those many countries which have been formed into nations and countries uphold 
that history of one’s nation and country is an important matter to be known clearly 
and accurately through studies and teaching. It is a discipline for evaluating ideas 
                                                 
5 Mongkut, “A Brief Notices of the History of Siam” in Appendix A, in The Kingdom and People 
of Siam, John Bowring (2 Volumes) (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1857), pp. 341-63.  
6 Chalong Soontravanich. “Wiwattanakan kankian prawatsatthai chak chaophraya Tipakorawong 
thung somdetphrachaoborommawongter kromphraya Damrong Rachanuphap”, in Prawatsat lae 
Nakprawatsatthai, ed. Charnvit Kasetsiri & Suchart Sawatsri (Bangkok: Prapansan, 1976). 
7 Ram Wachirapradit, “The Development of Thai National History, 1868-1944” (MA Thesis, 
Chulalongkorn University, 1996), p. 104. 
 38
and actions as right or wrong, good or bad, as a means to inculcate love of one’s 
nation and land.8
The fall of absolutism in 1932 did not alter the promotion of official 
history centered on Ayutthaya as a dominant national memory. Though failing to 
promote the Constitution, the People’s Party version of history did succeed in 
establishing new characteristics for Thai history, by bringing in a wider range of 
actors into the history of Ayutthaya as popularly perceived by the masses.   
Luang Wichit Wathakan, born to Chinese parents in Uthaithani, was 
successful in turning himself into the champion of Thai racialist history. Prolific 
in writing, Wichit authored many works of nationalistic fiction and plays in the 
historical genre. Among the most memorable works was Luat Suphan [The Blood 
of Suphanburi], a romantic musical drama about the Suphanburi villagers. Starting 
out as a love story between a Burmese soldier and a Thai girl, the story moves to 
the tragic end when the Thai villagers decide to sacrifice their lives to fight against 
the Burmese troops just before the fall of Ayutthaya.9   
Written during the years of military rule, Luat Suphan and other works of a 
similar genre reflected the political ideology of the period. With the end of 
absolutism, the new leaders of non-royal background needed to create a new 
version of the past that could legitimize their current position. Under the regime 
that promoted people’s power, ordinary folks were added to the story formerly 
dominated by royal contributions. Significantly, Wichit explained that the 
villagers purposely decided to fight the invaders, knowing that they were losing 
but wanting to allow more time for the defensive forces in Ayutthaya. In short, 
                                                 
8 Chulalongkorn, “The Antiquarian Society of Siam”, trans. Chris Baker, JSS 89,1&2 (2001), p. 
95.  
9 Wichit Wathakan, Luat-Suphan, Rachamanu, Phrachao krungthon, Suk thalang (Bangkok: 
Commemoration Volume for Khunying Chan Thepprachum, 17 October 1937); Barme, Luang 
Wichit, 121-124.   
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they willingly gave their lives in defending not their village but Ayutthaya, the 
core identity of Thailand. By disseminating this historical fiction to the 
population, the military government hoped to show that ordinary people could 
also contribute to defending their nation as much as any king.  
 
II. Sarit’s Vision of Ayutthaya 
Overall, during the Phibun years Ayutthaya was popularly perceived as the 
great kingdom of the Thai Race. Wars and battles was the main elements of the 
narrative, but allowed the depiction of the heroes and heroines of both royal and 
commoner to demonstrate their loyalty to the Thai kingdom. The way Ayutthayan 
history functioned as a common past to unite all Thai under a homogenous 
collective memory, however, underwent some changes under the Sarit regime. 
After their successful coup in 1957, the army reasoned that they had to step in to 
cope with the arising communist insurgency beyond the capability of the existing 
government.10 Evidently, this pressing issue of defending national security 
demanded a new version of the past. In the terrain of Ayutthayan history, the 
image of the warrior monarch waging war for national existence was, 
unsurprisingly, selected as a dominant theme. 
 
Merging of Monarchy and Military     
As member of a new generation of military educated entirely in Thailand 
without direct and substantial exposure to foreign society, Sarit and his successors 
appeared conservative and shared little interest in Western political ideas. Sarit 
believed that alien concepts such as Western democracy and constitutionalism 
                                                 
10 Ardsuk Duangsawang, “Prawat cheewit”, pp. 70-72.  
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could never fit well with the Thai society until these were amended to match Thai 
ways. As he expressed it shortly after the coup, 
The fundamental cause of our political instability in the past lies in the sudden 
transplantation of alien institution onto our soil without proper regard for the 
circumstances which prevail in our homeland, the nature and characteristics of our 
own people, in a word a genius of our race, with the result that their functioning 
has been haphazard and ever chaotic. If we look at our national history, we can see 
very well that this country works better and prospers under an authority, not a 
tyrannical authority, but a unifying authority around which all elements of the 
nation can rally. On the contrary, the dark pages of our history show that whenever 
such an authority is lacking and dispersal elements had their play, the nation was 
plunged into one disaster after another.11   
To Sarit, this rationale was presented to distinguish himself from other 
foreign educate politicians. Claiming to model was require after the traditional 
father-child relations, Sarit formed a paternalistic government and presented 
himself as Phokhun [Supreme father] demanded that his “children” comply with 
his word.12 Abandoning the abstract alien concepts of constitutionalism and 
democracy, Sarit moved to secure his leadership by employing the traditional 
source of authority familiar to the Thai, namely the monarchy’s charisma, 
believing that it would draw support from the people and would shift the loyalty 
away from the People’s Party remnants and the constitution.13 After more than 
two decades of People’s Party government that had downplayed the king’s 
existence, Sarit restored the monarchy as the key institution of the Thai society.  
                                                 
11 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science 
Association of Thailand and Thammasat University, 1979), p. 156. 
12 David Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 279-81.  
13 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian. Kings, Country, and Constitutions: Thailand’s Political 
Development 1932-2000 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 13-14, 155-62.    
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Several public spectacles were employed in this reinvention of tradition. 
Sarit himself regularly demonstrated his respect for King Bhumipol (r.1946-
present), repeatedly emphasizing that the King’s opinion mattered and frequently 
making public declarations that his own position was legitimized by royal 
approval.14 In gaining the monarchy’s popular support, Sarit sponsored the king’s 
trips to the rural areas throughout the country, as well as foreign countries for 
international recognition.15 The king began to appear in public regularly. Every 
year, university graduates new to received their certificates from his hand. Even 
the National Day was changed from June 24, in memorial of the 1932 coup of the 
People’s Party, to the king’s birthday on December 5th.16  Once again, monarchy 
had established its position in the state’s pantheon of the Nation, Religion, King 
trilogy. Sarit’s restoration of the monarchy was, however, a move for mutual 
benefit. Once established, the monarch squarely backed up Sarit’s regime and 
allowed him to enjoy the approval of the divine right.  
Social Studies textbooks of this period emphasize strongly the monarchy’s 
importance as: “the King is the leader of all Thais. He is the symbol of the state. 
He represents the Thai nation and state… All in all, the Thai takes the king as 
their supreme leader of Thailand and Thai nation”.17 As Thailand is officially a 
constitutional monarchy, the texts recognize the king as Thailand’s most 
important political institution.   
                                                 
14 Thak, Despotic Paternalism, p. 309-311. See also Thak Chalermtiarana, “Towards a More 
Inclusive National Narrative: Thai History and the Chinese: Isan and the Nation State”, in 
Leumkotngao kohphaopandin, ed. Kanchanee La-Ongsri & Thanet Apornsuwan (Bangkok: 
Mathichon, 2001), p. 84 
15 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 281 
16 Watcharin, “Beabrian sangkhomsuksa”, p. 64.  
17 MOE, Nahthiponlamuang [Civic Duties] for Mattayomton (Bangkok: Kurusapa, 1963), p. 43, 
cited in Watcharin, “Beabrian Sangkhomsuksa”, p. 139.  
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The political ideology of Sarit era clearly infiltrated the image of the 
Ayutthayan past constructed through history textbooks written according to the 
1960 curriculum. The first year lower-secondary student would need to learn the 
complete chronology of 33 Ayutthayan kings. Following in their second year, all 
versions of Ayutthayan history textbooks narrated their contents along the 
chronological line. Various historical events, whether domestic or external in 
origin, were woven into a single story circled around a series of great Ayutthayan 
monarchs. The Ayutthayan king thus was the center for all-important events in the 
Thai national history. The narrative was presented in two cycles of rise and fall. 
The first one began with Ayutthaya’s foundation by King U-thong in 1350 and the 
first fall in the King Mahachakkraphat reign in 1569, followed by the revival 
under King Naresuan, who re-unified the kingdom and extended its territory by 
invading many power centers. Ayutthaya then prospered for almost two centuries 
before crumbling under the attack of Burmese troops in 1767. But it seems that 
the lost of this “capital city” was such a tragic end that the resurrection of King 
Taksin was added to the narrative.18    
This mode of narrating the past chronologically had long been the norm of 
Thai recorded past. The chronological plot fosters a direct connection between 
past and present and conceals many possible ruptures. It helps in linking the 
previous ruler with the present one and legitimizing the current king’s status. In 
these textbooks, history written in this way then allowed the perception of 
Ayutthayan rulers to reinforce the current king’s authority as the national leader, 
legitimate enough to lead the modern Thai nation while granting Sarit the divine 
right to rule.   
                                                 
18 Poonphon Asanachinda, Prawatsat (Bangkok: ThaiWattana panich, 1970), pp. 1-35; DICD, 
Wicha prawatsatthai lae thangprathet (Bangkok: Kurusapa, 1974), pp. 1-57.  
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Some historical “facts” were purposely bent to legitimize Sarit’s rule. The 
image of Ayutthaya was militarized and depicted as a military state, whereas its 
administrative system was termed a “military administrative order” [witee 
kanpokkrong baeb thahan].19 The tropes of war, territorial expansion, and conflict 
dominated the narrative to illuminate the leading role of the warrior kings. In 
short, “if there was war, all male citizens had to become soldiers while the king 
was the military’s leader”.20 This projected clearly the indivisibility of civilian and 
military, and the ruling army presented itself as civilians simply taking a military 
role to defend the threatened nation, as in Ayutthayan time. Meanwhile, credit was 
given to the king who now led the nation against its enemy as earlier rulers had 
done.  
However, it was in the dominant image of Naresuan that the elevation of 
monarchy and the militarization of Ayutthayan history were merged. He was the 
monarch who liberated Ayutthaya from the Burmese occupation and led the Thai 
army to seize the Burmese strongholds several times; no other historical icon in 
Thai history could challenge his position as the nexus of the king and military 
leadership. Since this suited the Sarit regime’s objective, textbooks of the 1960s 
further elevated Naresuan’s eminent position.21  
Naresuan was in fact the central icon of Ayutthayan history in 1960s 
textbooks.  Great details on successive wars were presented to prepare the stage 
for the “greatest king” in Thai history. Internal and external crises served merely 
to help illuminate the contribution of the national hero, a warrior king who 
                                                 
19 Prasart Laksila et al. Prawatsat (Bangkok: ThaiWattana panich, 1968), p. 35; DICD, Wicha 
prawatsat, p. 4.  
20 DICD, Wicha prawatsat, p. 4. 
21 For Comparison see, Chamlong Sangamankong, Phumisat-Prawatsat (Bangkok: Thai Wattana 
panich, 1958), pp. 171-173.   
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defended the country from the invasion of its main national enemy.22 Surprisingly, 
16 of 23 pictures appearing in the text are about war, and the other 7 are directly 
associated with Naresuan himself.23 The importance given to Naresuan was 
obvious in the book’s tribute to him:  
King Naresuan the Great was a great warrior of the Thai nation. He was really 
born to rescue the Thai nation, as in the old saying “Ayutthaya was never short of 
good men”. Even at the end of his life, he died as brave soldier on the way to 
war…All Thai people remember and are grateful for his enormous contribution, as 
he rescued the nation and regained independence, so they come together to call 
him another maharat [the great monarch] of Thailand.24
Beyond the representation in textbooks, a linkage between military 
government and Naresuan can also be traced via other sources. As one of the first 
monarchs entitled “Great” [Maharat] in Thai history since the Fourth Reign, his 
status in the pantheon of national heroes was not just confirmed under military 
rule.25 Instead of celebrating Army Day on 28 July in commemoration of 
Thailand’s regaining of its “lost territories” in Laos and Cambodia in 1941, the 
Thai army decided in 1952 to change the date to 25 January, the day that Naresuan 
won an elephant battle over the Burmese prince in 1592.26 The construction of the 
Don Chedi monument during this period by adding the bronze sculpture of 
Naresuan on a war elephant in front of the old pagoda, believed to be built under 
his orders, was a visual demonstration of how this great warrior king protected the 
country from its enemy.27  
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Furthermore, some of the emphasis on Naresuan’s virtues and ethics also 
reflected the selective representation of historical “facts” to confirm Sarit as a 
suitable national leader.  
His [Naresuan] most important trait was bravery. He had the ability to make 
prompt and correct decisions. As we can see when the Crown Prince and other 
Burmese generals encircled his elephant, King Naresuan decided to challenge the 
Prince to an elephant duel.28
Another version also made a similar claim about his leadership:  
One can see that King Naresuan possessed miraculous power. He rescued 
independence and greatly expanded the territory due to his excellent leadership 
with bravery, decisiveness, knowledgeable, and innovation, which produced with 
confidence and trust among military and civilians.29
These virtues of Naresuan obviously are meant to remind of what Sarit 
was known for. In a time of insurgency, he advertised himself as a decisive ruler 
capable of ending the communist and Isan secession threats. Interpreting the 
emphasis on Naresuan’s virtues in the era of Sarit rule, one sees the similarity 
between the two persons. If Naresuan was the leader who ended the national crisis 
in the past, Sarit must be then the best person to govern Thailand during the time 
of crisis in the 1960s.   
 
Ayutthayan Hegemony  
The dominant King Naresuan in the narrative of Ayutthayan history during this 
period did not just support the leading role of the monarchy and military, seen 
from a different angle, the image of Ayutthayan greatness projected under Sarit 
carried implications for national stability and unity, badly needed in that time. 
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Caught up in the political struggle between the world great powers, starting with 
the first Indochina war of 1954, the Thai government committed itself to the 
American bloc by becoming a member of SEATO in a defensive move against a 
possible external threat. The special relationship with the US reached its milestone 
at the Rusk-Thanat secret agreement of mutual defense in 1962 after the Laos 
crisis in 1960-1, to assure the US commitment to Thailand in case of a communist 
attack.30 But not all threats would come from outside national borders: the arising 
communist and secession movements had become major concerns for the Thai 
government.  
To promote national integrity, the Sarit regime centralized the production 
and dissemination of Thai history to a further degree. To buttress the unified 
nation, the Bangkok court tradition was depicted as the national culture, while 
deviant contents that might imply the independent status of any region and thus 
support the secessionist movement were downplayed, and the Ayutthaya past was 
selected as a subject for this campaign. Its image was projected as a great 
kingdom existing for more than four centuries, with its power felt in a large 
“territory” equal to or exceeding that of the modern Thailand. Ayutthaya was 
represented as the only political entity that had existed on contemporary Thai 
territory, and as the Thai nation in the past. The definition of Ayutthaya and the 
Thai nation is often a very blurry one, and a claim such as “Ayutthaya was the 
capital of the Thai race from 1350 to 1767” is not uncommon.31  
This is historically impossible have, as the contradicting stories from the 
Ayutthaya-Bangkok, Chiangmai, or Pattani point of view could not create a 
homogenous story as the military government had expected. However, Thai 
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history from the multi-centric point of view was thus unusable for the military 
regime in promoting national unity. To make sure that all Thai citizens around the 
country would identify with Bangkok through the promotion of the Ayutthayan 
past, the history of various regions was downplayed and only selectively 
presented. The Bangkok-Ayutthayan view has arguably occupied the main 
position in the narrative; only a few elements of local history that fit with national 
unity were allowed  alongside as a minor contribution to the story of Ayutthayan 
grandeur.32 This would help explain the incredibly unified plot of Thai history 
during this period.33
 An example of the degree to which how Ayutthayan history was promoted 
under military rule was the well-publicized “commemoration of 200 years of the 
fall of Ayutthayan” organized nationwide in April of 1967, to remind Thai people 
about “the Fall of Ayutthaya” that had taken place two centuries before. Activities 
included the exhibition of artifacts at the National Library, National Museum, 
Silapakorn University, Chantrakasem Museum, along with some selected artifacts 
on exhibit in several provinces. This exhibition would encourage more Thai to 
come and see the remnants of Ayutthaya’s glory. For the people living in 
provincial towns outside the Central region, the nationwide exhibition would be a 
chance to learn and understand the Ayutthayan past which they had only got to 
know through textbooks.34  
In commemorating the fall of Ayutthaya, a 10-day seminar program was 
organized at the National Library, with participation from eminent historians; the 
collection of the speeches given for this event represented the knowledge on the 
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Ayutthayan past circulated among academics with state support. The topics 
ranged from medicine, law, literature and architecture to sculpture, music, mural 
painting, and theatre during the Ayutthayan period. It also included familiar topics 
such as Ayutthayan society, Ayutthaya viewed from the West, religion, 
government, international relations, and the military, era where the speaker 
presented the Ayutthayan government as attached with the “traditional national 
principle of the Thai” that “every man must be national soldier”.35 Ayutthayan 
history was brilliantly presented as the past of all Thai nationals: “The ruins have 
that survived are a monument to remind us that Thai are people with a past… later 
generations will study and recognize it as the testimony to Thai dignity, the 
magnificence of the Thai nation since the past of Ayutthaya”.36
 In presenting an even clearer impression of Ayutthaya as a common past 
for all Thai, a story of war and struggle with the national enemy was employed. 
Some textbooks mentioned 20 wars almost exclusively with Burma, the key rival 
of Ayutthayan kingdom. In constructing Burma as the prime national enemy, the 
Royal Chronicle compiled in Mongkut’s reign was later credited as the first major 
attempt of the Thai elite in projecting the war between Ayutthayan and Peguan 
kings as a conflict between two countries, or people of different nations.37 
Whereas the Burmese were represented as the aggressors, the Thai only wished to 
maintain their sovereignty.38 The threat from the Western powers was definitely 
the cause of this sudden move to heighten the sense of belonging to one common 
Thai nation. However, it was through Our War with the Burmese (1917) and The 
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Bibliography of King Naresuan the Great (1950) by Prince Damrong that the 
image of the Burmese as the national enemy was widely disseminated to the 
public. While the first one was the first and detailed study on all wars between the 
two kingdoms, where Damrong emphasized that Burma was the national enemy, 
the second was a heroic tale of the great king that represented him as a liberator of 
the Thai nation.39 The impact of those two books was enormous since they had 
been used as sourcebooks in the writing of history textbooks by later generations 
that continued to depict Burma as enemy of the Thai nation. 
For the textbooks of the Sarit years, every major war with the Burmese 
during Naresuan reign received a very detailed description. This is quite 
understandable since under Naresuan people over a huge area had recognized his 
authority, interpreted by the modern Thai state as a major territorial expansion. 
Moreover, the wars waged during his reign also included the invasion of Burmese 
capital, a great achievement for an Ayutthayan monarch which has never been 
repeated. Therefore, the wars presented the case of a nation in crisis and 
emphasized the need for the Thai to unite and fight with the common enemy, 
which suited perfectly the political context of the Sarit era.  
With information on those wars waged against the key national Other, the 
Thai national past would appear as the collective struggle of the Thai people 
against those who are not their. The text did mention that, “Once he had declared 
independence, King Naresuan prepared for the fight to preserve independence…at 
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the same time he had gathered together all Thai people to become one and 
prepared a new strategy to fight Burma.”40
The Thai who supported Ayutthaya under Naresuan’s leadership 
symbolized the modern Thai nation’s struggle with the communist threat, 
represented as Burma in the historical narrative.41 The Burmese were projected as 
the national enemy that kept invading Ayutthaya, thus actually taking up the role 
of the Other who helps mark the contrast between what is Thai and what is not. 
Thus, the history of Ayutthaya’s warfare with Burma helped tighten the depiction 
of Thai identity by borrowing a national Other for radical contrast.   
The security threat and the nationalist historical plot that emphasized the 
integrity of the Thai nation were promoted to another degree during Sarit period. 
Whereas the communist threat made this plot very useful, this form of national 
history was actually intensified by the projecting of Ayutthaya as the sole center 
of the Thai world. Its glory was promoted to mark the superior status above all 
other centers. A national enemy was also projected, and the sense of a common 
destiny and goal intensified to allow the cult of Naresuan, the national war hero, to 
rise. Ayutthaya then became a representation of the Thai geo-body in the past, 
sometimes even surpassing the territory of modern Thailand in scope. 
 
III. Decentralization of the narrative?: Ayutthaya Polity in the ’90s  
After an interval of three decades, the Ayutthayan image appearing in the 
textbooks of the 1990 curriculum differed markedly from the 1960s. The Thai 
nation was no longer struggling for its existence and could shift its concerns to 
other issues. Much of the content was altered. No doubt, the Ayutthayan image is 
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still regularly promoted in the Thai historical narrative, however, its degree of 
dominance is no longer the same, nor exclusive.       
  
Dispersion of Security Threat   
Since the late 1980s, the great innovation and diversification of the work 
on local history has been one major trend in the recent history of Thai 
historiography.42 The history of each region, town, or even village has gradually 
acquired a narrative of its own. Instead of being suppressed and censored, as was 
the case under military rule, narratives of regional differences have been strongly 
promoted.  
However, it is rare that these local histories could escape the dominant plot 
of Thai national history by offering a narrative of the past that deviates or 
contradicts the official one. In most cases, the local historians only provide more 
detailed information on how their village, town, or region could fit in and 
contributed to the established national narrative, how particularly their community 
can be linked to Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, and Bangkok.43  
Though this movement cannot produce any alternative mode of narrating 
the Thai past to challenge the official linear structure, the existence of the local 
history movement itself is already worth a closer look. The fact that the Thai state 
does not discourage but actually promotes and funds research and conferences in 
this category forces one to ask the question of why the image of Ayutthayan past 
as a prime unifier for the Thai nation is no longer exclusively present.           
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Since the early 1980s, Thailand has enjoyed territorial integrity without 
significant threats to its sovereignty. As the Chinese Communist Party (CPT) 
ceased its support for the insurgency and the Thai government adopted the new 
policy known as 66/23 that saw the members of the CPT as “fellow countrymen” 
and not a foreign threat, the CPT collapsed and the internal communist insurgency 
ended.44 By the end of the Vietnam War, the Thai government successfully 
assimilated Northeastern region with the rest of the nation. With these 
developments, the Projecting the image of King Naresuan unifying the nation in a 
war against the foreign threat lost its prime function. Thailand no longer needs the 
military regime to solve this problem. The army had to learn to cope with this 
change by adopting a new outlook as the leader who fights not war but poverty 
and brings Thailand along the road of prosperity.   
The new curriculum released and implemented in 1990 reflects a lessening 
of state concern over the issue of national security, and it rarely mentions security 
as the prime goal of the education system. In its preface, the rationale for 
implementing the new curriculum was “to catch up with the economic and social 
needs at present and in the future.”45 Economic development, together with the 
environmental and social problems caused by rapid industrialization, are the main 
issues of concern.46         
Textbooks of Thai history since 1990 have not follow the format of their 
1960 counterparts. The linear narrative of Ayutthaya from its foundation to its fall 
is given as a short general outline and is not adopted as a plot of narration for the 
information on Ayutthayan history; thematic chapters on politics and governance, 
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society, economics, arts and religion, and foreign relations are adopted instead. 
Naresuan is mentioned only briefly in the section of politics and governance.47 
Prasert Wittayarat’s text gives a short description of each Ayutthayan monarch, 
with limited information on Naresuan, mentioning not only his war victory but 
also his “encouragement of foreign trade, sending an ambassador to China, and 
opening diplomatic relations with Western nations, namely Spain and Holland.”48     
This very brief description on his reign with focus on diverse issues 
markedly contrasts with the textbook of the 1960s, where only war and security 
issues were discussed. The greater variety of contributions on Naresuan’s reign 
fits in smoothly with the new description of the monarch’s responsibility: “as 
Ayutthayan territory had expanded greatly…His royal responsibility was no 
longer limited to the ruler or leader in the war campaign; his great burden was the 
government for happiness, prosperity, and integrity of the country.49  
With a shift in the king’s most important role from military leader to the 
leader of the Thai nation, we see a move from the emphasis on Naresuan to a 
focus on King Trilok, the great political reformer. In the Prasert version, only 
Trilok’s name is depicted in bold letters as he launched a major reform to 
strengthen the Ayutthayan command over other centers and divided the civilian 
ministers from the military one.50 Interestingly, most textbooks of 1990 identify 
Trilok’s reforms as the key source of Ayutthaya’s strength and the basis for its 
stability. The elevation of Trilok may also be linked to the trend of de-
militarization of Thai politics that has developed during that period. As Chatchai 
government was popularly elect and based its legitimacy on people’s will, the 
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image of warrior king that would credit the military man as national leader no 
longer appeared so desirable. Conversely, it was the image of an ancient 
Ayutthayan king ruled according to law with a minimal military presence, an 
embodiment of monarchy and politician that suited the political ideology 
popularly pursued during the Chatchai government.      
 
In Need of Sophisticated Appearance 
Apart from the subsiding of security threat, the Thai state’s support for the 
production of local history has actually contributed to Thai identity in at least two 
other ways. First, it allows Thailand to make claims to being the home of ancient 
civilizations beyond the reach of what official national history could cover. 
Second, with different cultures and historical experiences, the Thai state would 
appear more sophisticated and diverse to both domestic and international 
audiences; it also begins to advertise diverse tourism campaigns by commodifying 
regional historical resources.    
The aspiration to recover age-old evidence proving the Thai nation’s 
antiquity was already in place since the time of Chulalongkorn, when he called for 
the history that traced civilization in Thai territories back more than 1,000 years.51 
Unfortunately, the prehistoric artifacts discovered in Thailand are not concentrated 
in one area, although Ban Chiang site and the Northeastern region could be the 
closest case thus no single region could claim to be the original home of Thai 
culture. More importantly, the large gap between prehistoric evidence and 
Sukhothai era has made it difficult to link those archaeological artifacts with the 
narrative of national official history. As a result, this scattered archaeological 
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evidence has been left un-incorporated for the local historian to make claims for 
its association with regional identities, which in turn affect the early narrative in 
official Thai history’s linear structure.52  
Such a change is obvious in the book History of Settlement in Thailand. 
This textbook presents development themes from the origin of Thai race through a 
process of state formation up to the casting or the merging of Thai culture. The 
most remarkable aspect of this textbook is that it allows a multi-centric view of 
national history. The area of Thailand of pre-Ayutthayan times is depicted as the 
home of numerous political centers whose different cultures developed and were 
transmitted until the textbook ended just at the foundation of Ayutthaya. The text 
requires the co existence of Lanna, Sukhothai, and Ayutthaya, claiming that Lanna 
only became part of the Thai kingdom in the Thonburi period.53 This information 
never shows up in the school textbooks denies the previous claim.  
Secondly, as Thailand moves to rely so heavily on the tourism industry 
and sell its exotic cultural appeal to visitors, it now needs much more diverse 
histories of local heroes or monuments for intensive promotion of historical 
sites.54 Ayutthaya and Sukhothai have long been listed among the country’s major 
attractions, while the promotion of other sites, such as Ban Chiang, Phimai and 
Phanom Rung, began much later. Capitalizing on the World Heritage titles, 
Thailand has tried to promote the new historical sites to tap the interest of more 
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tourists.55 More detailed stores are then needed for the promotion of these new 
attractions so they would appear more important and attract more attention. The 
diversity of Thai history that was once viewed as threat to national integrity is 
now embraced as resources for the tourism industry and consumption.56 Local 
history, mentioned and celebrated so much on local historical sites supplies this 
much needed story. In this case, some aspects of the past denied by previous 
regimes have been called upon for present use.            
               
Non-Decentralized Far South 
Though in general, the recent version of Ayutthayan history was not taken 
as an absolute version of the collective memory of all Thais and began to allow 
for the emergence of multi-centric history, not every center has experienced such 
a decentralization process. Though it was the success in maintaining the national 
consciousness that explains the birth of multi-centered history, it is understandable 
that regions posing a security threat to Bangkok would not receive similar 
treatment, i.e. the “Far South” or the Muslim-dominated  provinces (Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat, and Satun), seen by the Thai state as a threat of the secessionist 
movement. Though the situation changed in the late twentieth century, the Thai 
state still has not succeeded in forming the national consciousness among citizens 
in this area. 
Archaeological research has proved the existence of the ancient settlement 
in the Pattani area, dating back to the sixth century. The kingdom, possibly 
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Langkasuka, flourished as a major trans-isthmus trading city.57 This area then 
developed into a trading kingdom of Pattani in the fifteenth century. Through an 
interaction with Arab traders, the Pattani ruler of the early sixteenth century 
embraced Islam. These breakthroughs in the history of Pattani were rarely 
acknowledged by the Thai state since they not suit its ideology.   
 In the textbook on the History of the settlement in Thailand, several 
“ancient states’” are mentioned. Srivijaya was the “ancient state” that represented 
the prosperity of the Southern region. Interestingly, there is information on the 
prosperity of the Tambralinga state that according to the text predated Srivijaya 
and had control over Ligor (Nakorn si thammarat), Chaiya, Songkhla, and Pattani. 
Following the “ancient states” chapter, the author then describes another series of 
pre-Sukhothai states.59  The section on the South begins by describing the decline 
of Srivijaya, Tambralinga and the occupation by the Chola Tamil. The focus of 
this part then concentrated on the rise of Nakornsithammarat and the ruler Sri 
Thammasokarat, who gave his name to the state. Nakornsithammarat expanded its 
influence to rule several centers-Kedah, Songkhla, Kelantan, Pattani, Saiburi etc., 
altogether 12 major centers. These cities under Nakorn’s power are represented as 
the 12 animal symbols, a symbol of the golden age of Nakorn under the Sri 
Thammasokarat dynasty.60            
 From reading this textbook, one would get the sense that Southern 
Thailand had long been a home of high culture mastering trading activity. From 
the book’s perspective, it does not matter whether Srivijaya was centered in 
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Southern Thailand or Sumatra, since the Southern Thai had already founded the 
Tambralinga state, centered at Nakorn, long before that. Therefore, Tambralinga 
represented the stronghold of the Thai in this region. Moreover, the secession 
prone region of Pattani that has called for independence is tamed by the claim of 
its long subjection to the Buddhist states, Tambralinga and then Sri 
Thammasokarat respectively. There is not a single page in this textbook where 
Patani is given the status of a “state”. It could only be presented as a city under 
Nakorn’s control, which would not leave room open for any interpretation that 
takes Pattani as formerly independent state to inspire the secessionist movement.  
The dominance of Nakorn over other centers like Pattani in the South is 
then linked to the Sukhothai and Ayutthayan history to legitimize Bangkok’s rule 
over the troubled region. The author starts this linkage by introducing the 
inscriptions containing details on political relations between King Sri 
Thammasorarat and King U-Thong of Ayutthaya, followed by its cultural 
interaction with Sukhothai. This helps orient Nakorn to the center of the national 
linear history. In concluding the story, the author only needs to mention the 
incorporation of Nakornsithammarat into the Ayutthaya kingdom in the late 15th 
century.61 Since Nakorn was part of Ayutthaya, which developed into the Thai 
nation, Thailand should thereby inherit the undisputed right of sovereignty over 
the area falling under Nakorn’s sphere of influence, including Pattani and the “far 
South”. Here security reasons do not allow for the decentralization enjoyed by 
other centers where multi-centered history could blossom.                   
The case of the un-decentralized history of Pattani shows that the noble agenda of 
“local history” for the appreciation of the diversity envisioned by scholars was not 
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accepted unselectively by the Thai state.62 In the end it is the interest of national 
security that commands how history is to be written in the textbooks.63  
        
Conclusion 
Ayutthayan history is the major frontier of contestation in the politics of 
representation of Thai identity. As the kingdom believed to be a center of the 
Thais for more than four centuries, it gives significant justification to Thailand as 
an ancient and great nation since time immemorial. The Ayutthayan past provides 
the historical dimension much needed by the young Siamese/Thai Nation State. 
However, the image of Ayutthaya as a great and unified kingdom has also 
experienced several alterations.  
As discussed above, the image of Ayutthaya during the Sarit period was 
very much centered on the leadership of Naresuan. The choice of this warrior king 
as the center of the narrative of Ayutthayan past was governed by the political 
context of the 1960s, when the military leaders intended to inculcate new loyalty 
among the Thais toward their leadership. The failure of the Constitution as a new 
source of national loyalty initiated by previous governments led to the promotion 
of a more familiar and less abstract symbol of national unity, namely the monarch. 
As a result, the heroic story of Naresuan was selected to promote both army and 
monarchy. Moreover, his victories in several battles helped demonstrate the 
influence of the Ayutthayan court over other centers that now lie within 
Thailand’s borders, thus, justifying the legitimacy of Bangkok, a successor of 
Ayutthaya, to rule over those peripheral centers.  
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Three decades later, we then see Ayutthaya beginning to be re-imagined 
when the threat of national integrity that justified the dissemination of the above-
mentioned image had ceased to exist and the Thai state had come to better realize 
the benefit of local diversities. This benefit appears to be both on the pride of the 
center as they could capitalize on the antiquity of other centers, as well as the new 
and diverse image which could function as a cultural capital for the burgeoning 
tourism industry. However, the shift toward a more decentralized or multi-
centered history was influential but by no means complete. Within this 
transformation, we still see Ayutthaya as a unified power center to which all Thais 
should look back as their common past.  
 
Chapter 4  
Sources of National Prosperity: The Economy of Ayutthaya 
 
The greatness and unity of Ayutthaya have long been utilized in forging 
collective memories for all Thai citizens. However, binding people together by 
referring to the common political unit was only the most obvious function of the 
Ayutthayan image in the creation of the national past. To understand more 
conclusively the role of Ayutthaya’s past, we must go beyond the aspects of 
military might and territorial demarcation and look at its other aspects. This 
chapter will deal with Ayutthaya’s economy as depicted in the textbooks of the 
1960 and 1990 curricula.  
Economic growth in Thailand over the last few decades had been 
undeniably stunning. Once heavily dependent on the production of agricultural 
products, with much of the population living at a subsistence level; Thailand now 
relies significantly on the demand of the international economy. Here, I will 
explore how the dynamism of Thai economy of the last few decades has left 
obvious traces in the depiction of the issues of trade and the role of Chinese and 
Westerners was in the Ayutthayan economy. 
  
I. Nation and its Economic History
As comparison with political issues, economic problems might not be 
viewed as quite so important for a newly established nation. At the turn of the last 
century, priority was given to national defense and internal peace rather than to 
economic development; therefore the plan for a lower Chaophraya River irrigation 
project proposed by a Dutch official in Chulalongkorn’s reign to boost rice 
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production did not receive government support.1 Similar priorities were reflected 
in the study of the past. Economic history usually first appeared as a mere 
component of political history; its data helped fulfill Siam’s claim to be a 
powerful nation by presenting the commercial responsibility and influence which 
the predecessor polity once possessed.2 It was only much later that economic 
history acquired independent status in books or as topics taught in school.   
In the Thai educational system, the economic-related content began to 
appear in a rather subtle form in textbooks during Chulalongkorn’s reign. Kullada 
Keshboonchu-Mead emphasizes on the role that the Thammachariya [Civic 
Manners] textbook series used at the time played in implanting an ideology 
suitable to the new economic order of capitalism. Its lessons suggested the 
society’s penetration into the money economy and division of labor as an 
indication of their civility. This textbook also encouraged the students to pursue 
material wealth and become productive members of the Thai nation.3  
The fact that the phongsawadan, key documents used to write Thai 
history, had nothing to say about economic activities since they did not elevate the 
king’s dignity has made the composition of Thai economic history an arduous 
task.4 Political ideology further deterred this situation, since the discussion of 
economic history was attributed to Communist and Socialist regimes. Some 
                                                 
1 Wilailekha Tavonthanasan. Chonchannamthai kapka rap wattanatham tawantok (Bangkok: 
Muang Boran, 2002), pp. 152-53. 
2 Pierre Chaunu, “Economic History: Past Achievements and Future Prospects”, in Constructing 
the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology, ed. Jacques Le Goff & Pierre Nora (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985).    
3 Kullada, “Rise and Decline”, pp. 155-59; See also her, “Official Nationalism Under King 
Chulalongkorn”, paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, 3-6 July 1987, 
Canberra, Australia. 
4 Walailekha Thavontanasan, Chonchannam thai kapkan rapwattanatam tawantok (Bangkok: 
Muangboran, 2002), p. 108. 
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economic studies were banned on the ground that they stimulated revolution and 
threatened the monarchical rule.5  
Among the few early works on the economic history of Thailand was 
Prawatkankhathai [History of Thai Commerce] (1943) by Khun Wichitmatra. The 
book narrated the development of commerce from ancient times up to the 
Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, and Bangkok periods. The long chapter on Ayutthaya 
mentioned its important trading relations with major nations of Asia and Europe.6 
Wichit’s Prawatsat setthakit thai [Economic History of Thailand] was another 
general work. He mentioned Narai as the Thai ruler who had “an economic plan” 
by hiring the French to build a Western style port and shipyard at Mergui.7  
Until very recently, the limited number of works on the Thai economy 
available reflected the domination of national security issues, as the orientation 
and production of Thai history were plotted to reflected this priority. As a result, 
there was little room left for economic history and the story of Ayutthayan 
economy.   
       
II. Great Kingdom Built on Agricultural Surplus
The economic aspects of Ayutthayan history during the Sarit period hardly 
differed from the previous form. In the textbooks written according to the 1960 
curriculum, warrior-kings dominated the narrative of Ayutthayan history for the 
purposes of legitimizing Sarits military regime, now allied with the monarchy.  
 The sinificance of Ayutthayan wealth seemed to be undermined since it 
was not regarded as having the importance of glory gained from the battlefield. In 
                                                 
5 Pannee Bualek, Kansuksaprawatsatsetthakitthai: Botsamruatsathanakwamru (Bangkok: Sayam, 
2001), pp. 4-7. 
6 Wichit Matra, Prawatkankhathai (Bangkok: Ruamsan, 1973 (4th print)), pp. 78-308. 
7 Wichit Wathakan, “Kansornruangprawatsatsetthakitkhongthai”, in Wichit Wathakan Anusorn, 
(His Cremation Volume, 1962), p. 125.  
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one text, there is a chapter on “the progress of the Thai nation in the Ayutthayan 
period”, but this only includes legal, literary, religious, artistic and 
communications aspects, with nothing on trade, agriculture or commerce. The 
only content related to economic activity focuses on the forms of taxation, 
discussed in detail in the section on legal development.8  
A very brief mention on the economy of the Ayutthayan kingdom 
appeared in Prasart Laksila’s version. He claimed the average Thais during that 
period enjoyed a good life and that rice growing was the most important 
occupation. Trading activities between small communities specializing in the 
production of different goods were also mentioned, but, everything related to the 
economy was limited to one short paragraph.9 The DICD version described the 
whole course of Ayutthayan history in 57 pages; interestingly, it devoted only 
two-and-a-half pages to economic activities. Again, “rice farming is the most 
important profession of the Thai people therefore, it has received special attention 
and support from the government of every period to guarantee a good yield”. 10  
It is evident that within the limited space devoted to information on 
Ayutthayan economic activities, the agricultural sector was considered the most 
important. Rice was at that time the main export commodity. In 1960, the 
agricultural sector brought Thailand 39.8% of its GDP, dwarfing other sectors as 
the dominant economic activity.11 Moreover, Sarit emphasized the rural 
development and promoted agriculture as the foundation of country. Thailand was 
advertised as the “World’s Kitchen”, the main producer of key agricultural 
                                                 
8 Poonphon,. Prawatsat, pp. 1-6. 
9 Prasart, Prawatsat, p. 38. 
10 DICD. Wicha prawatsat, p. 13.   
11 Kevin Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism: Development Through Boom and Bust”, in The 
Political Economy of South East Asia: Conflicts, Crises, and Change, ed. Garry Rodan et al. 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2001 (2nd Edition)), p.82.  
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products to feed populations throughout the world.12 With this policy, Sarit 
expected to gain Thailand greater bargaining power in the world arena. 
During this period, the agriculturists particularly farmers, were promoted 
as the kradooksanlang khong chat [nation’s backbone], who contributed to the 
nation-development project under military rule. The best-known part of the song 
read, “The hardworking agriculturists are the backbone of the nation. Thais will 
become powerful because we are the agricultural nation”. Wichit claimed, 
There are three groups of real members of the nation: laborers, agriculturists, and 
soldier-policemen. The rest are ordinary members that support each other but must 
stand behind those three groups.13
A milestone in Sarit’s development policy came with the introduction of 
the National Economic Development Plan with the assistance of United States and 
World Bank. Although the First Plan (1961-1966) was launched during the Sarit 
years, intending to move Thailand toward the import-substitution industrialization 
strategy where foreign investment in the manufacturing sectors was strongly 
encouraged, the agricultural sector and agro-industry were still counted as the 
prime concerns. The objectives of the plan included the expansion of income from 
textiles, sugar, paper, and burlap bags.14 The sugar crisis further supported his 
vision for gaining foreign currency from exporting agricultural products. Sarit 
once declared, 
Agriculture is the best way for a stable life with freedom and self-support without 
need of dependence on others…Agriculture not only produces food but includes 
other consumer goods such as cloth made from cotton, rice sacks from hemp, tyres 
                                                 
12 Pleang Phupha. Chompol phuplikpheandin (Bangkok: Phailin, 1995), p. 93. 
13 Wichit Wathakan, Chatniyom. (Bangkok: Damrongkanpim, (2print) 1985), pp. 53-53, quoted in 
Saichon Sattayanurak, Chatthai lae khwampenthai doi Luang Wichit Watakan  (Bangkok: 
Mathichon, 2002), pp. 88-89.  
14 Sineenat Vechapat, “Kwamkitkhong chompol Sarit Thanarat kiewkap kanpattana setthakit lae 
sangkhom” (MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1996), p. 57. 
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from rubber. So be please satisfied and proud that you have set the right way of 
life in choosing agriculture as your occupation…15         
Actually, the government was also expecting that profits earned from 
agricultural products could be allocated to fuel the expansion of infrastructure 
such as roads and ports, so the country would appear more attractive for foreign 
investment. For the first time, the majority of farmers in the Chaophraya Delta 
could enjoy double even triple cropping due to the construction of dams and new 
irrigation canals, together with the introduction of the short-period rice developed 
by the International Rice Research Institute and intensive use of chemical 
fertilizers.16 The Thai government then reallocated the profits from the expansion 
of rice cultivation to support industrialization by the “rice premium”, a trade 
mechanism whereby, the government monopolized all rice exports and reaped 
profits from buying cheap rice and selling it at the much higher international 
market price. Furthermore, the rice premium also kept domestic rice available at 
cheap prices, allowing a low-wage workforce to attract multinational companies 
deciding to relocate their factories in Thailand.17  
In such a context, Ayutthayan trade received little concern in history 
textbook of the period and was mentioned only briefly as a significant source of 
income, along with reference to Ayutthayan’s strategic location for both domestic 
and international trade and its trading relations: “The king encouraged his people 
in commercial activities. His generosity to the foreign merchants who came to 
trade in Thailand attracted more and more of them to trade at Ayutthaya. Both 
                                                 
15 Niwat Chimpalee, “Pattanakansetthakit lae ponkrathoptor chonnabotthai” [Economic 
Development and Impact on Thai Rural]. JTU, 8 (September, 1978), p. 52, quoted in Sineenat, 
“Kwamkitkhong Sarit”, p. 66. 
16 Pasuk Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, Thailand: Politics and Economy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 36-39; Sineenat, “Kwamkitkhong Sarit”, pp. 67-69.  
17 Walden Bello et. al., Siamese Tragedy: Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand 
(Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998), Chapter 8.   
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domestic and international trade expanded enormously. The Country’s economy 
then progressed accordingly.”18  
Interestingly, this spotlight on the importance of foreign trader choosing to 
conduct their business in Ayutthaya was very similar to the government’s move to 
attract foreign investment in 1960. See against the economic nationalism of 
Phibun, this was an important shift in policy that not only ignored the threat of 
foreigners manipulating Thai economy but also explicitly stated the benefit of 
their involvement. The Sarit government began to convince the Thais of the 
contribution of foreign invest in Thailand, a process which would be intensified 
later on. 
However, the domestic merchants, who were mostly Chinese and 
dominated the trading activities of Ayutthaya did not receive much state backing. 
The anti-Chinese sentiment which had existed at the official level since the Phibun 
era was still very much in place.19 The problem with the Chinese contribution to 
Thai national history was that since the period of royal absolutism, the nationalism 
that the Thai king hoped to create, the “official nationalism”, had already 
employed the Chinese as the Thai “Other”. Wachirawut called them “the Jews of 
the Orient”; they were seen as parasites that exploited the locals by making easy 
money and sending it back home.20 Moreover, they had always attached their 
loyalty to China, not Siam. From the 1930s to the mid-1960s, their strong 
presence in the society was threatening to the Thai state, which officially defined 
them as the Other in the promotion of its Nationalism.21   
                                                 
18 DICD, Wicha Prawatsat, pp. 13, 37-38.   
19 Barme, Luang Wichit, pp. 152-55. 
20 Saichon, “Chatthai lae kwampenthai”, pp. 168-70. 
21 Thak, “Towards the More Conclusive History”, p. 73; Wichit Matra, (Khun) Lak-Thai 
(Bangkok: Srangsan (5th Print) 2510. Original 1928), pp. 9-15. 
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The decision of the Sarit government to continue the anti-Chinese policy 
of the Phibun years may relate to the problem of the Communist movement. As 
the Communist Party of Thailand had numerous ethnic Chinese members as well 
as link to China, the Thai state when looking to promote anti-communist policy, 
would easily include the Chinese among its targets.22 In eliminating their 
Chineseness that carried the possibility of being communist, the Chinese were 
forced to adopt Thai names. Even in the Sarit years, Chinese were still projected 
as the internal Other as opposed to the historical external Other, the Burmese. This 
ideology in turn explains why the information on the important Chinese 
contribution to the Ayutthayan economy was suppressed in the school textbooks 
of the Sarit period; at most as China was mentioned as an important trading 
partner with no mention whatsoever of the Chinese community in Siam.23  
In conformance with the objective of developing agro-industry, the 
Ayutthayan image in the Sarit years was one of an agricultural state where farmers 
played an indispensable role as the economic backbone of the nation. As the 
government started to encourage foreign investment, it also presented the long 
history of foreign traders as proof of Thai sincerity towards foreigners choosing to 
do business in Thailand. The Chinese, however, were excluded from this national 
narrative due to their close links with the demonized perception of the 
Communist.       
 
III. Inventing Image of the Oriental Entrepot  
After three decades of rapid development that changed Thailand’s 
economic status, the image of Ayutthaya projected since the Sarit period failed to 
                                                 
22 Kasian Tejapera, Commodifying Marxism: The Formation of Modern Thai Radical Culture, 
1927-1958 (Trans Pacific Press: Melbourne, 2001).  
23 DICD, Wicha prawatsati, pp. 13, 37-38; Prasart, Prawatsat, p. 38.  
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provide a “suitable” past that explained the economic boom of the 1980s-1990s. 
The structural changes in the Thai economy and the accelerated GDP growth of 
8% since the 1960s were due partly to Sarit’s economic development plan, the 
flow of foreign investment, and the huge amounts of money flooding into the 
country at the height of Vietnam War. The all-weather highways, numerous 
airports, expanded seaports, and other improved infrastructure built with US aid to 
support the war in neighboring Indochina and counter insurgency movement in 
the rural areas boosted Thailand’s competitiveness as a haven for multi-national 
companies to establish their manufacturing base. However, the rapid economic 
change was most visible during the late 1980s after several re-structuring 
programs imposed by Thai government to counter the oil crisis. The massive 
devaluation of the baht in 1984 soon paved the way for the stunning economic 
growth. Manufacturing sectors benefited greatly from this policy, leading 
Thailand to experience a boom through the export-oriented economy, which 
redefined its economic relations with the world.24  
The economically dynamic Thailand of the 1990s hoped to reorient its past 
to confirm the new source of prosperity. The Thai state had gradually discarded 
the static image of an agricultural Ayutthaya in the rush to appreciate and 
disseminate the newly invented image of Ayutthaya as Oriental entrepot. History 
textbooks of the 1990 curriculum present an obvious shift in how the Thai state 
deals with the issue of Ayutthaya’s economic system. The thematic order, used 
instead of the chronological approach which appeared in the textbooks of the 
1960s, has liberated the economic aspects of the Ayutthaya from the domination 
of the political content, allowed for a detailed discussion.  
                                                 
24 Pasuk & Baker, Thailand, p. 143-170. 
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Most current history textbooks divide the chapter on Ayutthaya’s economy 
into three sections: agriculture, handicrafts, and commerce. Though they accept 
the importance of agriculture as the foundation of the kingdom, the smaller part 
that farming sector played in the economy of the late twentieth century may 
explain its lesser significance in the image of the Ayutthayan past.25    
Handicraft production, together with household industry, is described as 
the least important economic activity and was mentioned only briefly; some texts 
even choose to ignore totally the handicraft.26  Prasert’s version mentions very 
briefly that the “handicrafts and industry of the Ayutthayan era, although less 
important as compared to agriculture and commerce, played a great role in the 
economic stability of Ayutthaya”,27 while Wittaya’s version further mentions the 
significance of pottery and porcelain that were exported to neighboring 
countries.28 Analyzed in its context, the inclusion of the section on handicrafts and 
industry in the story of Ayutthayan wealth may be related to the Thai economy 
that now relies so heavily on the export of manufactures. The history of export 
products demonstrates that Thailand has a long experience in this area. However, 
the main emphasis of the chapter on the economy is the section on commerce, 
where Ayutthaya is mentioned as a “nerve center” of international trade in 
Southeast Asia. Witthaya’s text devotes as many as 11 out of 14 pages of the 
chapter to commerce, particularly trading activities with foreign countries.29 
                                                 
25 Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism”, p. 84. 
26 Kramon Thongthammachat et. al., Prathet khongrao 3 (Bangkok: Aksorn charoenthat, Bangkok, 
2002), pp. 64-75.    
27 Prasert, Prathet Khongrao, p.56.  
28 Witthaya, Our Country, p. 35.  
29 Ibid., pp. 33-49  
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Prasert’s version goes further, claiming that we can use international trade as an 
index that determines the economic conditions of Ayutthaya.30  
Three major factors that could shed some light upon the emerging image 
of Ayutthaya as a commercial power of the region are structural change in the 
Thai economy of 1990, new developments in the academic world of that period, 
and changing perception of the Chinese. First factor is the change in the nature of 
the Thai economy. Thailand in the late 1980s adopted the export-oriented 
industrialization strategy and began to export a wide range of commodities to the 
world. Starting from the textile and leather industry, Thailand gradually moved to 
concentrate on manufacturing higher technology goods such as automobiles, 
mechanical equipment, and electronic products.31 This dramatic expansion in the 
manufacturing sector was possible because of the ongoing change in the patterns 
of the East Asian international division of labor. Japanese companies, followed by 
their Taiwanese, Korean, and Hong Kong counterparts, had decided to make 
production more competitive by relocating their factories in the resource-rich 
Southeast Asia, and Thailand was one of their favorite choices. Japanese 
investment surged in the early 1970s and surpassed the United States as the 
biggest source of foreign investment in 1973.32  
The result was a stunning structural change in Thai economy. The 
agricultural sector, which used to be the nation’s most important source of 
income, contributed only 15.8 and 12.7% of Thailand’s GDP in 1985 and 1990 
respectively.33 Based on the sources of the national wealth, Thailand in 1990 
                                                 
30 Prasert, Prathet khongrao, p. 57. 
31 Pisit Lee-ahtham, From Crisis to Double-Digit Growth (Bangkok: Dok-Ya Publishing House, 
1988), pp. 12-48.  
32 Pasuk & Baker. Thailand, p. 137. 
33 Hewison “Thailand’s Capitalism” pp. 82, 84. 
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could hardly be called an agricultural economy, as the newly industrialized nation 
relied on the production and export of various manufacturing goods.  
This transformation has inevitably created the need for a new Thai 
identity. As the nation has moved along the path of industrialization and an export 
economy relying heavily on the global market, the image of Ayutthaya as an 
agricultural state has lagged behind state objectives, and probably the needs of 
society as well.34 To further people’s belief in the promise of this new economic 
strategy, the Thai state in the 1990s reoriented its past by selecting an image of 
Ayutthaya as port polity and emphasizing its intensive commercial role to their 
citizens. The topic of its foreign trade has been discussed extensively in history 
text. One author illustrates the vitality of Ayutthayan foreign trade as follows: 
Trade with foreign countries was an important foundation for Ayutthaya. Trading 
activity with foreign countries was a good index that reflected Ayutthaya’s 
economic condition. In when of foreign trade stagnated, Ayutthaya’s economy 
would effectively decline. On the other hand, when trade blossomed, it would also 
benefit the Ayutthayan economy. Therefore, the wealth from foreign trade had a 
great contribution to the expansion of Ayutthaya’s economy and was a key factor 
in its development to become a great and powerful kingdom in the Indochinese 
peninsula.35              
Moreover, the importance of the Royal Treasury trade as another major 
source of income, apart from various taxes, is made explicit.36 Goods exported 
from Ayutthayan port are listed in great detail.  Ayutthaya’s status as a key 
regional entrepot, where people from East and West once came and traded their 
                                                 
34 Craig Reynolds, “Globalization and Cultural Nationalism in Modern Thailand”, in Southeast 
Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Thailand, ed. Joel S. Kahn (Singapore: ISEAS, 1998), p. 120. 
35 Wittaya, Our Country 3, p. 36.  
36 Ibid., pp. 46-48.  & Prasert, Our Country 3, p. 59-60.   
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goods, is emphasized.37 This might be seen as an implicit statement to show that 
Thailand in the time of Ayutthaya was a nerve center of global commerce, and 
that now it is time to regain that position.                   
The second factor in reorienting the image of the Ayutthayan economy is 
academic greater access to new historical sources that help shed light on the 
Ayutthayan economy. Although the Thai state in the late twentieth century may 
have desired to project the image of Ayutthaya as a port polity, this was not 
possible without the supporting information produced by scholars.  Work by 
foreign and Thai scholars who can utilize the information previously preserved in 
other languages has revealed the other, previously unrecognized face of 
Ayutthayan state.38   
Before this, French language records were the most familiar sources 
utilized in constructing an image of Ayutthaya. As the French came mostly for 
political and spiritual reason, the information on Ayutthaya in their records often 
dealt with court politics, topography and warfare.39 The pioneering use of Dutch 
sources by Dhiravat na Pombejra reveals the intensity of Ayutthayan foreign 
trade, unimaginable for one who had read only the British and French sources. 
Utilizing VOC records in original Dutch, Dhiravat has written several detailed 
studies mostly in English on Ayutthayan trade in the seventeenth century.40  
                                                 
37 Wittaya, Our Country 3, p. 36-37.  
38 Virapol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1977). 
39 Simon de la Loubere. A New Historical Relations of the Kingdom of Siam (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1969); Nicholas Gervaise, The Natural and Political History of the 
Kingdom of Siam, translated by John Villers (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1989). 
40 Dhiravat na Pombejra, “A Political History of Siam Under the Prasatthing Dynasty, 1629-1688” 
(PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1984); “Ayutthaya at 
the end of the Seventeenth Century: Was there a Shift to Isolation?” in Southeast Asia in the Early 
Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief, pp. 250-272.  Edited by Anthony Reid (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University press, 1993); Court, Company, and Campong (Ayutthaya Historical 
Study Centre Monograph No.1, Ayutthaya, 1992); Siamese Court Life in the Seventeenth Century: 
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The tapping of Japanese sources has proved equally useful in confirming 
Ayutthaya’s position as a commercial powerhouse. The record of junks docking at 
the Japanese and Okinawan ports, once studied and translated, has revealed the 
importance of Ayutthaya in the East Asian trade.41 Based on Japanese sources, 
one scholar has concluded that:  
Throughout her five century long history, Ayutthaya flourished and enjoyed great 
prosperity under the leadership of outward-looking kings whose policy was to 
strengthen the national power by promoting maritime trade in the Age of 
Commerce.42
He also contrasts this new image with the traditional image of a “tyrannical state” 
whose control over manpower was the only aspect that was known of Ayutthayan 
economic policy.43
However, one obstacle which has prevented mass access to these recent 
interpretations is the fact that these studies are often available only in English or 
very technical Thai. Among those who have popularized the image of Ayutthaya 
as a regional trading center is Charnvit Kasetsiri. His contribution to Ayutthayan 
studies is enormous; he has written, translated, and edited work in both Thai and 
English on the topics varying from peasant rebellions, religion and statecraft to 
guidebooks.44 However, many of his later works focus on trading activities in 
Ayutthaya. Presented in style accessible to the non-specialist, his books have 
                                                                                                                                      
Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand (Center For Southeast Asian Studies Report 
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43 Ibid., pp. 138-39. 
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reached a wide audience and influenced the perception of Ayutthayan past. 
Charnvit states his position that 
If comparative studies between Ayutthaya and other kingdoms with a clear 
commercial nature were pursued…we might learn much more about Ayutthaya’s 
commercial position, which had more to do with economic history rather than the 
boring political one.45
It is these works of translation and reintroduction that have allowed the new image 
of Ayutthaya as a port polity to be constructed.  
Another important point to be made here is that, new knowledge 
discovered by academics has not been automatically accepted and promoted by 
the Thai educational system. Since curricula and textbooks are designed to suit the 
current national agenda, only information that supports those objectives and 
buttresses the image that the state is trying to construct will be selected and 
included. The Ayutthayan economy is a case in point. For Marxist historians, it 
was static and feudal [sakdina] in nature. The expansion of the economy was 
impossible because the elite, the land-owning class had control over key 
production resources and taxed all surpluses from the peasant to finance their 
luxurious lifestyle or trade with foreigners, rather than to reinvest these surplus 
into the economic system. The monopoly of the Royal Treasury prevented foreign 
trade from eroding the subsistence economy. With this understanding, the Marxist 
historians depicted the Ayutthayan economy as stagnant and exploitative.46 
However, the Thai state has never incorporated Marxist interpretations into school 
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textbooks, where the interpretation of Ayutthayan economic dynamism has been 
overwhelmingly promoted. This simply shows the state’s selective representation, 
whereby only academic interpretations that match with official ideology will 
receive attention.        
The third factor in the transformation of Ayutthayan economic position is 
related to the changing position of the Chinese in Thai society. While in the1960 
textbooks, the Chinese had no place in Ayutthayan history, by the 1990s their 
contribution was openly accepted and displayed. Trading relations with China are 
mentioned in detail in the history texts, with an appreciation of how the Chinese 
merchants played a vital role in the fiscal and trading system of Ayutthaya. “Apart 
from conducting direct trade with Ayutthaya, the Chinese merchants developed 
Ayutthayan trade by transferring many systems and modes of trade such as the 
measurement system, account system, junk construction [to the Thai]”. The 
Chinese are also mentioned as official responsible for balancing accounts and the 
crews who help facilitate the Thai junk trade.47  
The changing status of the Chinese is closely linked to Thailand’s internal 
politics. Since the racial policies and the image of Chinese as the Other have been 
abolished and the focus of the nation is now economic prosperity, it is predictable 
that the history of Ayutthaya in the 1990s would incorporate and present in 
positive terms the undeniable Chinese contribution to the wealth of Thai society.48 
With the promotion of economic development, the Chinese can no longer be 
excluded from the Thai national history.   
                                                 
47 Witthaya, Prathet khongrao, pp. 38-40. 
48 Kasian Tejapera, “Imagined Uncommunity: The Lookjin Middle Class and Thai Official 
Nationalism” in Danail Chirot & Anthony Reid (ed). Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the 
Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1997).   
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By 1990, then, the image of the Ayutthayan economy experienced a clear 
transformation; many factors played a part in this radical shift. The new national 
interest in becoming an economic powerhouse of the region or even a Newly 
Industrialized Country is important. New knowledge produced by academics who 
read records in foreign languages provided a desirable image of an economically 
dynamic Ayutthaya that the Thai state could choose to promote. The end of anti-
Chinese sentiments has also allowed the content on Ayutthayan trade to be 
confidently included. Here we began to see a new image of Ayutthaya being 
construct for the Thai identity of the late twentieth century.     
 
 
Conclusion 
The clear transformation of Ayutthaya’s image from an agricultural state 
to a vibrant trading kingdom should be seen in the internal and external context of 
Thailand’s political economy. Radical change in the economic structure from the 
1960s to 1990s created a historical lag. Moving beyond the domination of the 
agricultural sector the, Thai economy, with its commitment to the export-oriented 
industrialization, had forced the collective memory to transform. As Thai people 
have a collective memory of Ayutthaya as a trading kingdom, they will need only 
a little imagination to understand why Thai society at the present time is 
concerned about growth in export volume and foreign investments.  
Chapter 5  
Foreign Relations Defined: Ayutthaya Among World Powers 
 
Apart from political and economic topics, a significant amount of space in 
textbooks on Ayutthayan history has been devoted to discussions of foreign 
relations. While Ayutthaya’s political and socio-economic status as discussed 
above provides images that contribute to Thai identity defined internally, a 
significant portion of that identity is formulated based on how the Thai are seen by 
Others and how they differentiate themselves from those they have come to 
interact with. Ayutthaya’s status derived externally from the views and comments 
of outsiders can help sustain the Thai identity and guarantee its image in the 
global arena. In short, the history of Ayutthayan foreign relations can be seen as 
the source providing an external definition for Ayutthaya’s image; its recent 
transformation is a redefinition of the Thai identity selected by the state.      
This chapter will look at how the relationship between Ayutthaya and its 
contemporary polities is presented in school textbooks of the 1960 and 1990 
curricula, and what this had to do with the way the Thai state expected its citizens 
to see themselves in the international sphere. My focus will be limited to the 
changing sources of power in the world, to whom the state can turn for a 
confirmation of its identity. I would argue that even in the history of Ayutthayan 
foreign relations, a proper image of the past presented as a component of the Thai 
national memory was subjected to state selection.       
 
I. Significant Others 
The history of any nation would need to include its diplomatic, military, 
commercial, or cultural relations with other countries. For Thai history, the 
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phongsawadan written since Ayutthaya’s heyday have regularly mentioned 
warfare with its neighboring countries, along with diplomatic relations such as 
exchanging gifts or the dispatching of ambassadors overseas.1 What then, were the 
functions of the record on foreign relations mentioned in the phongsawadan? 
Similarly, since history has often been written for the purpose of confirming the 
perception of who we are and national history has been used to shape national 
identity, what justifies he inclusion of information on Ayutthayan foreign relations 
in Thai historical writing?  
Along the line of my discussion in earlier chapters, I would argue that 
nformation on Ayutthayan foreign relations has helped to complete the picture by 
which perceptions of the past define the Thai identity and Thai-self. Instead of 
presenting the greatness and prosperity of Ayutthayan past in a one sided manner 
to confirm the glory of the Thai state since the ancient time, the history of 
Ayutthaya’s foreign relations, of how the kingdom was perceived by Others, 
could supply much more convincing confirmation of its glory. This is possible by 
making reference to other well-recognized historical actors, whether individuals or 
political entities.  
For tamnan histories of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, taking the 
Chinnakanmalipakon as example, charismatic figures like Buddha or King Asoka 
are often presented at the beginning. The story proceeds to describe how Buddha 
flew over from the subcontinent to mark the location of Thai polities. Some 
tamnan actually trace the direct linage of kings from Asoka to U-thong, the 
Ayutthayan founder.2 As a political statement, tamnan allows the enormous 
charisma of Buddha and Asoka be reflected in legitimizing the Thai king’s rule. 
                                                 
1 Such as the presenting of Ayutthayan princess to Lanxang in the reign of king Mahachakkrapat 
and the sending of a religious mission to Sri Lanka during the late Ayutthaya period.  
2 Charnvit, Rise of Ayudhaya, pp. 2-5.  
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With links to the founder of Buddhism and the great Buddhist king, the tamnan 
histories locate the Thai polity in the symbolic geography of the greater Buddhist 
world and elevated it into a polity significant enough to be founded by such great 
icons.  
Later forms of history still employ a similar strategy. By referring to other 
well-recognized actors regularly throughout the narrative, the history of 
Ayutthayan foreign relations allow for the Thai state to connect itself with the 
wider world and negotiate its status in the global hierarchy.3 But after the decline 
of Buddhism as dominant Truth regime that reinforced the tamnan, who are the 
charismatic actors that the historian should employ in justifying Ayutthayan 
greatness? As the wealth and greatness of a more powerful kingdom could be 
transferred to one’s own by establishing a direct relationship,4 whom can the Thai 
state cited as a guarantee of their glorious past? This process of selecting authority 
to confirm one’s own identity and status is visible through the survey of history 
textbooks, particularly in sections on “foreign relations of Thailand”, which testify 
how the state perceived and negotiated with a different world order. Here, the 
function of the history of Ayutthaya’s foreign relations, presented in detail in the 
textbooks, is not only to guide students to broaden their vision and learn about 
cultural interactions or how the nation managed the crisis; the state also “expect 
the student to be proud and realize the role of the Thai nation within the 
international community.”5         
                                                 
3 For the case of Japanese re-adjustment of its position in the hierarchy of world history, see Stefan 
Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Past into History (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1993).  
4 Constance Wilson, “State and Society in the Reign of Mongkut, 1851-1868: Thailand on the Eve 
of Modernization,” (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1970), p. 145 
5 Dhida Saraya, Prawatsat Kwamsamphan Rawangprathet Khongthai (Bangkok: Thai Watthana 
Panich, 2000), p. 4.; Davisilp Suebwatthana, Prawatsat Kwamsampan Rawangprathet Khongthai 
(Bangkok: Watthana Panich, 2002 revised edition), p. 3. 
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II. Ayutthayan Glory in the Western World Order  
In Mongkut’s reign, when Western political and cultural influence began 
to be seriously felt in the Bangkok court, the Thai started to emphasize their 
history of intensive contact with the European nations since Ayutthayan times. 
During the long nineteenth century, the British and French were the most active 
colonial powers in the region, acquiring territory in the vicinity of Bangkok’s 
sphere of influences. To equip themselves for negotiating their rights over these 
lands and to defend themselves against the accusation of being semi-savage, the 
Siamese elite needed to present themselves as being on par with the intruding 
powers. This led to a civilizing process whereby Western material culture and 
lifestyles were imitated, while traditional dress codes and Brahmanic rituals were 
slowly eroded since the European West had become a new source of “modernity”. 
The Thai elite now looked to the West in search of the “superior” way of life. 
Foreign specialists of almost exclusively Western origin were hired to 
demonstrate to the world Siam’s commitment to the path of Westernization and its 
expectation of great power’s recognition.6 Symbolically speaking, the cannon of 
the British gunboats in the First Opium War had blown away the old order. China 
and India, long the models of the great culture for the Thai elite now degenerated 
to become “backward”.7 The attempt to lead Siamese toward a “civilized” state as 
defined by Western standards was presented by Mongkut as follows,  
…The Siamese are still stupid with little knowledge. When they listen to 
the detailed and weird stories different from what they already know, they do not 
                                                 
6 Wilailekha, Chonchannamthai, pp. 83-84.   
7 Maurizio Peleggi, Lords of Things: The Fashioning of Siamese Monarchy’s Modern Image, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 9, 20-25, 28-30; Thongchai Winichakul The 
Quest for “Siwilai”: A Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth-Century Siam”, JAS (59/3, August 2000), p. 533. 
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get it anymore than the forest dwellers [primitive people]. …Only recently, in less 
than a decade, have they met Europeans who possess good traditions and do good 
deeds based on reason so that the knowledge of the Siamese ruler has developed 
far better than before…8     
Siam reoriented its sources of “modernity” and was ready to foster a closer 
relationship with the Europeans. The long history of Siamese relations with the 
West was now needed to project the continuation of this relationship. France and 
Britain, followed by other European nations the dominant world power of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century received special mention in Thai national 
history since its early beginning. The modern Siamese elite addressed themselves 
to the West, and though later on Japan was included as a world power, this elite 
took Europeans as their model and expected their subjects to do the same. The 
craze to advertise their civilized status for European confirmation was evident, as 
in the speech given by King Wachirawut to the contingent of Thai soldiers 
dispatched to the First World War:  
...This is a good chance for the Thai army to show to the nations we used to be 
scared of that, at this moment, we are now rising…These soldiers will be the first 
to bring the dignity and fame of our army to the eyes of the world. They will be the 
first to unfold the Thai flag at the center of Europe, which, at this moment, is 
considered the center of the world…I feel honored and lucky on behalf of those 
men for the fame that they [will enjoy] in carrying the might of the king [lord of 
land] to be manifested in the middle of Europe. In this event and the next to come, 
Siam will be equal and comparable to other nation…9
                                                 
8 Mongkut. Phrarachahatthalekhanai Phrabatsomdetphrachomklaochaoyuhua [Royal letters of 
King Mongkut], Publish in commenoration of 84 years Mahamokutrachawitthayalai, Bangkok: 
Mahamongkut Press, 2521, pp. 50-5; quoted in Ram Wachiarapradit, “The Development of Thai 
National History, 1868-1944”, p. 64.  
9 Wachirawut, Wathaphramongkut [Collected Speeches of King Wachiravut] p. 173, quoted in 
Ram, “Development”, p. 200. 
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With this cultural movement, together with the formation of a national 
history, was laid the conventional structure of Thai history that has been taught in 
schools since then. Thus, the West was emphasized in their relations of Ayutthaya 
kingdom to rank the Siamese past with that of the world powers. The Thai state’s 
use of relationships with Western nations to confirmation to Ayutthaya’s and 
modern Thailand’s importance continued up to the Cold War era of the 1960s. In 
the Thai perception, the Western nations dominating the international system 
possessed the authority to judge others, and their word and opinions should carry 
superior authority. Presenting long and equal diplomatic relations with them was 
the means to reflect their greatness back onto Ayutthaya, thus guaranteeing the 
glory of the Thai kingdom and confirming its identity.  
Within the scope of Ayutthaya’s past, it was events in the reign of King 
Narai that allowed for a detailed depiction of relations with the Europeans. The 
concise history composed in Mongkut’s reign had already mention Narai’s 
importance as a ruler enthusiastic about fostering relations with European.10 From 
then on, histories of Ayutthaya never failed to acknowledge his contribution in 
making Siam known to the world. One text written in Chulalongkorn reign’s 
stated that “although ambassador sent to the French court did not have any benefit 
in religious terms, but his name was made known among many nations until 
now.”11  
                                                 
10 Mongkut, Brief Notices, pp. 345-46. 
11 Wachirayan Warorot, Phrarattaprasasananai purimpak thetsanaphiset. [Special preaching on 
elementary royal administrative], in Phrathammathetsana [Royal teaching] (commemoration 
volume 50 years of his death, 1971), p. 478, quoted in Somkiat Wantana, Prawatsatniphonthai 
samaimai, p. 81.  
 85
In Prachathipok’s reign, Narai maintained his position as one of the great 
kings whose “foreign relations had made Thailand known to the world”.12 A book 
published for foreigner by the Ministry of Commerce and Communications in 
1930 had a section on “contact with other nations”, extending from the nations 
since pre-Sukhothai period to the end of Chulalongkorn’s reign. For the 
Ayutthayan period, the text only mentioned, though at length, the relations with 
Europeans and merely with the Japanese. It gave the impression of equal and 
friendly relations, emphasizing how Siam had acquired a great deal of European 
culture, such as the cannon-casting process, Western-style fortifications, medical 
techniques and confectionaries.13 The intention of presenting the Siamese 
adoption of things European, a sign of civility, was evident. The section on the 
“the progress of new nations in the West at present and the diffusion of that 
progress to the East” in the 1921 curriculum textbook painted the idea that Europe 
was the center and the ultimate source of civilization. For the Thai of that period, 
the Western nations were the source of what they counted as progress and 
advancement.14    
Continuing the tradition, Thailand of the 1960s was still tied culturally to 
the West.15 History textbooks of the Sarit period also illustrated prominently the 
role of the West as a main actor interacting with Ayutthaya. The section on the 
history of its relations with foreign countries included only Western nations: 
Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, French and even Danish. Surprisingly, Japan 
was mentioned with the Western nations but China, the contemporary powerful 
                                                 
12 Phittiyalongkorn, “Prakatbuangsoung adeetmaharat na phranakorn si Ayutthaya rachakanti 
chet” [Declaration in Homage of the Great Kings of the Past at Ayutthaya during Rama VII reign], 
quoted in Somkiat, Prawatsat niphon, p. 102.    
13 Ministry of Commerce and Communications, Siam: General and Medical Features, Executive 
Committee of the Eight Congress, 1930. pp. 29-33. 
14 Warunee, “Kansuksa”, pp. 286-87.  
15 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 277. 
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kingdom with an extremely intensive interaction with Ayutthaya, was omitted.16 
The story of the diplomatic relations between Ayutthaya and the Versailles court 
during Narai’s reign received detailed treatment. After very short sentences on the 
Dutch, the British and the Japanese in Ayutthaya, the rest of the chapter was 
devoted to relations with the French.17 “King Louis XIV sent his ambassador for 
friendly relations” was put in a bold subtitle. This sentence not only depicts the 
diplomatic relations between the two courts but actually implies that it was the 
French court which approached Ayutthaya in establishing a relationship, not vice 
versa. Information on the French selection of Ayutthaya as a center for its 
religious activities in the Far East further emphasizes its importance.    
[King Louis XIV] sent the Bishop of Heliopolis bearing a royal letter and tribute 
[bannakan] to present to King Narai in 1673…Narai feet that relations with the 
French would help reinforce national defense, technological advances and foreign 
trade. In 1681, he dispatched an ambassador to establish relations with King Louis 
and the Pope in Rome…18
The choice of word is important here. Usually, bannakan will be translated 
as “tribute”, not “gift”, and imply objects presented by the inferior to the superior 
rather than an equal relationship. Since it was a French initiative and Narai made 
the full decision to accept their “tribute”, the situation was thus presented as if the 
Thai were equal if not superior to the French in term of power. The relations with 
China and other states were totally ignored in this textbook. It seems that only the 
French were significant enough to be put on a par with Ayutthaya, and it was they 
who initiated diplomatic relations, confirming Ayutthaya’s importance for France. 
                                                 
16 DICD, Wicha prawatsatthai lae tang prathet (Bangkok: Kurusapha, 1974), pp. 41-50. 
17 Poonphon, Prawatsat, pp. 26-29. 
18 Ibid., p. 28.  
 87
The greater amount of information available may explain the importance 
given to the French relations. Although some historians have pointed out that even 
more intensive relations took place between Ayutthaya and the Dutch in the last 
20 years of Narai’s reign,19 the fact that French sources are more accessible to the 
Thai could be the reason for this emphasis on their role. Moreover, convince after 
the Paknam crisis of 1893, when French gunboats first blockaded and later sailed 
up to anchor near the Bangkok royal palace, the Thai was convinced that France 
was the most aggressive colonial power in late nineteenth-century mainland 
Southeast Asia, whereas Dutch power no longer threatened Siam. This situation 
may have encouraged the presentation of a history of long and peaceful 
relationship with the French as they had become the superior source of authority. 
Interestingly, not long after the Paknam crisis, Prince Damrong had commented 
on Narai’s skill in statecraft as follow’s 
Although there was no great war in Narai’s reign as had taken place under 
Naresuan rule, there were many significant crises. If the king had been not capable 
in state policy as Narai was, it might have been impossible to govern the country. 
That is why Thais and foreigners since the old days have recognized King Narai as 
one of the great kings.20  
Apart from being the king who made Thailand known to the civilized 
world, this major diplomatic success made him a skillful ruler as well. 
Interestingly, the legacy of the Paknam crisis for the depiction of Ayutthayan 
foreign relations was very visible in the 1960 textbook, more than 6 decades later, 
with minor changes in the actors’ roles: 
                                                 
19 George Vinal Smith. “The Dutch East India Company in the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, 1604-
1694”. (PhD Dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1974), pp. 132-35, cited in Nithi 
Aeusriwongse. Thai Politics in the Reign of king Narai (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 
1984), p. 3. 
20 Damrong, Thai roppharma, pp. 254-55. Quoted in Somkiat Wanthana, Modern Thai 
Historiography, p. 81. 
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During King Narai reign, the Dutch were not on good terms with Siam…and had 
sent the battleship to blockade the Chaophraya Delta in 1664. The Thai were the 
underdogs and realized that it was not possible to defeat the Dutch, so they decided 
in the treaty that Siam would not compete in trade with the Dutch and would allow 
them to monopolize the trade of Thai animal hides. This was the first time 
Thailand had conceded the right of extraterritoriality to the Company’s man in 
Thai territory.21
The Dutch action mentioned here is very similar to the experience of the 
Paknam crisis, illustrating a parallel process where a capable king solved the 
problem of the nation’s survival with the proper diplomatic strategy. As King 
Chulalongkorn and Mongkut had successfully negotiated with the foreign threat in 
a similar way with the Paknam crisis and Bowring mission, the admiration of 
Narai’s actions was an elevation of the Chakkri monarchs’ achievement in 
navigating Siam through comparable crises.  
In the Sarit years, Thailand’s most intensive relationship was with the US. 
Since the US did not exist in the seventeenth century, no relationship with 
Ayutthaya was available as a precedent. However, the history of Ayutthayan 
foreign relations could still be used to reinforce the idea of friendly relations with 
the US. Texts on relations with Europe often emphasized Thailand’s benefits, 
particularly in receiving Western culture and technology:     
Through contact with the French, the Thai received much useful technology, such 
as Western methods of construction in building fortresses and other edifices. 
French artisans created terracotta pipes for transferring water from the lake 
[Talaechupson] for usage in Lopburi city. The French navy helped drill the armies 
                                                 
21 DICD, Wicha prawatsatthai, p. 43. 
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in European style. Moreover, French priests had introduced medical practices and 
the use of various medicines to the Thais.22
 As Thailand in the 1960s decided to ally with the US to a degree never 
achieved with any foreign nation, the guarantee of benefits from this policy had to 
be stated clearly. Buildings and other infrastructure projects are sites of high 
visibility that can readily to be used as examples of the progress derived from 
contacts with the West. The depiction of water pipes, or fortresses introduced by 
the French in the Ayutthayan era should be seen as antecedents of a similar 
process when the US introduced the Kangkrachan Dam, Friendship Highway and 
U-Tapao airport to Thailand in the 1960s.         
Against the prominent depiction of relations with Europeans, China, the 
Oriental world power in Ayutthayan times, was almost totally ignored; only the 
structure of tributary trade was briefly presented. Since the Siamese elite tried not 
to accept the fact that their glorious kingdom of Ayutthaya, and even the early 
Bangkok kingdom that they always referred to, had once been under a tributary 
system dominated by what was seen in the 1960s as a backward and now 
communist China, the history of the long and inferior relations with China needed 
to be downplayed. 23 In some textbooks, only a single sentence mentioned the long 
relationship with China before moving on to discuss in detail the relations with 
Japan and European nations.24  
The image of the West was a source of “modernity” for the Thai elite, 
hence their need to foster the link by frequent reference to the durable, close, and 
equal relations since the Ayutthaya period. The European and American 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 49. 
23 Narumit Sotsuk, “Chakphap pisat panyuk nakbun sukwampenmanus: phonkratop tangkanmuang 
tosatannaphap khong chinsuksa naiprathethai”, JTU 13,2 (June 1984), pp. 6-13. 
24 DICD, Wicha prawatsatthai, p. 41. 
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international order had influenced the decision to depict the history of Thai 
foreign relations from the late nineteenth century to the Cold War era. By 
projecting such a story, the Thai could benefit from having the charisma of the 
West reflected upon their own status.  
 
III. Coming Full Circle?: Repositioning Ayutthaya in the Orbit of Eastern 
Powers 
The perception of the Western nations as the source of power and 
advancement, possessing legitimacy in confirming Thailand’s status was neither 
static nor fixed. Before the era of Western modernity, often widely perceived as 
the only source of cultural superiority, historical evidence showed that the source 
of cultural superiority or “modernity” for Thai society merely a century ago had 
been located in the Orient. Apart from Indic culture that had long influenced Thai 
culture, it was things Chinese that the Thai elite of the late Ayutthayan and early 
Bangkok periods appreciated and valued so highly.  
Thai acceptation of Chinese superiority had long been an issue of debate, 
and it had been rejected throughout most of the modern era. The fact that Thai 
monarchs had dispatch numerous diplomatic missions to the Chinese court 
between the 13th and mid-19th centuries bearing chimkong [tribute or gifts] for the 
Middle Kingdom could not be denied. Many Thai monarchs did approach the 
Chinese emperors for recognition as legitimate rulers. However, it was rare for the 
Thai to accept that these should be interpreted as acts of submission to Chinese 
superiority, and most historians explained this diplomatic relationship a pretense 
by tactful Thai rulers in order to access the burgeoning Chinese market. The Thai 
elite never took Chinese recognition seriously and definitely never became 
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Chinese vassals. King’s Mongkut declaration 1868 ends the shameful custom was 
often quoted to prove that Thai kings had simply sent chimkong to facilitate their 
profitable trade.25                  
This conventional wisdom fit in well with the wider recognized historical 
explanation Mongkut’s role in Thailand’s modernization. He was remembered as 
the father of modern science and a versatile monarch well-versed in foreign 
languages that closely followed the innovative changes in the West, and his 
declaration ending chimkong was articulated as an act of liberation from Chinese 
domination. The Thai nation was thus supposedly brought out of this obsolete and 
shameful ritual by an enlightened monarch who opened an era of embracing the 
advanced Western civilization. Unfortunately, the statement of this mid-nineteenth 
century king, living in the age of colonialism where Western culture was seen as 
the only source of “modernity”, are not qualified in proving the international 
system predated his time. He actually referred to China past as having been “the 
most esteemed country of all mankind”.26 Apparently, Mongkut’s abolition of 
chimkong represented the closing of the older Chinese world order and the 
beginning of the European one.  
Evidence shows that the early Bangkok court was fond of things Chinese. 
Shortly after the new capital was established, the Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
was translated into Thai.27 The taste of the Chinese court became an object of 
emulation. In 1818, the Thai monarch decided that a garden and bestiary should 
                                                 
25 Erika Matsuda, “Kanmuangchin lae watthanathamchak muangchin naikong ‘Chimkong’ 
songtoodbannakan paiyangchinnaisamai tonrattanakosin” in SW (24/1, Sept 2003), pp. 142-47.   
26 Mongkut, “Ruanghaephrarachasan krangthutthai paimuangchin taeboran” [On the Processions 
of Royal Letters When Thai Ambassadors Went to China Since Ancient Times], 
Chumnumpraborom rachathibai [Collected Essays]. Bangkok: 1967, pp. 60-61, quoted in Wilson, 
State and Society, p. 147.  
27 Craig Reynolds. “Tycoon and Warlords: Modern Thai Social Formations and Chinese Historical 
Romance” in Anthony Reid (ed.), Sojourners and Settlers (St. Leonards, New South Wales: 
Asians Studies Association of Australia in Association with Allen& Unwin, 1996), pp. 115-47.  
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be built in Bangkok after their envoy reported on similar project in Beijing.28 A 
painting of Mongkut in full Chinese mandarin costume showed that Chinese 
culture was still celebrated in his reign. Tribute in the early Bangkok period had 
received a reevaluation by Erika Masuda, who sees it as a channel for the Thais to 
access Chinese culture and establish Siam’s status within a Chinese world order.29 
Using the argument that by establishing relations with a more powerful kingdom, 
are could transfer its greatness to one’s own kingdom, the action of early Bangkok 
elites should be seen as a form of borrowing China’s charisma to elevate their own 
importance.  
 After the Opium War and a series of rebellions, China had lost its aura, 
and Europeans now became a model for the Siamese elite to follow. China was 
seen as a backward nation loaded with luxurious rituals which had failed to 
achieve any progress. When China became a communist state in 1949, it acquired 
the image of devil ready to invade and abolish Thai Buddhism and the monarchy. 
The Thai government in the Cold War era had seen China, together with USSR 
and Vietnam, as the source of the communist threat.30 Only by the end of the 
Vietnam War when Bangkok began to reestablish its diplomatic relations with 
Beijing, did China’s image begin to become more positive. Finally, it was the 
rapid expansion of Chinese economic power and its greater political influence that 
really changed Thai perceptions.31  Once again, the image of Communist China 
penned during the Cold War era had now became another “historical lag” that was 
no longer suitable, relations with China now had to be presented positively for the 
                                                 
28 Thipakorawong, Phrarachaphongsawadan krungrattanakosin rachakanthi 2 (Khrusapha, 
Bangkok, 1961), pp. 93-94.  
29 Erika Matsuda, “Kanmuangchin”, p. 148.   
30 Tamthai Dilokwittayarat, “Phaplakkhong “Communist” naikanmuangthai” [Image of 
“Communist” in Thai Politics]. RTSS (24/2), pp. 153-54. 
31 Narumit Sotsuk, “Chakphap pisat, pp. 6-13.  
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sake of new national political and economic goals. The Thai perception of an 
international hierarchy where only Western nations occupy the leading positions is 
changing.        
Clearly, the “rise of Asia” since 1970 as a general economic and political 
trend has been major change. The huge influx of investment-first from Japan and 
later from Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and China-and the bargaining power that 
East Asian countries gained in the world arena have forced the Thai to re-evaluate 
their relations with the world. In some cases, too, social problems in Western and 
Thai societies have led some intellectuals to search for a new model. A case in 
point is Suwunai Pharanawalai, an economist at Thammasat University, who 
became a major promoter of East Asian thought. In his view, the “wisdom of the 
East” or Phumpanya tawan-ok will help Thailand follow the path of wealth and 
will keep its society from moral decay.32  
Should the Thai follow the Western model of development or is it time to 
re-orient to focus on relations with their Asian neighbors? The representation of 
Ayutthayan history in the 1990 curriculum suggests the latter choice. The chapter 
on “relations with foreign countries during Ayutthaya period” was greatly 
expanded to include several Asian countries, including Japan, China, Sri Lanka, 
Iran and neighbors like Burma and Cambodia. Lanna and Lanxang now gained the 
status of foreign countries, rather than being subsumed under Ayutthaya. Western 
nations like Holland, Britain and the France remain past of the narrative but 
without their previous prominence.33 The textbook for selective modules on the 
History of Thai Foreign Relations presents an even more diverse picture of 
Ayutthaya relations with Asian countries. Dhida Saraya’s version consists of four 
                                                 
32 Reynolds, “Thai Identity in the Age of Globalization”, p. 315. 
33 DICD, Prathet khongrao, pp. 91-111; Prasert, Prathet khongrao, pp. 31-53. 
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separate sections on relations with neighboring countries, states outside the region 
(other Asians), tributary trade relations with China, and relations with the West.34 
Each category receives equal importance.  
This more balanced discussion has removed the relations with Western 
nations from their dominant position. Some texts begin by listing Ayutthaya’s 
objectives in conducting relations with Western countries as making friends, 
seeking more advanced technologies, and protecting Thai sovereignty, followed 
by a concise discussion of its relations with each nation. The exchange of 
diplomatic missions with the French court is still a focus, with particular emphasis 
on King Narai’s policy of countering the Dutch threat with French support.35 The 
use of the French diplomatic mission to elevate and guarantee Ayutthayan power 
is far from vanished, and Narai’s the audience with the Chevalier de Chaumont is 
described: 
…[Narai] granted the French ambassadors an audience at Lopburi palace. A 
special privilege was given that they were not required to crawl in front of the 
throne. King Narai the Great appeared and received the royal letter through a 
window, sitting higher than the French ambassadors.36                
The most obvious transformation in the narrative of Ayutthayan foreign 
relations concerns China. In textbooks of the 1990 curriculum, this relationship is 
discussed at length, including the tributary trade, Chinese recognition of the Thai 
kings, and very close trading relations. The discussion often emphasizes the 
continuous friendly relations between Thailand and China. Trade is the main 
issue, and details on trade goods are included. Some authors claim that:  
                                                 
34 Dhida, Prawatsat kwamsampan, pp. 22-57.  
35 Prasert, Prathet khongrao, pp. 46-53; Witthaya, Prathet khongrao, pp. 74-78.  
36 Davisilp, Prawatsat kwamsampan, p. 40.   
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Trade with China made Ayutthaya major trading center due to the diversity of 
Chinese goods, which were in great demand in many countries. Significantly, 
China was an important market for Thai forest products. Sometimes, when the 
Chinese faced natural disasters, they would order lots of rice from Thailand….37  
Although 1960 textbooks had discussed this issue, it had not been covered 
so extensively nor had it been expressed in terms of a symbiosis of the two 
countries. The-rice-trading relationship with China is vividly depicted; one text 
notes that the demand for Siamese rice to feed Chinese population was so great 
that “the Chinese opened some ports in the southern coast specially for junks from 
Siam”.38 This obviously favorable picture of commercial ties between Ayutthaya 
and China may reflect a particular state agenda in projecting the past to guide 
present-day citizens. As intensive trade with China went on for centuries and 
brought so much wealth to Ayutthaya, Thais in the late twentieth century should 
follow their ancestors by maintaining this trading pattern and profitting from the 
booming Chinese economy.   
Beyond the trade issue, one author even goes further to claim that “the 
Thai accept Chinese more than other races,”39 thus totally eradicating image of 
minority Others from the Cold War period. Moreover, the Ayutthayan history of 
1990 includes the Chinese among the defenders of the Thai nation:  
…At the time Burmese laid siege to Ayutthaya, there was a unit of Chinese 
nobility under the leadership of Luang Chodukrachasetthi [head of nobility 
responsible for East Asian trade], who led a group of men to fight the Burmese in 
defending the capital.40
                                                 
37 Dhida, Prawatsat kwamsampan, p. 24. 
38 DICD, Prathet khongroa 3, p. 100.  
39 Prasert, Prathet khongrao, p. 45. 
40 Narong Puangpit, Prawatsat kwamsampanrawangprathet khongthai (Bangkok: 
Aksornchareonthat, 2002), p. 31. 
 96
Thus the Chinese have acquired a space in Thai national history, not simply as 
traders that bring prosperity to but as defenders who fought a common national 
enemy.      
Though not an upside-down twist as with the case of China, the 
transformation in Thai perceptions of relations with the Japanese is also clear. 
Since the early twentieth century, the Thai elite have appreciated the Japanese for 
their strength and success in modernizing their country. With the alliance formed 
during the Pacific War, Thai-Japanese relations were extremely close. Research 
has showed that the story of Yamada Nagamasa, Japanese who migrated south to 
settle in Ayutthaya and received the noble title of Okya, was widely promoted by 
both countries in depicting their long cordial ties. In 1934, Luang Wichit even 
penned a Concise Story of Yamada to make his story known to the Thai and 
advertised the 300 years of its relations with Japan.41  
Once the war was over, Japan maintained its strong economic relation with 
Thailand, becoming the biggest foreign investor in the kingdom from 1973 
onwards. Thai-Japanese relations since the Ayutthaya period continue to appear in 
school textbooks while the 1960 curriculum textbooks discussed Japan alongside 
other Western nations, textbooks of the Chatchai regime had a more extensive 
discussion of their relations. As economic benefits from Japanese companies in 
Thailand had grown, the discussion often focused on commercial relations. The 
story of Yamada Nagamasa as the facilitator of closer relations between the two 
courts shows up in every text; some authors even mention his contribution of 
subduing rebels in the South.42     
                                                 
41 Satoko Tsuchiya. Phaplakkhong Yamada Nagamasa naikwamsampanrawang prathetthai 
kapyipun naikrissattawatthi 20  (MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 2001), pp. 104-14, 127-
47.   
42 Narong, Prawatsat kwamsampan, pp. 32-33.  
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Interestingly, relations with Japan have also been employed to reflect 
Ayutthaya’s glory. The starting point of diplomatic relations is often described as 
follows: 
Diplomatic relations with Japan and Ayutthaya started under the reign of King 
Ekathotsarot in 1606. Shogun Ieyasu of Japan sent a royal letter to initiate friendly 
relations, together with tribute [bannakan] including Japanese swords and armor. 
In return, the Japanese asked for cannons and sandalwood from Ayutthaya, and 
allowed the Thais to trade with Japan.43        
The relationship is thus presented as a Japanese initiative which demonstrated 
their recognition of Ayutthaya’s presence as an important political and economical 
power in the region. With this historical record of Japanese acceptance of 
Ayutthaya’s status, the modern-day Thai can could count on the recognition of 
this world economic power and be proud of their important position in the world 
today.        
As the “rise of Asia” reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, the narrative 
of Ayutthayan foreign relations was transformed to suit this new international 
order where players such as Japan and China had rapidly become significant. The 
Thai state saw the benefit of having close ties with these rising powers and chose 
to affirm their long established relations. With a long history of foreign relations 
stretching across the centuries between the Ayutthayan era and modern time, the 
Thai state could hope for smooth relations with them at present and in the future. 
Moreover, it has secured recognition of the importance of Ayutthaya and the Thai 
nation on the part of leading actors in a possibly new Asian world order. 
      
Conclusion 
                                                 
43 Dhida, Prawatsat kwamsampan, p. 37. 
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The shift of emphasis in the history of Ayutthayan foreign relations, from 
the West to countries like Japan and China in the era when Asia started to rise, 
should not be seen as merely a coincidental. Viewing national history invented for 
the nation’s usage, this transformation reflects the mode of confirmation whereby 
the Thai state has tried to appropriate the story of its past in order to remain an 
important player in the world arena in a time of transformation from the old order 
to a new one. The history of foreign relations has different functions to play, and 
the function as a story of confirmation helps explain why it is an indispensable 
element in the history of Ayutthaya and a vital source of Thai national identity 
from the past through the present.     
   
 
Chapter 6  
Exhibiting the Suitable Images: Ayutthaya as appeared in the Museums 
 
So far I have explored the changing images of Ayutthaya represented in 
the school textbooks, but the Thai state has also employed other means in shaping 
the collective memories of their citizens. Public museums are infrastructures of a 
similar educational category but carry a more extensive and specific message. 
While textbooks are produced for use in the national education system, museums 
are also designed to allow those not included in the education system to learn 
about their own identity of the past.  Visitors expect to learn more about the past 
by gazing at the “authentic” historical objects on display.  
This chapter will trace the development of the public museum in Thai 
society and locate its contribution to the representation of Thai identity.  The Thai 
nobility’s transition from collecting religious objects to collecting antiques will be 
mentioned briefly before we turn to look at the foundation of history museums. 
Exhibitions directly related to the Ayutthayan past will be analyzed to reveal the 
image of that past as exhibited and its transformation parallel to the depiction in 
school textbooks.    
 
I. Reading Hidden Curriculum 
Following recent literature on Museum Studies, I look at the museum as evidence 
of the recollection and representation depicting the memorizing process.1 
Museums can be studied as a means to fix the memory of an entire culture through 
representative objects by selecting “what deserves to be kept, remembered, 
                                                 
1 Susan Crane, “Introduction: Of Museums and Memory”, in Museums and Memory, ed. Susan 
Crane (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 1-2. 
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treasured; artifacts and customs are saved out of time”.2 Exhibiting is not a neutral 
act of promoting knowledge, but an action of organizing objects to create a story 
that will influence the visitors’ impression. Structurally speaking, the museum is 
like a giant three-dimensional book adorned with visual and textual 
representation.  
This hidden narrative firstly comes in the form of an “axis of visibility”. 
With items arranged according to a predetermined order, the visitor will learn 
about what they see through the relationship. Systems of classification reflect the 
intention that the museum should project. The arrangement of objects in the 
exhibit for the visitor to gaze at, one by one, along the “axis of visibility” are 
similar to a pictorial book, which introduce readers to a series of pictures expected 
to be read from the first to the last page.3 By following the axis of visibility, one 
would get to learn about the collection according to the pre-selected plot. The 
choice of presenting one object but not others is also linked to the mode of 
representation and ideology of the exhibit, where objects carrying particular 
meaning are displayed for remembering while others are ignored and forgotten. In 
sum, the exhibit could not be neutral but is always an act of power relations.         
Subsequently, museum gradually came to employ more sophisticated 
techniques to frame visitor’s impression. Instead of letting the visitors interpret 
and appreciate the exhibited objects on their own, later museums imposed 
additional stories to link the objects together. The elaborate explanations, 
photographs, tables, and other graphic displays could add great information to the 
exhibited object and allow an ordinary artifact to become a meaningful icon. 
Models, miniatures, and dioramas, the recreation of historical objects and events 
                                                 
2 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.231.  
3 Tony Bennett, The Birth of Museum: History, Theory, and Politics (London: Routledge, 1995). 
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in 3-dimensional forms, allow large and sometimes no longer existent objects to 
be exhibited. Since major historical events can be reproduced into models and 
dioramas with little use of the original objects, the manipulation of messages in 
the exhibition could now reach a new degree.  
The rearrangement of objects, the expansion of the exhibition and the 
construction of new museums represent changes of curriculum in museum 
grammatology. This flexibility of the message in the exhibition of new “hidden 
curricula”, as in the case of textbooks, allows museum exhibits to serve many 
masters and prove themselves useful to the demand of each new ruling regime.4 
The museum then could be read for the governing plot as we have done in the 
textbooks.   
 
II. From Collection of Sacred Objects to Public Museum 
The limited evidence that come down to us hardly allows the early history of 
collection in Thailand to be told. Apparently, from the pre-Ayutthayan times, the 
rulers of various lowland polities engaged in fatal competition for the most sacred 
possessions e.g. Emerald Buddha, white elephants, legendary swords, Buddha 
relics especially those linked to sources of legitimacy such as renowned monarchs, 
great battles or Buddha. Their acquisition was considered important in 
demonstrating the ruler’s superior status on a universal monarch [Cakravartin] 
and was often included in the chronicles.5  
Nevertheless, both secular and religious objects collected by various kings 
of mainland Southeast Asia have played a very similar social function as displays 
                                                 
4 Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1994), 
p.1 
5 Sunait Chutinataranond, “Cakravatin: The Ideology of Traditional Warfare in Siamese and 
Burma: 1548-1605” (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1990). 
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to reinforce a monarch’s merit.6 Here, they provide a rationale to record its 
sources to claim the origins in sacred sources such as India, Sri Lanka, and 
Cambodia. The details and specifics mark of such objects are items to be 
mentioned, followed by the miraculous stories. Such details help confirm the 
special status of the objects, which in turn function to empower their owners. 
Such a mentality prevailed in the early Bangkok period; Rama I, for 
example, ordered the collection of Buddha images from all over the country to be 
housed in the capital. The chronicles recorded this activity in great detail, 
including the ceremony of moving the main Buddha image from the ancient city 
of Sukhothai, supervised by the king himself.7 The traditional concept of 
collecting sacred objects began to change in the Third Reign and intensify in the 
Fourth Reign, in conjunction with the intensity of Western contact. It included 
new objects to be collect in a grander scale as much as its new social function. 
During the Third Reign, objects of Chinese origin occupied the interest of 
Thai monarchs. Deep cultural proximity reinforced by the surge in the trading 
activity between Siam and China explained this trend. The stone sculptures of 
soldiers and mythical animals placed around the courtyard of major temples 
renovated or built under his reign indicate this mode of collection.8 In this period, 
Wat Phrachetuphon and other royal temples acquired a new function of housing 
non-religious objects, arguably becoming museums of Chinese stone sculpture.  
Museums in Thailand started as private collection of royalty and great 
nobles who began to follow the culture of collecting things European. Since the 
objects collected helped create and project one’s identity and taste, the expanding 
                                                 
6 Robert Heine-Geldern, Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia (Data Paper no.18, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asian Program, 1956).    
7 FAD, Phramahakasatthai kapkan phipittapan (Bangkok: Graphic Format, 1996), pp. 16-17.  
8 FAD, Phramahakasatthai, p. 22.  
 103
collections of the Thai elite demonstrated their status on to visitors who 
understood this cultural code. Hence, the collections functioned to confirm 
Siamese elite’s “civilized” status.9         
Mongkut was among the pioneers in building up a private collection. As 
an Asian monarch who mastered English language for an understanding of 
western culture and knowledge, he began to acquire curio objects through various 
channels. The Racharudee hall built in the Western style with intention to be use 
as a throne hall was his first private museum. Exhibits from his collection and 
gifts from foreign diplomats were placed in this hall for the visitors, both local and 
foreigner.10 This mixture of rare, extraordinary, precious, and ancient objects was 
then shifted to be exhibited at the Praphatpipittapan Hall. This was the first time 
the word “Pipittapan” [museum] was used instead of the loanword “mewsiem,” 
suggesting a higher degree of familiarity with this new concept of exhibited space.  
  Under the colonial world order, Siamese kings looked to European as a 
source of “civilized” manners, and began to follow them in the quest for the 
“valuable” objects.11 Paradoxical as it may seem, the objects to be collected 
included both ancient artifacts (inscriptions and sculptures) and modern curios 
such as clocks and telescopes. While ancient artifacts represented a sophisticated 
background that proved the claims of Siam’s past achievements, the modern 
objects demonstrated the collector’s modern mind and sophisticated attitude of the 
collector toward science and progress. Both categories were marvels for the 
collectors and played a significant role in their identity formation; “as one 
becomes conscious of one’s self, one becomes a conscious collector of identity, 
                                                 
9 Peleggi, Lords of Things, chapter 1. For European case see, Krzsytof Pomian, Collectors and 
Curiosities: Paris and Venice, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
10 John Bowring, The Kingdom and People of Siam (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
Vol. 1, pp. 410-12. 
11 Thongchai, “Quest for ‘Siwilai’ ”, pp. 542-545.  
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projecting one’s being onto the objects one chooses to live with. Taste, the 
collector’s taste, is a mirror of self”.12  
 The culture of collecting among the Siamese elite reached its high point 
when Chulalongkorn opened the first “museum” to the wider public in 1874, 
commemorating his 21st birthday. Broad ranges of objects were exhibited in this 
“museum”, from animal skeletons, magnets, miniature trains, globes, to the 
objects of royalty.13 These mixes of scientific objects and things of local culture 
help convey the Siamese identity to the visitors. By presenting the wealth of Siam 
and the taste in scientific curios, the Siamese king moved to elevate himself on a 
par with the West. Royal objects put on display would convince the visitors that 
Siam was a country with long history of high culture whose rulers appreciated 
scientific knowledge and thought in the similar way as any Westerner. Hence, no 
further civilizing mission was needed.14 After the first, the King would organize 
more exhibitions and encourage other people to join them. The curio objects of 
great quality would be rewarded.  
 Following the death of Prince Wichaichan, the 3 front halls of the Front 
Palace were allocated to be a site for the new museum with the name of 
“mewsiemluang thiwangna” [Royal Museum at Front Palace].15 The collections 
were subsequently rearranged into different categories: the Natural history 
collections were exhibited in Siwamokkaphiman Hall, while the local objects 
were exhibited in Phuttaisawan Hall. There were also plans to expand the 
collection to include other categories, i.e. royal historical objects, foreign artifacts, 
                                                 
12 John Elsner & Roger Cardinal, The Cultures of Collecting (London: Reaktion Books, 1994), p. 
3. 
13 Chira Chongkol, Pipittapantasatan wittaya (Bangkok: FAD, Min.Edu, 1984), p. 47.  
14 Pathommarerk Ketthat, “Pattanakan khong Borankadee nai Prathetthai” [Development of 
Archaeology in Thailand], in Sathannaphap khong khwamru dan borankhadee khong thai nai 15 
pi thipanma (SASC, Sinlapakorn University, 1995), p. 10     
15 FAD, Phramahakasatthai, p. 36. 
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trade and nature, ethnography, and technology.16 A special mission was 
dispatched to observe how great European museums were developing to match 
international standards.17 Siam then joined the international exhibitions worldwide 
with the objective, clearly stated by Crown Prince Wachirawut in 1905 of, 
“let[ing] the Americans know Siam, the things happening in Siam, and 
agricultural goods and handicrafts from our nation. Nothing could make the 
Americans appreciate [us] more than seeing things with the information in the 
catalog”.18   
Away from the Bangkok court, the provincial elite, too, had built up their 
own collections for curiosity and prestige. The governor of Ayutthaya province, 
Phraya Boran Rachathanin had an interest in archaeology. Under his 
administration, the Governors house at Chantrarakasem Palace was used to store 
the inscriptions and artifacts found in his jurisdiction. Later, Damrong 
recommended that Phraya Boran exhibit his collection housed inside the stable as 
“Boran Museum” [Ancient Museum]. Established in the year 1902, this was the 
first provincial museum of Thailand. It was later renamed “Ayutthaya Museum” 
or “Museum thikrungkao” [museum at the old capital].19   
The establishment of this museum by the two major statesmen of Siam 
could not be just an accident. The fact that Ayutthaya occupied a special position 
in the emerging Thai national history explained the promotion of this private 
collection: the Siamese elite wished to present Ayutthayan heritage to the visitors, 
particularly the Westerners on sight seeing trips to Ayutthayan’s ruins, in a more 
                                                 
16 Ibid., pp. 45-48. 
17 Peleggi, Lords of Things, Chapter 6 
18 Prince Wachirawut on sending the exhibition to the St. Louis World Fair of 1905, cited in FAD, 
Phramahakasatthai. p. 50. 
19 Pamphlet from the Chantarakasem National Museum  
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impressive manner both to demonstrate their tasteful collecting activities and 
exhibit the nation’s glorious past. 
Under Wachirawut, this concern with exhibiting the Thai past and identity 
for locals and foreigners was significantly promoted. Apart from the Museum in 
Ayutthaya, second provincial museum was established at Lopburi, housed in the 
old palace of Ayutthayan King Narai. As these first two provincial museums are 
attached directly to the Ayutthayan past, it seems that the remnants of that past 
received first priority to be preserved and projected as the most important source 
of identity.    
Not until Prachathipok’s reign did museums in Siam truly become public 
spaces accessible to a wide audience. The palace museum in Bangkok was 
expanded and reorganized under a new name, “Pipittapan thasathan 
samrapphranakorn” [Museum of the Capital city]. Prachathipok declared that his 
decision “…to establish the Capital Museum is to house the art objects and 
antiquities for the good of people to study and gain knowledge, and for national 
pride….”20 In the 1934, after the coup, its name was changed to “Bangkok 
National Museum”, while the Chantharakasem Museum in Ayutthaya would also 
be attached to the National Museum in 1936. These changes were to emphasize 
that the new regime now ruled in the name of the people and the nation. 
 
III. Ayutthaya in Museum s Under of Military Rule 
Memorial of Ayutthayan Wealth 
Event before the Sarit years, the Fine Arts Department had started the 
excavation and reconstruction of some imposing ruins in Ayutthaya, with the plan 
                                                 
20 Cited in FAD, Phramahakasatthai, p. 78. 
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to turn this area into a historical park. This activity went almost unnoticed by most 
Thai until late September 1957, when newspapers reported the arrest of treasure 
hunters. News of the looted crypt under the main tower of Wat Rachaburana, built 
by an Ayutthayan king in the fifteenth century to commemorate his brothers’ 
death, marked a great change in the public perceptions of the old city’s wealth.21 
To prevent further cases, the mayor of the city and police chief requested the FAD 
to excavate and remove all treasure left inside the crypt. After the first week, 
numerous objects including golden miniature pagodas, bronze and gold Buddha 
images, a gold plate with Chinese and Arabic scripts, a royal sword with inlaid 
jewels, and many other valuable objects were rescued. News of the discovery 
spread all over the kingdom and people rushed to Ayutthaya to see the treasures, 
which were kept at the Police office.  
During a visit later that year, the Queen commented that such treasures 
deserved to be housed in a proper building. Since the Chantrarakasem Museum 
was too cluttered and too old to provide good security, she proposed that a new 
museum should be built in Ayutthaya.22 The government reacted promptly by 
allocating funds for the construction; another significant source of money was 
donation from people in exchange for the amulets found in great quantity inside 
the crypt. By early 1958, Prime Minister Thanom Kitikachon came to lay the 
foundation stone in person. The museum was then named “Chaosamphraya” to 
celebrate the temple founder, likely the person who had those treasures to be 
buried in the crypt. The construction and exhibition took four years to complete; 
                                                 
21 Pratum Chumpengpan, Pipittapantasatan wittaya (Ayutthaya: Chaosamphraya Museum, 1987), 
p. 29.  
22 Phiteepert phiphittapantasatan haengchat hosamut haengchat lae ronglakon haengchat 
(Cremation Volume of Num Yunaitham, 1974), pp. 17-19.  
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the royal opening was held in December 1961.23 Here we see the importance of 
Ayutthayan wealth as a source of common pride, needing to be housed in a special 
museum.  
For the collection on exhibit, the Chaosamphraya Museum demonstrated 
the ‘taxonometric’ mode of exhibition by classifying objects into broad categories 
with only brief labels stating the name, school of art, age and place of discovery. 
The visitors were expected to be impressed by the craftsmanship and link it with 
the glory of Ayutthaya.24 A special room was built with a security system to house 
the gold and other objects of great value from the crypts of Wat Mahathat and Wat 
Rachaburana. As those objects are the raison d’ être for the construction of the 
museum, special treatment is desperately needed. Apart from a special lock 
system like those in the treasury, additional guards were appointed to each room 
to look after the gold objects placed in specially made glass boxes, some of them 
bullet-proof. Apart from the valuable material and the incredible craftsmanship, 
the photos, charts, and explanatory texts placed in the room would not fail to 
convey the information that these objects once belonged to Ayutthayan royalty. 
Some royal objects, especially the sword, remain symbols of the Thai monarchy. 
Their meaning is much more than its beauty; they provide a symbolic link to the 
prestigious status of the monarch in the golden past of the nation, and thus to 
current king as well.           
 In addition, the national treasures resurrected from oblivion lost were 
presented as a lesson to all Thais that they should help protect objects of common 
memory. A common consciousness of belonging to the once wealthy and 
powerful kingdom was stirred to strengthen the sense of pride and collective 
                                                 
23 Ibid., pp. 21-23.  
24 FAD, Namchom pipittapantasantan haengchat Chaosamphraya (Bangkok: Fine Art 
Department, 2001).   
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glory. In the speech given in the opening ceremony of the museum, King 
Bhumipol emphasized, 
 Ayutthaya was the capital city that prospered for 417 years, full of ruins, ancient 
artifacts, and art objects that deserve great attention. If we judge from the 
achievements of Ayutthaya in the past, the museum we have now is far too small 
to house and exhibit the artifacts and art objects discovered in this province.25
 On the wall of Chaosamphraya Museum are two messages written 
permanently to remind all visitors. A message delivered by Bhumipol at the 
museum’s opening ceremony reads,  
Ancient objects, objects of art, and all the ancient sites are all valuable and 
necessary in the historical, artistic, and archaeological research. They demonstrate 
the progress and prosperity that the Thai nation has possessed since the past; hence 
they deserve to be eternally preserved as national treasure. In particular for the 
ancient objects and the objects of art, these must be more museums to keep and 
exhibit for the students and people to see and learn from than we have at present.26  
Interestingly, half a century earlier, Chulalongkorn had made a similar call 
for the study of past evidence as proof of the Thai nation’s antiquity.27 It seems 
that time had not changed the vital role of archaeological objects in 
demonstarteing national glory.   
The museums exhibit of Ayutthayan wealth was part of such anenterprise, 
designed for the public to learn about their country’s past glory. Artifacts 
presented in the museum help provide hard evidence for the claim of being a great 
and civilized nation. The greatness is presented to create a sense of pride to unify 
people on Thai territory, the greatness that should encompass all Thai citizens.  
  
                                                 
25 Phiteepert pipittapantasatan, p. 25.   
26 My translation of the text, which also appears in Phiteepert pipittapantasatan, p. 24. 
27 Chulalongkorn, “Antiquarian Society”. 
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Bangkok National Museum  
Together with the formation of the Chaosamphraya National Museum in 
Ayutthaya, the newly discovered information pertaining to the Ayutthayan past 
has led to significant changes in the exhibition in the Bangkok National Museum. 
As the museum that houses the most important collection of artifacts found 
throughout the kingdom, the Bangkok National Museum is a showcase of the 
glorious Thai past. In 1967, the King and Queen arrived at the museum to open 
the two newly constructed buildings that added huge exhibit space to the existing 
structure of the Front Palace.28 However, the most remarkable change was the 
mode of exhibition. From the taxonomic mode whereby all stone objects were 
grouped together, the exhibits were now rearranged according to the artistic 
schools to which those objects belonged. Thus the visitor could now learn about 
the development of Thai civilization through the magnificent artifacts that 
depicted the successive periods of the past.29 The Siwaimokkaphiman Hall, 
located at the front part of the museum and hence the first hall to be seen by most 
visitors, now housed a collection on the prehistoric objects, particularly the 
artifacts from Ban Chiang excavated two years earlier.30  
Exhibition in the two newly built halls then started with the Asian artifacts, 
mostly, are from Buddhism, followed by several galleries arranged according to 
their antiquity from the Dvaravati, Java-Srivijaya, Lopburi, Chiang Saen, 
                                                 
28 Phitee pert pipittapantasathan haengchat, pp. 100-102. 
29 The speech during the opening ceremony of the Bangkok National Museum explains this change 
by saying that “Bangkok museum housed more than 20,000 of valuable objects… Previously they 
were kept and exhibited in groups according to material. For example, all the stone objects from 
different period were put together. But according to the modern principle of museum exhibitions, 
we must focusing on the convenience for [people to] study through the different period”, see 
Phitee pert pipittapantasathan haengchat, p. 103.   
30 Peleggi, The Politics of Ruins, p. 47 
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Sukhothai, U-Thong, Ayutthaya and Bangkok periods.31 A visit to the museum 
will be a journey through the linear narrative of Thai art history which reminds 
one about the prehistoric antiquity of the nation, the heritage from the great 
traditions of Asia, and the successive periods over which one’s ancestors had 
created a series of impressive arts. As Chiang Saen represented the Northern style 
and Srivijaya represented the Southern school of art, no matter which corner of 
Thailand they came from, they could then find a representation of their local style 
in the meta-narrative of the common past. Thai art history could be represented in 
one single story by the artifacts from different parts of the country with intention 
to present the common story of all Thais.                           
 The collection in Bangkok National Museum was rearranged again in 1982 
for the Bangkok bicentennial celebration. The prehistoric artifact exhibit in the 
Siwamokkaphiman Hall was reduced to make way for an exhibit of Thai history 
which employed the linear narrative from the origins of Thai people to Sukhothai, 
Ayutthaya, and Bangkok.32 It was in this “Gallery of Thai History” that the 
common past projected by the state became the commanding theme of exhibition. 
Beyond the emphasis on the narrative, additional objects were included to 
create an even more complete story of the Thai nation. To add the common 
people’s role in the national past, the full-scale diorama of the Bangrachan 
villagers defending their camp from the invading Burmese was constructed as the 
only large-scale diorama in the museum, which reflected its status as the scene of 
                                                 
31 Phitee pert pipittapantasatan, pp. 86-88. This exhibition according to style was an innovation of 
Suphataradis Diskul, the influential art historian who developed this meta-narrative in the Thai art 
history after the initiation of George Coedes. He was also a consultant for this exhibition. On Thai 
art history see Maurizio Peleggi, “Royal Antiquarianism, European Orientalism and the Production 
of Archaeological Knowledge in Modern Siam”, in Asia in Europe: Europe in Asia, ed. Srilata 
Ravi et. al. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004). 
32 FAD, Namchomhongsadaeng prawatsat chatthai phipittapantasatan haengchat phranakorn 
(Bangkok: Amarin Printing, 2002), p. 7.  
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first importance. Built in 1982 during the renovation, it helped complete the vital 
message in the narrative of Thai national history. As the most important scene that 
allowing ordinary people to appear in the national past, it is too significant to be 
omitted out, therefore its reproduction-the diorama-must be built to complete the 
climax of the narrative.    
Other galleries basically housed a collection of artifacts varying from the 
tiny prehistoric potsherds to enormous royal chariots. Except for the short general 
introduction to the collection in each room, only limited explanations were 
limitedly provided, so visitors would need to rely on their prerequisite knowledge. 
As a result, the “Gallery of Thai history” functioned as an introduction by 
showing the whole story of the Thai past. The fact that this gallery was located at 
the front part of the museum and was likely to be the first stop for the visitor, 
helped stress its function as a plot or conceptual guideline for the rest of the 
museum.33  
    
IV. New Techniques/ New Narratives  
World Heritage and its Cosmopolitan Image  
As we saw in the case of textbooks, once the situation changes beyond the 
explanatory logic of the old narrative, a new narrative is needed to provide a 
suitable past for the current context. Museums, the three-dimensional form of sign 
and text produced by state agencies to create a suitable identity for citizens, also 
go through such transformations. Extensive renovations or the construction of new 
museums are the ways to replace the obsolete message with a more desirable one. 
                                                 
33 See the map in the pamphlet introducing the Bangkok National Museum or FAD, 
Namchomhongsadaeng prawatsat chatthai, p. 2.   
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After the end of the military regime, Thailand underwent tremendous 
political and economical change. Academic research also started to look at new 
research materials and construct new historical explanations. It was not only 
school curricula that experienced great change in the 1990s; the “hidden 
curriculum” in museum exhibitions, also changed. It was in these years that a new 
museum on Ayutthaya with a different outlook and message opened to the public, 
who were now seeking a new image of the past to assure their changing identity.      
Occupying the imposing building along the main boulevard of the town of 
Ayutthaya almost opposite to the typically nationalistic and temple-like building 
of the Chaosamphraya Museum, the Ayutthaya Historical Study Center [AHSC] 
could hint at a challenge that perhaps unintentional by a new Ayutthayan image 
toward the old one. The original plan, drafted in cooperation with Japanese 
scholars, was to construct a museum about the former Japanese community in 
Ayutthaya at the old Japanese settlement. With a 170 million baht grant from the 
Japanese government, the plan was expanded to become the center for Ayutthayan 
historical study. Its completion marked the celebration of the King’s 60-year 
birthday together with the centenary of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.34            
The project was completed and opened to the public in mid 1990. The 
smaller building located in the Japanese settlement is a gallery with exhibits on 
“Ayutthaya relations with foreign countries” while the much larger building 
includea a main office, library, storage room, seminar room, and the hall for 
permanent and temporary exhibitions. All these resources are intended to be used 
by research scholars to deepen the understanding of Ayutthaya’s past.           
                                                 
34 “Khwampenma khong soonsuksa prawatsat Ayutthaya” ,pamphlet for the AHSC (undated).  
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 Though the Chaosamphraya Museum had already been devoted to the 
Ayutthayan past, the ASHC marked a great shift in both method and message. Its 
use of dioramas and models in the exhibition is claimed to be unique in Thailand. 
As stated in the pamphlet, “This museum does not focus on the compilation and 
display of valuable artifacts such as Buddha images, pottery or jewelry leaving 
visitors with their own imagination based on those valuable objects without any 
obvious connection.”35 The exhibits at AHSC are arranged in the “thematic mode” 
instead of the “taxonometric mode” seen in Chaosamphraya.36 Exhibited objects 
are no longer classified according to their material, but grouped under common 
themes. This simple but important change in the mode of classification creates a 
different effect on the visitor, who now learns about the relations of each object 
beyond its common original material. The purpose of including on electronic 
maps, models and other forms of multimedia is to tell a story with the emphasis on 
connections between various objects, as objects alone could never tell a connected 
story. The only way that a narrative can be conveyed to the visitor is through text, 
which comes in a more extensive form than simple labels.  
The exhibition at AHSC employs those mechanisms to a new degree by 
adding models, dioramas, and other interactive equipment as exhibits. The new 
issues that objects alone could not represent can be narrated through such media, 
allowing the new story to be composed with minimal use of artifacts. Only 
reproductions, such as a model of a Siamese junk, or a copy of the diary of Dutch 
trader, are now needed. The diorama of the scene from Ayutthaya’s Southern 
fortress allows audiences to experience how trade was conducted in the past when 
camera was not yet invented. Even the long-distance trade routes from Ayutthaya 
                                                 
35 Ibid.  
36 Margaret Hall, On Display: A Design Grammar for Museum Exhibitions (London: Lund 
Humphries, 1987), p. 25. 
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to Korea, Iran, or Denmark could be displayed as an electronic map.37 As a result 
of the new medias, the AHSC could now exhibited broader stories in a much 
clearer form. 
The permanent exhibition covers five themes, “Ayutthaya as a capital 
city”, “Ayutthaya as port city”, “Ayutthaya relations with foreign countries”, 
“Ayutthaya as a political and governmental center”, and “The Life of the villager 
in the past”. Under these main themes, the new image of Ayutthaya as a trading 
kingdom where international communities engaged in peaceful interaction is 
evident. The scenes of Thai village life, presenting the lifestyle of the majority of 
Ayutthaya’s inhabitants, add the story of a national past outside the court. The 
story of royal ceremonies does appear, but there is no imposing exhibit of any 
great war; it is the theme of commercial relations, not war, that dominates the 
exhibit.  
The grant from the Japanese government that made the construction of this 
museum possible helps explain the image of Ayutthaya that AHSC intends to 
present and the function that it is expected to fulfill. As a major trading partner, 
the Japanese expect to cultivate a special relationship with Thailand by presenting 
their deep historical ties. By emphasizing the long, peaceful relationship with each 
other, the people of both countries should feel that their current close relationship 
in economic terms is just a continuity of similar interaction since ancient times. 
No Japanese economic or cultural influence needs to be seen as a threat.               
With this intention in mind, several exhibits were built to strengthen such 
claims. Despite the difficulty or cost, the decision to depict such scenes as a 
trading ship seen from the fortress is meant to present hard evidence in 
                                                 
37 Chatthip Nartsupha (ed). Soonsuksa prawatsat Ayutthaya [AHSC], for the fortress scene (p.49) 
and the map of Ayutthaya trading relations (p. 38). 
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authenticating the claim of long, peaceful relations.38 To present the long 
continued identity of the Thai, not as a xenophobic and inward-looking people but 
as outward looking people ready to engage with foreigners in this cosmopolitan 
polity, the identity represented by the Ayutthayan past was reified. Ayutthayans 
are no longer just farmers but also traders familiar with conducting business with 
people from afar.  
With this information emphasized in the displays, we see the way that the 
new museum was built to accommodate the changing image of Ayutthaya.39 
AHSC has become a source of authenticity for the new historical narrative, 
demonstrating supporting evidence for the new narrative and intending to produce 
new literature that suits the new plot.40 Unfortunately, few monographs were 
produced and its library is now closed, leaving only its exhibits which attract 
ordinary visitors and history teachers who prefer to take their students to the 
AHSC rather than Chaosamphraya National Museum.41 
 
A Tribute to Cultural Tourism 
In the year 2000, as the “Amazing Thailand” tourism campaign helped 
draw foreign currency into the kingdom after the economic crash, the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand (TAT) expected to be a great engine of economic growth, 
launched a new gallery with an exhibition on Ayutthayan history. This exhibition 
is a part of the new information center housed in the old Fascist-designed town 
hall, adorned with the busts of the five greatest Ayutthayan kings-Uthong, Trilok, 
                                                 
38 Chatthip, Soonsuksa prawatsat. pp. 48-49. 
39 On division between “Object display” and “Information display” see, David Dean, Museum 
Exhibition: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 3-5 
40 Dhiravat na Pombejra, Court, Couriers and Campong (AHSC Occasional Paper No.1, 1992). 
41 Komkrit Siriwong, Triam-Udomsuksa School, Bangkok (Interviewed 17 December 2003) and 
Prasart Khaewyotha, Ayutthaya Wittayalai, Ayutthaya (Interviewed 11 December 2003).    
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Naresuan, Narai, and Taksin-plus Queen Suriyothai, a legacy of the nationalist 
narrative. Ironically, its militaristic façade offers a different image of Ayutthaya 
from what TAT intended to present.  
           The exhibition title “Phranakhon Si Ayutthaya chak Mahaanachak heng 
Usa ahkane suu moradok lok” [Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya: From a great empire 
in Southeast Asia to a world heritage]42 is particularly interesting since the 
greatness of the kingdom is projected with the use of the word “great empire” 
instead of the typical “kingdom”. The dominant status of Ayutthaya appeared here 
first with reference to the rest of Southeast Asia and ultimately the World Heritage 
List. 
 This compact exhibit is comprised mostly of pictures, including a huge 
aerial photograph of the Ayutthaya islet, an engraving of international trading 
vessels, a reproduction of the mural painting, and numerous colorful photos 
introducing each historical tourist attraction. There is also a compact temple 
model with a multimedia presentation of life in a traditional Thai house and a 
religious festival.  
A mini-theatre built in a shape of boat shows a 15-minute documentary 
video, which is actually about the experience of three groups of travelers: the 
Thai, Japanese, and European. The Thai come to pray at the ancient temples and 
make merit together with their elderly family members. The Japanese come to 
learn about the glory of this international port where their fellow countrymen took 
refuge from religious persecution. The European traveler came here to appreciate 
Thai generosity and for self-discovery. The narrative makes clear the international 
status of the trading port as well as its glory of the art and culture. Not much 
                                                 
42 Original English translation. 
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historical detail is given; the emphasis instead is on hospitality of Thai culture, the 
magnificence of ancient art, and more choices of places to visit during one’s stay 
in Ayutthaya.43 In this exhibit the image of Ayutthaya is presented by maximizing 
its status as a World Heritage site to suit the tourism business of both Thais and 
foreigners.      
   
V. Tensions in Exhibiting Suitable Stories 
 Judging from various texts and conferences over the last decade, the 
commodification of Ayutthaya’s new image as an international entrepot has 
proved to be a very successful industry. As a recently invented image suitable for 
Thailand’s identity in an ever-globalizing international community, it has been 
reproduced in numerous forms. Guidebooks and articles in tourism magazines 
published during the last few years to feed the expanding cultural tourism market 
reflect this phenomenon, while the conferences help generate interest in this newly 
discovered aspect of Ayutthaya’s past among home grown and oversea scholars 
alike.44  The old nationalist narrative still remains, however, and in many 
occasions, it is promoted by means of monuments and museums to serve its 
lingering function.  
The re-opening of the permanent exhibition in the “Gallery of Thai 
History” in the Bangkok National Museum on December 2002, after two years of 
renovation that cost more than 23 million baht, proves that on some occasions the 
Thai state is still keen on promoting the story of the monarchy and military 
                                                 
43 TAT gallery, Ayutthaya.  
44 For example, an international seminar on “Ayutthaya and Asia” was held on November 23, 
1999.at SAC, see also Kennon Breazle, ed. From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime 
Relations with Ayutthaya (Bangkok: Toyota Foundation & FSHP, 1999). 
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glory.45 Compared with the 1982 exhibits, many changes have been made in the 
introductory hall. By contrast with AHSC and TAT gallery, the governing theme 
of the exhibits has hardly gone through any alteration. It is still based on a 
chronology of conventional periodization that runs from the beginning of the Thai 
race, with cultural groups existing on present-day Thai territory before the 
thirteenth century, then tracing the development of the successive kingdoms of the 
Thai people-Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Thonburi, and Bangkok. Here, the nationalist 
narrative endures and is presented in a very powerful form. Several exhibition 
techniques such as large pictures, dioramas, electronic maps and multimedia have 
been abundantly employed. 
A walk through the exhibition reveals messages representing the “history 
of the Thai nation”. After a long corridor depicting the story of Sukhothai 
kingdom as a great era of Thai art and culture where ceramic wares, ancient 
bronze cannons, and of course, a replica of the Ramkhamhaeng inscription are on 
display, visitors will reach a room marked with the sign “Ayutthaya period”. The 
first diorama in this room is “the foundation of the capital” by Uthong. Next is a 
large birds eye-view model of Ayutthaya in its glory days; the most notable 
features of this model are the grand temples and the palaces painted in gold, which 
dotted the flat topography of the sprawling metropolis. On the other side are the 
explanatory notes on “the Portuguese settlement in Ayutthaya”, “the flourishing of 
Ayutthaya until the reign of King Ramathibodi II”, and “models of the ancient 
antiquities found in Chedi Wat Phrasrisanphet” depicting the 500 lives of 
Buddha.46 After that the visitor will encounter the topics of “Upholding religion” 
                                                 
45 “Pipittapantasatan haengchat phranakorn perthai kaochom hongchatsadaeng nithatsakantavon 
“prawatsatchatthai’ langchak pitprapproong mapen wela 2 pee”: News release  (Education 
Division, National Museum Bangkok, 2002).  
46 The title of each topic mentioned here follows the English version given at the exhibit. 
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(presenting a harmonious society) and “the magnificent gold treasures of 
Ayutthaya”, (reflecting the wealth of the kingdom). So far the overall message 
concerns Ayutthayan great prosperity.  
The narrative now turns to the trope of the kingdom in crisis, starting with 
a large painting of “the death of Queen Suriyothai” and followed by “the fall of 
the city” with the Burmese invasion.47 A series of impressive dioramas following 
the first fall of Ayutthaya concentrate on the role of Naresuan, beginning with a 
large reproduction of a mural painting depicting King Naresuan’s “restoration of 
Independence” with the diorama entitled “Independence proclamation of King 
Naresuan”, focusing on what was an extremely important episode of Ayutthayan 
history in the Sarit period curriculum. Following are dioramas of “King Naresuan 
firing across the Sittang River” and “Brave feats of King Naresuan” depicting 
well-known episodes of the warrior monarch climbing a ladder with his sword to 
attack the Burmese military camp. Importantly, these two dioramas are the only 
ones in Ayutthaya section equipped with sound effects further reinforcing the 
impression of his war bravery. The heroic story of King Naresuan has not ended 
here: dioramas on “King Naresuan as fight [sic] with Lak Wai Thammu” and, the 
most memorable moment of his long reign, “King Naresuan the Great engaging in 
a dual on elephant back” with the Burmese viceroy, demonstrate this great skill in 
fighting and make visible the Thai history’s turning.48  
These five dioramas on Naresuan’s achievements are examples of an 
elaboration on a selected issue. Obviously, Naresuan is a centerpiece of this 
exhibit. Though very few artifacts related to his story have actually survived to 
                                                 
47 FAD, Namchom hongsadaeng prawatsat chatthai. p. 90 
48 The picture of the dioramas depicting the “Independence Proclamation of King Naresuan” and 
“King Naresuan the Great Engaging in a Dual on Elephant Back” appears in FAD, Namchom 
hongsadaeng, pp. 94-96.  
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our age, his heroic acts can still be presented in the museum in incredible detail. 
This would not be possible without the new exhibiting technology. Through the 
use of exhibition boards, recorders, and dioramas, five of nine such models related 
to his story and dominate the Ayutthayan history, similar to the narrative in school 
textbooks under military rule. 
Next to the heroic epic of Naresuan is the diorama depicting the famous 
scene of the “French envoys granting [sic] at Sanphet Prasat”. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the diplomatic relations between Ayutthaya and the court of 
Versailles help project the international status of the old Thai kingdom as on being 
par with other world powers. The diorama of the seventeenth-century ruler Narai 
and over the group of French diplomats is set in the splendor of the grandest 
palace any Ayutthayan king ever built, under the title “glory of foreign relations”, 
thus also supporting the claim of being a civilized country. The international ritual 
of exchanging treaties and building a diplomatic relations with people of different 
faiths helps project the civilized manners in international society and the religious 
toleration of the Thai court since ancient times. 
The issues that formed the exhibit covering the end of the Ayutthayan era 
includes a board on “the destruction signs” explaining the many causes of the 
downfall, a list of Ayutthayan kings to remind the visitor of the long continuity of 
the kingdom that lasted for 417 years, the story of “the Bangrachan villagers” and 
finally, Phraya Wachiraprakan cutting his way out with his men and forming his 
own “Phraya Tak troop” at Chantaburi, which gives hope and a sense of the 
continuity of Thai history with the next era. The use of brick surface imitating 
ruins in this section emphasizes a sense of nostalgia for the long-gone golden 
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past.49 The story of Bangrachan is selected to represent the downfall of the great 
kingdom. As the only diorama in this section, it evokes the patriotism of those 
who defend their kingdom from the invading enemy, a perfect choice to end this 
golden age. It allows the ordinary Thai to have a place in the national narrative; 
modern-day citizens are expected to learn that even though the villagers lacked of 
adequate weapons, they could still make a significant contribution to the national 
survival.50        
In a bigger picture we can see that the history of Ayutthaya has been 
reduced into two sequences of the rise and fall. The arrangement of exhibitions in 
the Gallery of the Thai nation suggests such a plot, with the room designed to 
frame the story’s sequence encountered by visitors. Uthong and Naresuan, the 
founders of the two sequences, are the key figures that laid the foundations of the 
empire. Then in each case the kingdom enjoyed an age of prosperity in cultural 
and economical terms under the peaceful reigns represented by Ramathibodi II 
and Narai.  Following are the end sections that explain its two collapses in term of 
disunity and a lack of warrior kings. The story of the fall represented by the 
sacrifice of Suriyothai and the Bangrachan villagers not only mark the end of both 
periods but also allow different players, women and commoners, to have a role in 
the national grand narrative.   
How can we explain the recent exhibit at the gallery of Thai history that 
seem to turn back to embrace the “hidden curriculum” of the military regime? 
Like any social institution, a museum should prove itself useful to the ruling 
regime. Despite changes in the last few decades that led to the promotion of the 
cosmopolitan plot as in the case of AHSC and the TAT gallery, the role of the 
                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 77.  
50 Ibid., p. 112. 
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monarchy as a core of Thai historical narrative still remains intact. Thai history 
according to the textbooks and general understanding of the Thai is a series of 
kingdoms rising and falling. Though the nation is now secure, some degree of 
common memory is still needed to create citizens with a common identity. Thai 
history is still needed to unify the country’s citizens and present the impression of 
a coherent development of the whole kingdom through the ages. It is this function 
that has allowed the nationalistic plot to endure despite the rising importance of 
the cosmopolitan plot. Both narratives can exist side by side as long as they still 
prove useful.   
 
Conclusion 
As a newly acquired infrastructure of representative power, museums have 
developed to become another important sphere where the Thai state could project 
what they perceive as a past which deserves to be taken seriously by its citizens. 
Under this institution, artifacts of Ayutthayan past have been preserves and 
presented as evidence to authenticate the image of the Ayutthayan past over 
successive period. Museums of the absolutist regime exhibited Ayutthayan 
artifacts to prove the antiquity and advancement of the Thai nation in the past. 
Later, the Chaosamphraya Museum was established under royal initiative and 
with great support from Sarit government to house major collections of 
Ayutthayan artifacts with particular attention to royal objects. The Bangkok 
National Museum exhibited the image of Ayutthaya as a powerful state regularly 
engaged in wars of survival and expansion. However, this trope of emphasis on 
the royal and military history of Ayutthaya gave way to the displays presenting 
Ayutthaya’s commercial relations with foreign countries. With new exhibition 
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techniques, the AHSC and TAT galleries can present this image of Ayutthaya, 
more suitable to Thailand in the 1990s. This transformation in the way the 
Ayutthayan past is presented in the museums has not been total. The need for 
introducing a common past for the new generation of Thai citizens still justifies 
the exhibit on Naresuan’s war victories as in the case of the recently renovated 
“gallery of Thai history”. Similar to other educational means such as textbooks, 
museums too have played an important role in disseminating desirable images of 
Ayutthaya’s past in each era as a past that should be taken as the identity by each 
Thai citizen.                             
 
Conclusion 
Beyond Conventional Wisdom 
 
 
It is conventional wisdom for many intellectuals, including many 
historians, to blame the version of Thai national history promoted in the 
educational system as a cause of misunderstanding between people across national 
boundaries. Regarding this conventional myth, Suchit has commented that, “the 
backward and jingoistic history from the Phibun period received government 
approval and was taught continuously to the students until a majority of the 
country accepted and believed it as a fact.”1 Here, one sees the general perception 
of the state’s version of history as “backward and jingoistic”, static and 
unchanged, and taken uncritically by most Thais as absolute fact. Furthermore, 
Saichon and Thongchai also describe this state version of Thai history as being 
Royal-Nationalistic or giving monarchy a towering position in the narrative. As 
this study of the transformation in the state’s version of Ayutthayan history during 
the three decades from the era of authoritarian military rule to the elected Chatchai 
government of the 1990s shows, some of the widely accepted myths of Thai 
national history demand greater scrutiny beyond these generalizations. 
First, regarding the issue of Thai history being “backward and jingoistic” 
and having a negative effect on the coexistence between people of different races 
and nationalities, Suchit has correctly noted that such characteristics prevailed in 
the Phibun years, but this is not the case for more recent versions. Clearly, the 
recent image of Ayutthaya does not deserve the term “backward” as many of its 
elements are actually derived from the latest findings of leading academics. We 
                                                 
1 Suchit, “Yoklerk ruanglewlai”, pp. 11-12.  
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have seen that work using Dutch and Japanese sources has been generally 
incorporated into the 1990s textbooks. The larger space allocated for the relations 
with Thailand’s neighboring countries-that used to be seen as threats-as an 
integral part of Ayutthayan kingdom should put the claim of “jingoism” into 
question. The museum exhibits on trade and diplomatic relations between 
Ayutthaya and its neighboring countries and the image of a cosmopolitan 
Ayutthayan society where the Thai, Malay, Chinese, Portuguese and other races 
lived side-by-side project a peaceful history.   
Secondly, the accusation that the state version of history has been static 
and unchanged from Phibun’s day until the present is also far from true. 
Throughout this study, by using curricula, textbooks, and museum exhibits from 
the two periods, I have presented the transformation in the image of Ayutthayan 
history disseminated to become the collective identity of each Thai citizen. Far 
from being static, the image of a militarized kingdom lead by warrior monarchs 
has gradually given way to the more diverse picture of a relatively peaceful and 
bureaucratically sophisticated Ayutthaya; the image of an agricultural kingdom 
has slowly morphed into that of a merchant empire; and while Western countries 
are still depicted as important players in Ayutthayan foreign relations, the Asian 
countries have clearly received more significant mention. Obviously, the 
Ayutthayan image promoted by the state’s educational apparatus has closely 
followed the shifting national interest, which has often made the old image 
redundant and allowed for the birth of a new one. Over the three decades duration 
in question, the narrative of Ayutthaya’s past was much more “dynamic” than 
“static.” Moreover, this dynamism has at least partly liberated the state version of 
Thai history from the old character that many scholars still vaguely claim exists. 
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The third point concerns the claim that the state version of history has been 
taken uncritically by the masses as fact. Although official control over what 
should be present in history classes and exhibits is still intact, the state monopoly 
over the production of historical knowledge has been broken. Although the state 
version of the Ayutthaya image disseminated through curricula, textbooks, and 
museum exhibits will definitely shape each Thai citizen’s perception of the past 
and influence the formation of their identity, these media are by no mean the only 
sources where information on Ayutthayan could be found. As the Ayutthayan past 
is so central to the notion of Thainess and identity, other social institutions have 
also contested to define the Ayutthayan past that would suit their own interests.              
The various guidebooks and popular histories published by private 
publishing houses that have proliferated among travelers in the last decade or two 
have often presented a progressive and critical view of the established state 
narrative to stimulate greater interest among the public for commercial profit. 
Suchit’s contribution is of course predominant here, as Sinlapa Wattanatham has 
successively introduced those debates to the masses in both magazine and book 
form. Ironically, many of these books have been used in composing school 
textbooks, which clearly allows critical views to seep into the state narrative.         
Moreover, some of recent historical dramas and films such as, 
Bangrachan, Suriyothai, and Kasattiya, have chosen to locate their stories in the 
Ayutthayan past. Some of them claim that the accuracy of their production is 
based on extensive research and the supervision of professional historians so that 
people will decide to come and see what they perceive as the “real history of 
Ayutthaya”. Due to the easy access to such media together with their entertaining 
and exciting presentation, they have definitely influenced the masses’ perception 
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of the Ayutthayan past and challenged the notions of that past that they learned 
during their time in the educational system. Will the Thai who visit the complex 
of ruins at Ayutthaya recall the defense by King Naresuan’s army? Will they 
lament the lost of vibrant cosmopolitan commercial society that once lined the 
city’s canals? Will they simply recognize the connection with the heroic Queen 
Suriyothai? As to which image of this national past most successfully dominates 
Thai perceptions and influences how they think of their identity, one can only 
guess.      
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